


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SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE PERSIAN WARS.

1.—THE CAMPAIGN OF MARATHON.

It may seem bold to re-open the question (or questions) of the campaign of Marathon so soon after the publication of the monumental chapters of Busolt, of Hauvette, of Macan.¹ But the labours of these scholars at once invite and facilitate farther discussion. They focus many scattered arguments, contribute new suggestions, put the humbler student abreast of recent researches, and show him where his own conclusions differ from accepted views. How much I owe to them will be obvious without particular references.

The theory here put forward, although independently reached, is not altogether new—perhaps no theory of Marathon could be—but I was not aware, until it was written, how closely certain of its main features had been anticipated by Busolt in a work published twenty years ago (*Die Lakedaemonier* pp. 355–369). That eminent historian has, however, since then twice changed his views, so that it may be useful to recall his readers to what I still consider to be his best solution of the problem. Perhaps the discussions of the interval have reinforced it in some respects. On one important point I find myself in agreement with Professor J. B. Bury's article on the Battle of Marathon in the *Classical Review*, March 1896, and even where we disagree, we must often have asked much the same questions.

What was the aim of the Persian expedition, the commission of Datis and Artaphrenes? Was it to punish the Athenians and Eretrians for their share in the burning of Sardis? Was it to restore Hippias to his tyranny as a Persian vassal? Was it a deliberate move in that 'forward' policy which had already carried the empire to the frontier of Thessaly and now threatened to swallow up the Greek peninsula? Support can be drawn from Herodotus, and elsewhere, for each and all of these views. They are not mutually exclusive, but probably the two former are too narrow, and the last too wide. Whatever was the scope and purpose of the mission of the heralds—a question which bristles with difficulties—we shall probably be safe in limiting the immediate object of this particular campaign to the subjugation of the free Ionians.² And here arises the inevitable suspicion that to Persian eyes, and

¹ Busolt, *Griechische Geschichte*, Bd. II.², 1895. Hauvette, *Hérodote*, 1894. Macan, *Herodotus*, Books IV., V., VI., 1895, especially

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Appendix X.

² Carystus, like Virgil's Mantua, was unfortunate in its neighbourhood.

possibly in veritable fact, although we cannot expect our authorities to admit or recognize it, the expedition was merely the completion of the 'pacification' of Ionia. Artaphrenes must have regarded Athens as a revolted subject, and he had reason.¹ Is it impossible that the Persian empire may once have formally extended across the Aegean and included Athens and Eretria? But apart from all dangerous speculations, we are probably justified on any hypothesis in assuming that the proximate aim of the expedition was the reduction of the Ionians of Europe. This was the pressing need, for the Persian government must have seen that the Ionians in Asia would never be pacified so long as their brethren across the water were independent. And this was surely a sufficient task for one campaign. Athens was the goal and the limit of the expedition.

Why, then, after the surrender of Carystus, did not Datis and Artaphrenes steer direct for the bay of Phalerum? Why, if they preferred to land at Marathon, did they sail straight past it to Eretria? Was it simply a methodic system of conquest that deflected them? Having once touched Euboea, did they feel bound to complete the subjugation of the island before moving any farther westwards, just as they had deviated from their course to secure Naxos and Paros on their flank? Had Eretrian (and Chalcidian?) exiles, perhaps Gongylus, something to say in the matter? Did the superstitions of Hippias, who had once before returned from Eretria, here shape the Persian strategy? Was there not yet another, more cogent, reason? Eretria was an easier prey than Athens, smaller, less capable of resistance, and (if we may trust Herodotus) already betrayed. The Persian leaders wished to bring to bear on waverers and recalcitrants in Athens the moral effect of the fate of Eretria.

Eretria taken, the next object of attack was Athens. The Persians, Herodotus tells us, after waiting a few days sailed for Attica, *κατέργοντες τε πολλὸν καὶ δοκέοντες ταῦτὰ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ποιήσειν τὰ καὶ τοὺς Ἐρετρίεας ἐποίησαν*. These words, whatever their exact meaning, are obviously added for rhetorical effect, to point the contrast between expectation and performance, perhaps also between Athens and Eretria. At best they can express no more than an inference from the general situation, and have no historical weight. The attempt to extract from them a plan of campaign seems to me illegitimate and futile. In their most natural interpretation they would mean that the Persians expected to burn Athens and enslave the population. To this interpretation I would adhere, although the guidance of Hippias is sufficient refutation of the statement.

Whatever the Persians expected, their objective was Athens. Why then do they take so extraordinary a course to get there? Why burden themselves with a toilsome march of some five and twenty miles through the enemy's country, when their fleet might have put them at once within striking distance of the city? Herodotus tells us that Marathon recommended itself to Hippias as being a place suited to the action of cavalry and

¹ Herodotus, v. 73.

quite near to Eretria. We need not press the superlatives, or make Herodotus responsible for the assertion that no place in Attica was better suited or nearer—enough that Marathon possessed both these advantages in a very high degree. But can they be said to have been advantages? What use do the Persians make of their cavalry? Was not the plain of Athens much better suited for its action? How can nearness to Eretria be an advantage, when it implies a corresponding remoteness from Athens? One advantage the Persian cavalry did enjoy at Marathon—pasturage. But if that were an inducement, they must have contemplated a prolonged stay, and Herodotus recognizes no such intention. His reasons seem to be mere inference, to account for the fact that they did land at Marathon, and possibly influenced by memories of Pisistratus' landing and the Pisistratid reliance on cavalry.

It is scarcely credible that the Persians were afraid of the Athenians, that they doubted their own power to force a landing on the shore of the Saronic gulf. There can have been no insuperable difficulty in effecting a disembarkation at some point on so extensive a coast from so numerous a fleet. The advantage of an unopposed landing may have counted for something, but it can not have been the sole reason for putting in at Marathon.

Modern historians have added two more reasons, to which too much importance has been allowed. These reasons have a certain plausibility, some real relevancy, but they do not in themselves amount to an adequate cause. In the first place it is urged that the Pisistratidae had strong local influence in the neighbourhood of Marathon. Was it so specially strong just there? Philaidæ, the home of the Pisistratid family, lay farther south, about half way between Marathon and Sunium. But Marathon was in the Diacria, the country of the Pisistratid faction? On the contrary it seems to have formed part of the Paralic *trittys* of the tribe Aeantis.¹ It remains true, however, that the Diacria was not accessible by sea, and Marathon was the most convenient port for it as a whole. The second reason assigned is the superstition or instinct of Hippias, which led him to follow the omen or precedent of his former return from Eretria *via* Marathon. But the circumstances were very different. To land at Marathon was the obvious and even necessary course for Pisistratus, but Hippias had neither the same need nor the same prospect of success by that route. Pisistratus had no overwhelming fleet and formidable army to back him; Hippias had both. Pisistratus was looked upon as a mere adventurer, and his landing was at first ignored; Hippias led an invading host which could not be concealed or disregarded.

¹ I assume the identity of the Diacria with ἡ μεσόγειος χώρα of the Aristotelian *Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία*. Their identity seems to be clearly implied, and to be historically necessary. It is not inconsistent with Hesychius' rough description: ἡ χώρα Διακρία, ἡ ἀπὸ Πάρνης ἕως Βραυρώνας. The Diacria would be a horse-shoe shaped district round the three land sides of

the central plain. The name was obviously given from the point of view of Athens; it signifies the country beyond the hills, *i.e.* the ridges of Parnes, Pentelicus, and Hymettus. The only precise and positive definition of the three divisions, the Plain, the Shore, and the Trans- or Ultra-montane, is given by the distribution of the *trittyes*.

Pisistratus quietly collected his adherents, matured his plans, and moved upon Athens. Surely Hippias was not so simple as to imagine that *that* history would repeat itself, that the Athenians had forgotten that lesson!

Is it not much more likely that he calculated on their remembering it, and made a feint of following in his father's steps with the deliberate purpose of misleading them? Probably Miltiades' decree, to go forth and meet the invader, was already carried, and known to Hippias. Certainly, with the example of Eretria before their eyes, with the consciousness of treachery in their midst, the Athenian patriots were not likely to elect to stand a siege. At all events Hippias made no movement towards Athens. The Persians must have reached Marathon at least twelve hours, more probably eighteen or twenty-four, before the Athenians. The polemarch and his staff could not have guessed where the landing would take place. The news that the enemy's fleet had put into Marathon had to reach them, they had to assemble their army, and march out. If the Persians landed at day-break, the Athenians would deserve great credit if they arrived at sunset. The Persian generals had quite time enough to send an advanced guard to occupy the passes. They apparently waited patiently for the Athenians to come up. There is not a hint that they intended to march on Athens. Why should they, when they might have sailed? Once more, why should they have landed at Marathon at all? Why, but to bring the Athenians there? As Mr. Bury puts it, 'the purpose clearly was to lure the Athenian forces to Marathon.'

But why lure the Athenian forces to Marathon? Was it in order to fight them there? Was it the object of the Persian generals to bring about a battle in the open, on ground favourable to themselves, and so finish the campaign at a blow, and 'avoid a wearisome siege'?¹ Athens, denuded of the best and loyalest part of her defenders, was not likely to offer any serious resistance. She would capitulate and receive back Hippias. Did the Persians in fact choose the plain of Marathon for their battle-field, and practically challenge the Athenians to fight them there? Was it, in Mr. Macan's words, 'to have been a case of the spider and the fly'?

No doubt a pitched battle was one way, perhaps the quickest way, of finishing the campaign. Yet I cannot persuade myself that this interpretation of the Persian strategy is very plausible. In the first place, it does not give any point to the choice of Marathon of all places. Marathon was rather a remote corner of Attica to select, and was not by any means an *ideal* site for the Persian tactics. If Hippias and his friends were convinced that the Athenians would accept their challenge, they might have found much better battle-fields much nearer to Athens. But, secondly, is it credible that the Persians expected the Athenian commander, or commanders, to risk a pitched battle against their own greatly superior forces on their own ground? Herodotus may be drawing on imagination (his own or

¹ 'Of the Acropolis,' adds Mr. Bury. But I am not yet convinced that Athens was without walls.

another's) when he depicts their confidence on leaving Eretria, and their astonishment at the temerity of the Athenian charge. But surely his inference, although dramatic in motive, is justified by all probability. We have no trustworthy record of the Persian land force, but on a very low computation it must have outnumbered the Athenian by something like two to one,¹ and the cavalry only increased the disparity. A pitched battle on open ground must have appeared to the Persians highly improbable. Thirdly, was it even the most desirable solution? We need not suppose that even Datis and Artaphrenes positively lusted for a big slaughter, which must fall on both sides, and Hippias, in the interests of his future despotism, had every motive to adhere to the traditional clemency of his family's policy. If Hippias could be reinstated without the pitched battle, we may reasonably assume that this was the preferable alternative. Lastly, the Persian leaders must very soon have discovered that the Athenians did not intend to accept their challenge. If their sole object in landing at Marathon had been to fight there, we should have expected them, when the enemy declined the trial, either to take the offensive against his position (which, although a strong one, was open to attack from two sides at once), or else to sail away and renew the attempt on some other field. Instead of adopting either of these courses, they wait on at Marathon, day after day, apparently in complete tranquillity!²

If Hippias' purpose in luring the Athenians to Marathon was not to fight them there, what else can it have been? Obviously it must have been to get them well away from Athens. This answer, by the way, does full justice to the remoteness of Marathon. But why get them away from Athens? Presumably that he might gain possession of the city in their absence. How was this object to be effected?

In the first place the Athenian army had to be detained at Marathon. Plainly it could not withdraw unmolested so long as the Persians were there in sufficient force. So long as the whole Persian army remained at Marathon the Athenians were not likely either to attack or to attempt to make off. They had no obvious motive to do either, and both would involve grave risk to their army and to the state. But if the Persians moved off towards Athens, whether by land or by sea, they at once gave the Athenians both a motive and an opportunity for attacking their rearguard, and also set them

¹ The Athenians, with the Plataeans, and probably a few thousand light-armed *thetes* or 'δούλοι,' may have numbered about 15,000. Herodotus gives the Persians 600 ships besides the horse-transports. Busolt allows 50,000 as a probable estimate for their army. Perhaps we may reckon the Persian loss at Marathon (6,400) at about one-third of the troops engaged, for the wings were not pursued, whereas the centre must have been almost annihilated. This calculation would put the combatants at about 20,000. If half the army was engaged

(see below), the whole force would be about 40,000. Even 30,000 might be enough for our theory. Attempts to reduce the number of the Persians are generally based on the assumption that their whole army fought at Marathon.

² From the movements of Philippiades and the Spartans it appears that the Athenians must have faced the Persians at Marathon for at least seven days. They would reach Marathon on the 8th of the (lunar) month at the latest, and the battle was fought on the 16th at the earliest.

free to return to defend or save their city. If they went by sea, the embarkation of their last divisions was difficult, and the Athenians would reach Athens by road before they could arrive there round Cape Sunium. If they went by land (*i.e.* by the coast road, which alone was open to them), they had to be prepared for an attack in rear or flank from the Athenian position in the valley of Avlona, and the Athenians would reach Athens either on their heels by the same road, or simultaneously by the hill road.

But here the Persian superiority of force comes into account. Half or two-thirds of the army might stay at Marathon to guard the Athenians there, the other half or third might be sent to Athens, and alone be sufficient to deal with the garrison. The Athenians on the other hand could not afford to divide their army. They needed their whole force to meet either half of the enemy.

We may reasonably conclude that this was the plan which the Persian leaders had projected. One of the two generals was to stay at Marathon, the other, doubtless with Hippias, was to lead his division to Athens.¹ The Athenians might attack the division left behind, or might attempt to escape by the upper road. But no doubt the force which was to be left was held sufficient to give a good account of them if they ventured out of their fastness whether to advance or retreat. In the latter case it would only be necessary to delay their march by harassing attacks until the other division was in position. But both Hippias and Miltiades must have known perfectly well that if the Athenians went back otherwise than victorious the fate of their city was sealed.

Clearly the crisis of the campaign was bound to come when the two Persian divisions parted company. The Athenians must act then, and act quickly. But the initiative lay with the Persians. It was their action which determined that of the Athenians. But what determined *theirs*? in other words, why was the crisis delayed? The answer to this question brings us in view of certain considerations, which we have so far left out of sight, but which really governed the whole scheme of the campaign.

There is abundant evidence that Athens was undermined by intrigue and conspiracy, and that Hippias had a secret understanding with a powerful party in the city. He could reckon not only on his own family connections and some old adherents, but also on the Alcmaeonidae, into whose party most of his former political followers had been absorbed by the seductive concessions of Cleisthenes. The Alcmaeonidae had driven out Hippias, just as they had driven out his father before him. But just as they had once also restored Pisistratus, so they might likewise bring back Hippias. Herodotus' apology

¹ Probably Datis was to stay and Artaphrenes to go. In the first place Artaphrenes was the higher in rank, and would naturally undertake the more responsible and glorious task of receiving the submission of Athens. Secondly Pausanias seems to imply that Artaphrenes was in command of the cavalry (see below). Thirdly

the prominence of Datis in the tradition indicates that it was he, and not Artaphrenes, who was vanquished at Marathon. The Parian Chronicle names only Artaphrenes, but probably as supreme commander-in-chief of the expedition.

for them is very damning. Qui s' excuse, s' accuse. Nobody else seems ever to have been blamed for the raising of the shield. Nobody's views are better represented in Herodotus. Can we doubt that he gives us their own defence? It reappears in the mouth of Alcibiades at Sparta (Thuc. vi. 89). What is the value of that plea of 'not guilty'? It conveniently ignores the Alcmaeonid relations with the tyrants Cleisthenes of Sicyon and Pisistratus, and with the barbarians, the kings of Lydia and of Persia. Who was responsible for the alliance with Persia, the earth and water given to Artaphrenes at Sardis? When was that submission repudiated? Who recalled the twenty ships from Ionia, and punished the plain speaking of Phrynichus? It can hardly be denied that the Alcmaeonidae in their struggles with the Eupatrids of the Plain leaned to Persia, while their rivals relied on Sparta, and perhaps formally enrolled Athens in the Spartan alliance. When Cleomenes expelled the Pisistratidae, he doubtless imagined that he was setting up an oligarchy, but he soon discovered his mistake, and turned from Cleisthenes to Isagoras. As then Cleisthenes opposed a Persian alliance to Isagoras and Cleomenes, so now on the eve of Marathon we find the Alcmaeonidae and Persia leagued against Miltiades and the Spartans. It was not without reason that Aristophanes and those who felt with him looked back on the battle of Marathon as a victory, not only of Athens over the Mede, but also of aristocracy over democracy. It is strange that the Medism of the Alcmaeonidae has ever been doubted. It is confirmed by the dark words of Pindar, by the ostracism of Megacles son of Hippocrates; and can we be sure that their connection Xanthippus and their ally Aristides were utterly *ἀπὸθεν τῆς τυραννίδος*? At all events Themistocles, looking before and after, recalls them on most favourable terms *διὰ τὴν ἑέρξου στρατείαν*, Aristides from *Aegina*, Xanthippus from—where? Was it somewhere *outside* Geraestus and Scyllaeum?

There was a good opportunity for Hippias. Miltiades had come back to Athens, and been recognized as the champion of the aristocratic and anti-Persian party. There had been a trial of strength. 'His enemies' had accused him for 'his tyranny in the Chersonese.' He had won, they had lost; he was in power, they were not. He had the support of Sparta. What could they expect but expulsion, and the undoing of the political work of Cleisthenes? Was it not better to come to terms with Hippias and make a formal submission to the Great King? We must not judge their conduct by the later Greek standard. Neither tyranny nor Medism meant as yet all that they meant to Herodotus. The age of the tyrants was scarcely over. The memories of the 'principate' of Pisistratus were not odious to the *δῆμος*, for whom he had been the executor of Solon's reforms. Greek cities lived and thrived under the easy yoke of the King. The Ionic revolt was the work of the aristocracies of merchant princes, not of the populace. The feeling against Medism and Barbarism was largely the creation of the wars that were yet to be fought, and the literature that was yet to be written.

These considerations may help to explain much in the history of the campaign. The understanding between the Alcmaeonidae and the Persians

is expressly attested, all the better because Herodotus is reluctant to admit it. Given its full weight, it clears up the strategy on both sides. Let Miltiades be got out of the way, and his rivals would bring about a revolution. Let them have time and opportunity to work their plans, and they would admit Hippias to the city, without bloodshed, as soon as he presented himself. When all was prepared the signal would flash forth to the Persian tents. On the other part we may recognise the prudence of Miltiades. Conscious of the treachery within the walls, with the example of Eretria before his eyes, could he venture to stand a siege? Could he hesitate to march to meet the invader, to press for a battle? *Ἦν μὲν νυν μὴ συμβάλωμεν ἔλπομαί τινα στάσιν μεγάλην διασείσειν ἐμπεσοῦσαν τὰ Ἀθηναίων φρονήματα ὥστε μηδίσαι· ἦν δὲ συμβάλωμεν πρὶν τι καὶ σαθρὸν Ἀθηναίων μετεξετέροισι ἐγγενέσθαι, θεῶν τὰ ἴσα νεμόντων οἰοί τε εἰμὲν περιγενέσθαι τῇ συμβολῇ.* But in attacking a superior force 'the half is better than the whole.' Miltiades doubtless knew what was going on, and foresaw what would happen. The traitors would not declare themselves before the Persians appeared. The opportunity for attack was bound to come when the enemy's forces separated, but the day and the hour would be determined, not *by*, but *for* the Athenians. The battle must be fought, and they must be ready for it. Meanwhile they had time to consider their plan of attack, and every day that passed was a gain, for it brought nearer the full moon that would set the Spartans free. So the waiting game suited both sides best. The Athenian general awaited the separation of the Persian forces, the Persians awaited the signal.

Two criticisms will have occurred to every reader. In the first place, Herodotus says not a word of a division of the Persian forces, but simply lets the day of Miltiades' *prytany* bring on the battle. The delay is thus explained, and the occasion of the engagement determined, merely by the rotation of precedence among the generals. This account is open to grave objections, and has been set aside by almost all recent historians. Can we believe that Miltiades, after so earnestly insisting on the necessity of fighting, postponed the battle on no other grounds than a point of etiquette? Can we believe that the dawn of a certain day was in itself a sufficient reason for so momentous and responsible an action? Was there no strategical motive to determine the sudden change from defence to offence? Can we, lastly, believe that Herodotus has rightly represented the official position of Miltiades? Is there not serious anachronism in his conception of the relation between the generals and the Polemarch? and may not the rotation of the presidency be at least erroneously interpreted? There seems in fact to be some lack of lucidity, if not positive mystification, in Herodotus' account. The suspicion naturally arises that some essential features of the story have been suppressed, and then afterthought, perhaps only half-conscious, has striven to cover the gap by spreading out other facts, by substituting conjectural motives, by reconstructing, and by readjusting the historical data to the impression produced by the mutilation. Mr. Macan has vindicated the claims of the neglected Callimachus. We would not dispute the pre-

ponderant importance of Miltiades, but surely there is an evident wish to find for him some constitutional position to legitimize his real authority. The suggestion lies near at hand that the *prytany* of Miltiades has proved equally useful to cover the omission of the true reason for the attack, the division of the Persian forces. Herodotus obviously has no clear idea of the strategy at all. Our hypothesis has been framed to explain the difficulties in his narrative, and interpret better what he does tell us. Granting our general conception of the campaign, it may safely be said that if any feature was more likely than another to drop out of the Athenian tradition, it was precisely the division of the Persian army. A vestige of it may perhaps be detected in the numbers given by Nepos. But the national vanity was not likely to insist upon the point. Patriotism and Alcmaeonid influence would combine to omit or veil it. May not the obscurity of Herodotus be due mainly to this reticence in his sources? It is at all events clear that he has not supplied us with any adequate reason for the Athenian attack. It is also extremely improbable that the Athenian commander attacked the whole Persian army in the open plain. If he was so rash, why did he not attack sooner? if he waited so long, why did he not wait longer? It was his obvious policy to delay until the Spartans came to his aid. We want some pressing motive or some good opportunity to account for the attack. We find both in the division of the Persian forces preparatory to a move on Athens.

The second criticism that will have suggested itself is this. We have supposed that the Persians were waiting for the signal from their friends in Athens, and the Athenians were waiting for the Persians to move. But according to the express statement of Herodotus the shield was raised when the Persians were already in their ships, that is to say, as Herodotus believes,¹ after the battle was over and the vanquished barbarians were re-embarked. Either, therefore, the Athenians did not wait for the division of the Persian forces to deliver their attack, or the Persians did not wait for the signal to divide their forces. This is a valid objection, but we may cheerfully accept the second alternative if we can show good reason why the Persians should have so far departed from the programme as to anticipate the signal. It might be conjectured that they had notice from Athens that the conspiracy was nearly ripe for execution and they must 'stand by' ready for immediate action. But it is much more likely that the plot hung fire, and the Persian leaders, fearing the imminent arrival of the Spartans, determined to make their attempt on the city without delay. What their partizans were about, or what caused the delay, of course we do not know. There would be influential persons to win over, officers and guards

¹ It is perhaps possible that Herodotus was misled or misunderstood his information. The signal might be put after the embarkation of *half* the Persian army for Phalerum (assuming that that was the plan contemplated). To Herodotus' informant the words *ἐὸς ἡμέρας* might have meant 'when that half

was aboard and ready to sail.' To Herodotus, who had no notion of any division, they could only mean 'after the battle and the embarkation of the survivors.' But this refinement is not necessary and makes no difference to the alternatives.

to seduce, important posts to occupy, and no doubt Miltiades' friends were not passive in their opposition. But at all events the expected advent of the Spartans set a limit to the possibility of delay, and supplies an adequate answer to the objection. Adopting this solution, we may say that the landing at Marathon, the delay there, the division of the Persian forces, and the signal of the shield, are all to be explained by the understanding between the Persians and the Alcmaeonid party at Athens, but that the order of the last two items in the programme was in fact reversed by the military necessity of anticipating the arrival of the Spartans. If the Spartans went straight to Athens, they would prevent the surrender of the city, if they were diverted to Marathon, they would redress the balance of force between the Athenian army and the Persian contingent to be left there.

If, then, the Persians did divide their forces into two brigades, one to stay at Marathon and the other to go to Athens, by what route did they intend to send the latter, by land or sea? The hostile armies confronted one another for at least a week. Obviously the whole Persian force must have been disembarked, especially the cavalry.¹ But whereas the Athenian position seems to be fairly established in the valley of Avlona, we have no certain evidence of the position of the Persians. Herodotus does not mention a camp, although on other occasions he is careful on this point. Probably there was none. Pausanias was shown the 'stone mangers of the horses of Artaphernes, and marks of his tent on the rocks.' They were *ὑπὲρ τὴν λίμνην*, possibly (it has been suggested) at a point on Stavrokoraki above the village of Kato Suli. It is thereabouts, near the spring Macaria and the great marsh, that water and fodder seem to be best and most abundant. The Charadra would form a natural entrenchment, and the promontory of Kynosura a breakwater for the ships riding at anchor. But while those who know the ground generally encamp the Persians in this neighbourhood, it is too hastily assumed that the whole Persian army was stationed north of the Charadra. A position to the south of it, between the Charadra and the little marsh, was obviously better for guarding the Athenians. Probably from the first advent of the enemy, certainly in preparation for any move on Athens, the Persians must have occupied the southern part of the plain, which commanded the coast road. They must have done so, if only to detain the Athenians, much more if they proposed to send part of their own forces to Athens. We cannot suppose that the one brigade would have sailed away and left the other cooped up beyond the Charadra, and cut off by the position of the Athenians from the use of the land communications with Athens. If the land route were preferred, the necessity was doubled, for the Athenian position had also to be masked in order to secure the right flank of the marching column.² On either hypothesis the occupation of the southern part of the plain is necessary, and the

¹ The cavalry may after all have had a good deal to do with the choice of Marathon as a landing point. It is one of the few places in Attica where there is pasture to be found in the autumn.

² This point has not escaped Mr. Macan's reviewer in the *Athenaeum*, Dec. 21st, 1895, and Mr. Bury.

occurrence of the battle where the tumult fixes it sufficiently explained. But the hypothesis of the land march involves us in difficulties which are avoided by the other. If the brigade destined for Athens got safely through the pass, what became of it afterwards? how was it re-embarked? why did not it, rather than the fleet, make a dash for the city? If the Athenians delivered their attack while it was filing past, why do not the cavalry appear in the battle? why was the loss so small on both sides? how was the Persian embarkation effected? is it likely that the Athenians attacked so long as the two brigades were both still on the plain? So acutely have these difficulties been felt by some historians, that, while clinging to the idea of the march by land, they have supposed that the cavalry (as Curtius suggested), and possibly some of the infantry, were embarked already, and prepared to accompany the march on shipboard (so far as the routes lay together). But obviously, if *any* part of the Persian army was to go by land, it would have been the cavalry. The road to Athens presents no difficulty to cavalry. Pisistratus took his Eretrian chivalry with him. It is easier to ride to Athens than to walk, it is harder to embark cavalry than infantry. Mr. Bury cannot be allowed to smuggle the cavalry on board under cover of the remark that 'on the march to Athens it would have been a useless encumbrance.' We cannot accept *both* the embarkation of the cavalry *and* the march. But inasmuch as the embarkation of the cavalry is one of the most plausible suggestions ever made about the battle, and not without positive evidence,¹ this incompatibility constitutes yet another objection to the hypothesis of the march by land.

If, on the contrary, we suppose that the brigade for Athens, including the cavalry, was already embarked and under way when the Athenians assumed the offensive, we avoid all the most serious difficulties. The motive and opportunity for the Athenian attack become plain and adequate, the victory less surprising, the absence of cavalry natural, the losses better proportioned, and the embarkation of the Persians easier. The cavalry may well have been already shipped off for service in the plain of Athens. Hippias would remember that cavalry was sometimes useful against the Spartans (Hdt. v. 63). It had at all events been of no service at Marathon, and could neither get at the Athenians nor pursue them over the hills. We may also surmise that the fodder of the plain was by this time exhausted. If a reason for the choice of the sea route is needed, beyond its ease and security, one may be found in the political sympathies of Phalerum, the stronghold of Alcmaeonid influence. The Persians were sure of finding a friendly base of operations close to the city. This consideration was all the more important in their uncertainty as to the success of the conspiracy.

Once the Persians were divided, half of them safely stowed away on the ships and under sail for Phalerum, the opportunity for the Athenian attack had come. The charge must have been carefully meditated. Whatever may have been the pace of it, we may probably accept the view which sees in the

¹ Mr. Macan very justly vindicates the value of Suidas on the *χαρισμὸς* of the cavalry.

Athenian formation something more than a makeshift to spread out an inferior number so as to equal the length of the Persian line of battle.¹ As usual it is rather the soldier's than the general's account which has survived in the tradition. Nevertheless the victory was not instantaneous, there was a stubborn struggle, χρόνος ἐγένετο πολλός. As to the duration denoted by πολλός opinions differ. Probably most men would find an hour's hand to hand tussle ample, and the small Athenian loss points to a short estimate. The time might be measured in minutes and still be long under the conditions. But it is likely that there was some breathing space between the rout of the Persian wings and the crushing of their centre. The wings made good their escape unpursued. Few of the centre, which had advanced 'inland' after the Athenians, can have got on board. The fact that no more than seven ships were taken may only mean that the seamen did not wait long for the fugitives. It was at this point that according to Herodotus the belated signal of the shield was raised.

The remainder of the Persian fleet made off after the squadron which had already *ex hypothesi* sailed. The Athenians returned to Athens 'as fast as their feet could carry them,' at all events in plenty of time to witness the futile demonstration of the enemy off Phalerum. There could be no question of betrayal now. Even without the return of the army and the arrival of the Spartans, the victory must have entirely changed the tone of the populace and the aspect of the situation. Miltiades had won again.

In our view the battle of Marathon was not 'primarily a general's battle' because it was even more primarily a statesman's battle. Miltiades may or may not have had the handling of the army in the field, but the contest was between him and Hippias, rather than between Callimachus and Datis and Artaphrenes. So far his pre-eminence in the tradition seems to be justified.

It may be useful to recapitulate the main points in our interpretation of the campaign. The expedition of Datis and Artaphrenes was formally the last step in the suppression of the Ionic revolt, although it was also far more than that. The subjugation of the islands was systematically carried through, but there was a special motive for taking Eretria before Athens. The political situation at Athens was an acute crisis in a long standing struggle, and presented a very favourable opportunity to Hippias. The plan of campaign was governed by an arrangement between Hippias and the Alcmaeonidae. The purpose of the landing at Marathon was to remove Miltiades and the bulk of the armed garrison from Athens, and keep them out of the way while the *coup d'état* was prepared. Part of the Persian force was to be shipped to Phalerum, and admitted to Athens when the revolution was proclaimed. Obstacles must have been encountered by the conspirators the plot hung fire. At last the impending arrival of the Spartans forced the Persians to make the attempt before the signal. The Athenian commander

¹ The Persians, be it noted by the way, array. They were not taken off their guard. appear to have been quite ready and in orderly

delivered his attack as soon as the Persian forces were sufficiently separated. The victory at Marathon frustrated the invasion as much by its moral effect at Athens as by its military consequences. Miltiades was justly regarded as the hero of the campaign.

The theory here put forward does not contradict any well accredited fact in the evidence, nor invoke imaginary causes. It explains on one consistent hypothesis the landing at Marathon, the delay there, the Athenian attack, the absence of the Persian cavalry, the embarkation of the vanquished, the signal of the shield, and the prominence of Miltiades.

J. ARTHUR R. MUNRO.

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SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE PERSIAN WARS.¹

2. *The Campaign of Xerxes.*

THE defeat at Marathon made it doubly necessary for the Persian government to undertake the subjugation of the Greeks across the sea. If there was ever to be peace on the Aegean that 'Majuba' must be 'wiped off the slate.'

This time there was to be no mistake. The expedition was long and carefully prepared, and was planned on an enormous scale. The number of Xerxes' host cannot indeed be demonstrated, but it may be estimated with some probability, and the historian is bound to attempt an estimate. No sane critic could accept the millions of Herodotus. Nor would many now be found to admit the 700,000 or 800,000 given with or without garniture by Isocrates, Ctesias, and the later authors who mostly depend upon Ephorus. These figures seem to have been deduced from Herodotus. In iv. 87, the land forces led by Darius against the Scyths are said to have numbered 700,000, and it is implied that they were the full levy of the entire empire. In viii. 100 and 113, Mardonius is to be left with 300,000, while Xerxes goes home with the *larger part* of the army (cf. Thuc. i. 73). In vii. 20, Xerxes' host is larger than that of Darius or any other on record. This last passage may account for the addition of 100,000 by those critics who remembered it, and cavalry, auxiliaries, and marines could always be added according to taste, although the original purpose was of course to reduce Herodotus' total to more reasonable figures. But what is the value of the number 700,000 in Herodotus, iv. 87? The pillars set up by Darius on the Bosphorus recorded *ἔθνεα πάντα ὅσα περ ἦγε ἦγε δὲ πάντα τῶν ἡρχε*. Did they record anything more, and if so could Herodotus read it? The one stone rejected of the builders was covered with 'Assyrian' letters, but was the Greek inscription, built into the altar of Artemis, exposed to view? Herodotus in his account of Xerxes' army is obviously drawing on some official document or monument, but he cannot tell the number of the several national contingents, and his total does not appear to be derived directly from his authority. Was

¹ Continued from Vol. xix. (1899), p. 197. The present article has been delayed by press of other work. Meanwhile Ed. Meyer has published his *Forschungen*, vol. ii. and *Gesch. des Alterthums*, vol. iii. which partly anticipate

what I meant to say, but save me the trouble of labouring certain points. I have also the benefit of my friend Mr. G. B. Grundy's elucidations, especially of Thermopylae, in his *Great Persian War*.

Darius more explicit? Herodotus tells us details about the army of Xerxes which give us some clue to the method whereby he probably arrived at his figures, but he furnishes no particulars about the army of Darius. To argue from the latter to the former is to explain *obscurum per obscurius*. And after all the number 700,000 is as monstrous and contrary to common sense in the one case as in the other!

Another estimate has been based on the 300,000 left with Mardonius. If 300,000 were deemed enough to conquer Greece, is it credible that more were ever sent? If Artabazus with 60,000 men escorted Xerxes homewards, is it credible that the king had any very large force with him? So the whole original force cannot have been much above 300,000. But even 300,000 are too many to be probable in view of the difficulty of transport and supply, the length of the campaign, the character of the country, and the limited opposition to be expected. And the number 300,000 is no better supported than the rest. Some of the most recent historians therefore have entirely given up Herodotus and calculated Xerxes' army simply by *a priori* probabilities. I do not think the problem is quite so desperate. We may not accept Herodotus' figures, but they are not mere arbitrary inventions, and we have to reckon with them. Of the discussions which I have read M. Hauvette's seems to me to come nearest to a right method.

We may here leave out of account the forces serving on the fleet, the contingents supposed to have been picked up on the road through Thrace, Macedon, and Thessaly, and the non-combatants and camp followers. For their numbers Herodotus expressly says that he relies upon conjecture, and the exaggeration is patent. All the more does his catalogue of the regular army (vii. 60 *sqq.*) deserve attention. The descriptions of the costumes and accoutrements may be drawn from Mandrocles' picture in the Heraeum at Samos (Hdt. iv. 88). But the list of forty-six nations² distributed into twenty-nine groups, each group under its own ἄρχων, who is named and specified, is clearly official. It is also clear that, whether the twenty-nine groups correspond to the provinces or not, the list represents the military organization of the whole Persian empire. Herodotus, and doubtless the Greeks in general, had an unquestioning belief that Xerxes brought against Hellas every people, nation, and language, whom he ruled (Hdt. vii. 21, 56: Aesch. *Pers.* 12, 712). It would never occur to Herodotus or any one else that he was guilty of the least inaccuracy if he transcribed a Persian 'Army List' of the period as a true enumeration of Xerxes' host. We need not believe that his catalogue was derived from any record of the review at Doriscus, or gives an official account of the troops there present.

Herodotus puts the total of the land force brought from Asia at 1,800,000 (vii. 60, 87, 184). He reckons 1,700,000 to the infantry, 80,000 to the cavalry, and 20,000 to the camel and chariot corps. I interpret this reckoning to mean that he started with a total of 1,800,000, *estimated* the 'mounted' troops at 100,000, and set down the remainder as infantry. The story of the

² For the number cf. Hdt. ix. 27 and vii. 76 with Stein's note.

packed enclosure, which covers the calculation, cannot be taken seriously. How then did Herodotus arrive at his total? His official catalogue appears to have been something like the Byzantine military lists. It gave the names of the ἄρχοντες and of the contingents under the command of each, but no numbers (vii. 60). Herodotus must, I think, have got his 1,800,000 from his conception of the Persian military organization, that is to say, from the number of the ἄρχοντες, and the number of the troops which he imagined each ἄρχων to have commanded. He mentions twenty-nine ἄρχοντες, but so awkward a number could hardly be chosen as the basis of any conceivable scheme of organization. We might almost have conjectured a thirtieth *a priori*; had not the inclusion of the Immortals in the total, and the pointed way in which Herodotus introduces them at the end of his list, of itself suggested that Hydarnes, the Captain of the Guard, is to be added to the other twenty-nine. The army was organized on a decimal system. Herodotus mentions decarchs, hecatontarchs, chiliarchs, and myriarchs, above whom come the ἄρχοντες and the six generals-in-chief. We might expect the next grade above the myriarchs to be captains of 100,000, and so the author of the epitaph at Thermopylae interpreted the thirty ἄρχοντες, when he wrote *μυριάσιν ποτὲ τῇδε τριηκοσίαις ἐμάχοντο*. But Herodotus would make the ἄρχοντες captains of 60,000, and this number is supported by several examples and analogies in the Persian organization. The corps under Artabazus (Hdt. viii. 126), and the land force at Mycale under Tigranes (ix. 96), were 60,000 strong; Cyrus, when he dispersed the river Gyndes (i. 189), is said to have broken up his army into 360 divisions; the normal number of the Persian fleet is 600 ships (iv. 87, vi. 9, vi. 95); and there were *six* generals-in-chief over Xerxes' host. Herodotus is probably right in setting over the myriarchs commanders of 60,000. The regular strength of a Persian army corps probably *was* 60,000. But is Herodotus right in making his thirty ἄρχοντες into commanders of army corps? Hydarnes commanded the Immortals, and they were only 10,000. If we are right in putting Hydarnes among the ἄρχοντες, there is a presumption that the other twenty-nine were also myriarchs. Herodotus describes the numbering of the host by myriads, and throughout his account assumes the myriad to be the unit of measurement. We naturally expect to find that the same unit underlies the list of ἄρχοντες, that each name corresponds to a myriad. The number of troops left with Mardonius, which Herodotus must have derived from another source, seems to confirm this conjecture—300,000 = 30 × 10,000. Not much stress perhaps can be laid on the evidence of Aeschylus in such a matter, but, such as it is, it goes to support our theory, *e.g.* *Pers.* 302 *μυρίας ἵππου βραβεύς*, 314 *μυριόνταρχος*, 980 *μυρία μυρία πεμπαστάν*, 993 *μυριοταγόν*. Herodotus in fact seems to have promoted his ἄρχοντες a step too high.³ It was not they, but the six generals over them, who were commanders of 60,000. If so, the whole army must have numbered 360,000, which agrees very well

³ I gather from M. Hauvette's remarks, the ἄρχοντες myriarchs, but I have not seen *Hérodote*, p. 310, that M. de Gobineau makes his *Histoire des Perses*.

with the story of Cyrus on the Gyndes, and with the force assigned to Mardonius, which was arrived at, I believe, by deducting the corps which fought at Mycale under Tigranes— $360,000 - 60,000 = 300,000$. But thirty myriads are not 360,000, but only 300,000. The additional 60,000 must be the cavalry and other mounted troops. Probably each army corps consisted of 50,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry (or their equivalent). Herodotus sets his thirty *ἄρχοντες* in command of infantry only. We may assume six more myriarchs for the cavalry. It is true that Herodotus has involved himself in an obvious inconsistency. He includes the cavalry in his total of 1,800,000, which (if our hypothesis is right) he deduced from his thirty *ἄρχοντες*. But he nevertheless regards these officers as commanding nothing but infantry. The root of the inconsistency lies no doubt in his mistake as to the grade of the *ἄρχοντες*—as myriarchs they are really infantry leaders and parallel to the hipparchs, but as commanders of army corps, according to Herodotus' conception, they would each have a cavalry division under him. (The position of Hydarnes is of course even more hopelessly inconsistent.) In the words with which he introduces his account of the cavalry, Herodotus seems to imply that each *ἄρχων* would have had his cavalry division, if all the cavalry had taken part in this campaign—*ἵππεύει δὲ ταῦτα τὰ ἔθνεα· πλὴν οὐ πάντα παρείχeto ἵππον ἀλλὰ τοσάδε μόνα*. Does he then give us the whole of the actually existent Persian cavalry under the impression that it is a fraction of his imaginary Persian cavalry? Does he, in other words, quote all the cavalry divisions that he found on his official list? No, he mentions only three hipparchs, whereas there ought (we maintain) to have been six. It appears to be a genuine historical fact that only part of the cavalry went on the campaign, and Herodotus must owe his knowledge of it and of the three hipparchs to some special source of information, the same doubtless whence he derived the story of the accident to Pharnuches at Sardis (vii. 88). The mounted contingents which he mentions are presumably those which he found in his list under the command of these three hipparchs. They ought on our scheme to number 30,000.⁴ Herodotus estimates them at 100,000, but it is evident how he gets his figures. Two of the eleven contingents (the Indians and Libyans) form the chariot corps, one (the Arabs) the camel corps, and there are eight cavalry contingents.⁵ Herodotus reckons each of these divisions at a myriad. It is only an apparent exception that he assigns 8,000 to the Sagartians (the only number he gives for any single

⁴ Cf. Aeschylus, *Pers.* 315, *ἵππου μελαίνης ἡγεμὼν τρισμυρίας*. It is true that in the preceding line this officer was only *μυριόναρχος*, which is probably nearer the fact, but '30,000 horse' may have implied to Aeschylus 'all Xerxes' cavalry.' What does *μελαίνης* mean? Were the horsemen black-capped and black-coated, like Circassian irregulars, or did the Persians share the Turkish preference for black chargers?

⁵ There is a flaw in the text of Herodotus,

vii. 86. The word *Κάσπιοι* occurs twice. I would read *Σάκαι* for the first, because (1) the Sakae specially distinguished themselves among the Persian cavalry at Plataea (ix. 71), but are not mentioned here; (2) their infantry was brigaded with the Bactrians (vii. 64); (3) *ΚΑΙΣΑΚΑΙ* might easily be corrupted into *ΚΑΣΠΙΟΙ* through reduplication of *ΚΑΙ* and the proximity of *ΚΑΣΠΙΟΙ* two lines lower down.

contingent in his whole list), for he brigades them with the Persians (*ἐπετεράχματο ἐς τοὺς Πέρσας*, vii. 86), and he has already mentioned 12,000 Persian cavalry (vii. 40-1), so that the Persians and Sagartians together make up two myriads. The arbitrariness of his estimate is patent throughout, but particularly in the case of the camel and chariot corps (vii. 87, 184).

We have thus arrived at the following scheme of the Persian army 'on paper'—six army corps, each consisting of six divisions of 10,000 men, one being a cavalry division: six generals-in-chief, and thirty-six myriarchs, of whom six were hipparchs. But was this the army which Xerxes led across the Hellespont? No, there are several indications that Xerxes had with him only *three* army corps. We have already seen that there were only three hipparchs. The army marches through Thrace in three divisions. In the course of the war only three separate commands can be detected: Mardonius, Artabazus, and Tigranes, of whom the two latter are expressly said to have had 60,000 men under their orders. Herodotus of course sends all six generals on the campaign. Even their presence would not prove that there were more than three army corps, for it appears to have been a not uncommon practice to divide the command (*e.g.* Datis and Artaphrenes, Artayntes and Ithamitres), and the way in which Herodotus couples them on the march through Thrace suggests joint command (vii. 121). But perhaps he simply took them from his list. Was that list quite up to date? It is a little suspicious that so many prominent officers hold quite different positions in the subsequent narrative.⁶ Artabazus and Tigranes, simple *ἄρχοντες* at Doriscus, reappear in command of army corps; was it their cases that led Herodotus to assign 60,000 men to each *ἄρχων*? Masistius commands not infantry but cavalry; had he succeeded Pharnuches? Mardontes seems to be in command of the marines at Samos and Mycale. Masistes might no doubt be absent from his Bactrian satrapy, but could Artayctes be spared from Sestos? On the other hand, were Darius' sons, Abrocomes and Hyperanthes (vii. 224), without high military rank? Be that as it may, the three army corps best suit the conditions and course of the campaign. After the battle of Salamis Mardonius remains in Greece with one, Xerxes takes back one (which afterwards fought at Mycale) to keep down Ionia, Artabazus with the third guards the communications in Thrace, and in the next summer marches to reinforce Mardonius in Boeotia. 180,000 men is not an incredible number even for a campaign in Greece, if we consider the preparations, but is large enough to account for the impression made on the minds of the Greeks, who had never seen the like before.

Xerxes' fleet is no less difficult to estimate, and we find fewer data to help us in Herodotus. Here, too, we must distinguish between the names and the numbers. It is likely enough that the catalogue of nations and list of admirals has an official source, perhaps the same document as the army list. But the example of the army does not encourage implicit faith in Herodotus'

⁶ It is unfortunate that Aeschylus is useless as evidence on this point. He appears to be content with any Persian name that will fit his verse.

enumeration. Were all the contingents present? and how does Herodotus get his numbers? All the contingents, or members of them (the Lycian might be an exception but for Kyberniscus), are incidentally mentioned again, and two of the four admirals, Ariabignes and Achaemenes, reappear in the story. On the other hand, it seems clear that Herodotus took his total of 1,207 triremes from Aeschylus, who perhaps meant no more than a poet's 'thousand,' although he spoke ambiguously and must have had some reason for noting the 207 fast sailers among them.⁷ Herodotus distributes the 1,207 among the nations, on what principle we cannot say. It is likely that he had special information on some details, *e.g.* the twelve Paphian vessels and the five led by Artemisia, but it is also likely that conjectural probability had its part in the calculation. It is suspicious that whereas the Greek contingents account for 307 ships, the Barbarian add up to exactly 900, and that the Dorian hexapolis furnishes just six times Artemisia's squadron. Diodorus (xi. 3) has practically the same totals (rounding 1,207 to 1,200, and 307 to 310), but considerable variations in the items. Evidently we can lay little stress on either the individual numbers or the total. Can the latter be to any extent controlled? In the first place, the Persian fleet at Salamis cannot be put above about 600 ships, for (1) the Greek fleet according to Aeschylus numbered 310, and Achaemenes implies (Hdt. vii. 236) that the Persians had about 300 more, (2) only 300 reappear at Mycale, (3) the strategy would have been different had the Persian superiority been greater. Secondly 400 ships are said to have perished in the storm at the Sepiad strand, and the 200 sent round Euboea are also said to have been annihilated. But these figures, although they cannot be checked, are probably gross exaggerations. Two naively contrary aims influence Herodotus. He starts from his Aeschylean figure 1,207, and first reduces it by divine assistance (viii. 13) to something like the number which really fought at Salamis ($1,207 - 600 = 607$).⁸ But when he comes to that battle he is once more confronted with his old total, for Aeschylus speaks of the fleet at Salamis. So he restores the fleet to its original strength by the monstrous supposition that the reinforcements from the islands balanced the losses.⁹ Probably, however, the losses did not exceed 200 or 300 (cf. Diod. xi. 12), and the original fleet therefore 800 or 900. Thirdly, another calculation confirms this estimate. Achaemenes was in command of the Egyptian contingent, 200 strong. Ariabignes commanded the Carian and Ionian squadrons, and probably also the Dorian which stands next them in the list and is naturally connected with them. These three squadrons would amount

⁷ *Persae*, 341-43:

Ξέρξης δὲ, καὶ γὰρ οἶδα, χιλιάς μὲν ἦν
ὧν ἦγε πλῆθος, αἱ δ' ὑπέρκοποι τάξεις
ἐκατὸν δις ἦσαν ἐπτά θ'. ὧδ' ἔχει λόγος.

⁸ Strictly perhaps one ought to say he starts with 1327, for he has added 120 from the Greek cities of Thrace (vii. 185), but what few ships may really have come from them (*e.g.* from Samothrace, viii. 90) are probably already

included in the Hellespontine contingent, and I do not believe that Herodotus pays any further heed to them in his reckonings. The total losses in the battles at Artemisium cannot be determined.

⁹ I observe that Ed. Meyer has made this point, *Gesch. d. Alt.* iii. § 217. Cf. also A. Bauer in vol. iv. of *Jahreshefte des Osterr. arch. Inst.* pp. 93-4.

on Herodotus' figures to 200 ships. If we may assume that the other two admirals commanded divisions equal to these, we get a total of 800, which would fit the other indications very well. We cannot on the evidence attain to more than a rough estimate.

The route chosen for the invasion was a reversion to Mardonius' plan. It indicates the purpose of a systematic conquest of Greece, and marks the progress of Persian policy since Marathon. It also enabled the invader to bring a larger land force to bear. I do not propose to discuss Xerxes' route in detail, but after travelling along the Thracian coast in 1896 with Prof. W. C. F. Anderson, I am inclined to agree with his theory (v. 'A Journey from Mount Athos to the Hebrus' in the Commemoration Volume of Firth College, Sheffield, 1898, pp. 211-52) that the right wing marched from Doriscus up the Hebrus and down the Axios to Therma, while the centre and left wing kept together as far as the Symbolon pass between Neapolis and the plain of Philippi,¹⁰ and there diverged, the left wing gaining Therma by the road south of Pangaeus, through Amphipolis, along the coast, and past Lake Bolbe, the centre by the road north of Pangaeus and through Seres. Xerxes with his guard may have made an excursion to Acanthus to see the canal, but no large division can have crossed the ridge of Chalcidice. The account in Herodotus is considerably confused through ignorance of the geography.

What was the attitude of the Greeks towards the coming invasion? The league against the Mede consisted mainly of Sparta and her allies and their allies. If other states joined them it was for the most part rather out of enmity to neighbours than from enthusiasm for the cause. Sparta was not likely to surrender her hard-won headship to a foreign suzerain without a struggle. She was bound to lead the national resistance, and she stood to win as well as to lose, for the states which still withstood her pretensions in continental Greece would either be driven to accept her supremacy, as Athens had already been driven, or be left at her mercy if she emerged victorious from the battle. Athens was of course irrevocably committed. For her the war was a question of life or death. A mutual need bound these two allies to one another. The isthmus might be defended; but without the Athenians the fleet could not face the Persian armada, and 'wide doors were open into the Peloponnese' (Hdt. ix. 9). That fact was not indeed, as the Athenians, forgetful of Marathon, pretended (Hdt. vii. 139), necessarily fatal to the defence, but it was doubly dangerous in view of the attitude of Argos, which gave the enemy a foothold and an ally within the 'island.' Moreover, the security of the Peloponnese could not of course be permanent if the Persians retained command of the sea. Athens was even more dependent on Sparta than Sparta on Athens. Thanks to Themistocles she had a fleet rivalled by none save Gelo's in the Greek world, but alone it could no more face the Persian navy than could the Peloponnesian. On land she was un-

¹⁰ The line followed by the new railway from Xanthi to Drama by the gorge of the Nestus is a fine piece of engineering only opened up by blasting. It was not a practicable road.

sheltered by the isthmus and helpless against the myriads of Xerxes. It was natural and inevitable that, if it came to making sacrifices, Athens should have to pay a heavier ransom than Sparta. Fortunately she was guided at this crisis by the greatest of her statesmen.

Themistocles stood upon the shoulders of Pisistratus. His mental horizon was immensely wider than the parochial politics of the City state. It is almost as ludicrous to see in his creation of the Athenian navy no more than a provision against the coming invasion, as to accept the childish detraction which affected to see in it no more than an effort to finish the war with Aegina (Hdt. vii. 144, Thuc. i. 14). *Τὴν ἀρχὴν εὐθὺς ξυγκατεσκεύαζε* (Thuc. i. 93). Of the old prosperous Eretrian league Sybaris was gone, Miletus ruined, Eretria ruined. What an inheritance might fall to Athens if she could survive to grasp it! Doubtless there was Corinth to be reckoned with when it came to the west, but once mistress of an eastern empire Athens need not fear to confront any opposition that the Peloponnese might offer. But Themistocles never let visions of the future or prejudices of the past obscure his view of a present situation. For the moment the Persian peril made it necessary to postpone these ambitions. The Athenians must subordinate their separate interests to the general safety in which their own was included. After the war would be time enough to resume their independent action.¹¹

That Themistocles succeeded in carrying through his policy is creditable both to him and to the Athenians. He had already persuaded them to forgo their private profit from the mines in order to build the fleet. He now persuaded them to forgo the triumph over Aegina which that fleet put in their power, to place their new navy under the orders of a Spartan admiral who brought only ten ships, to commit their destiny to the wooden wall, abandoning country and city to the enemy, and, not least hard, to lay aside all feuds and factions among themselves. In this reconciliation Themistocles himself led the way. Mindful of the danger, which had shown itself at Marathon, of intrigue between a party at home and *émigrés* in the enemy's camp,¹² he recalled among other exiles Aristides and Xanthippus. The terms of the compact may be inferred from the facts that Aristides commands the Athenian contingent at Plataea, and Xanthippus the Athenian squadron at Mycale.

The allies endeavoured to enlist other states in support of their cause but with little success. From outer Hellas help was not forthcoming. The eastern Greeks were already subjugated, or shut off in the Euxine. The western Greeks, surely by no mere coincidence, had enough to do to maintain their own freedom against Carthage. Only one ship came to the rescue across the Adriatic. Crete sympathised rather with the Dorians in Asia than with the Dorians of the Peloponnese. Even in Greece proper, which was

¹¹ Cf. Hdt. viii. 2, which may be coloured by afterthought so far as 'hegemony' is concerned v. Ed. Meyer, *Forsch.* ii. pp. 218-9), but has probably some foundation in fact, and certainly

is dramatically true to the situation. Cf. Plut. *Them.* 7.

¹² Cf. *Ath. Pol.* 22, Plut. *Them.* 11, and *Arist.* 8.

directly menaced by the invasion, the allies met with little encouragement: Corcyra despatched sixty ships, but the north-west as a whole, save where Corinthian influence was dominant, kept aloof; and the Achaeans held with it. The peoples represented on the Amphictyonic council mostly submitted to Xerxes, and the Delphic God approved their attitude. The Thessalians, the Boeotians (except the Thespians and Plataeans), and the Argives medized outright.¹³ No doubt the prospects of the defence were not hopeful, and the example of Ionia was deterrent; no doubt the Persian yoke was easy, and some might even gain by it; but the really influential consideration was, I am convinced, distrust of Sparta and her allies (cf. *Thuc.* v. 27 and 29). Most Greeks, if they could not be independent, preferred a suzerain in Mesopotamia to one at their own doors, a foreign master to one of themselves. The combination of Sparta, Athens, and Corinth appeared to them to be more dangerous to their autonomy than Xerxes and all his men.

This jealous suspicion must have been particularly strong in the Thessalians, Thebans, and Argives. These three states had all been allied with the Athenian tyrants in their anti-Spartan days, and all three were to give Sparta trouble in the future. The two former were powerful non-Dorian communities which withstood her influence in northern and central Greece. Argos was her implacable rival in the Peloponnese. The Argives could never forget Agamemnon and Pheidon and their lost hegemony. They were still smarting from the thrashing administered by Cleomenes. Sparta had nothing to expect from them but hostility.¹⁴ The negotiation recounted by Herodotus (vii. 148-9) is a pretty piece of Greek diplomacy—the Argives try to entrap the Spartans into an admission of their pretensions, or at least of their equality—but it can only have served to justify their assumed neutrality, and the retort with which the story ends neatly expresses the whole situation: οὕτω δὲ οἱ Ἀργεῖοι φασὶ οὐκ ἀνασχέσθαι τῶν Σπαρτιητέων τὴν πλεονεξίην, ἀλλ' ἐλέσθαι μᾶλλον ὑπὸ τῶν βαρβάρων ἄρχεσθαι ἢ τι ὑπέξει Λακεδαιμονίοισι. The very different measure dealt by Herodotus to the Argives on the one hand and the Thebans on the other reflects the different feeling about them in Athens at the time at which he wrote. He had the better chance of persuading his hearers of Argive neutrality, because they had for twenty years been accustomed to think of Argos as neutral, and in the case of Athenians benevolently neutral. But his tenderness for Argos is particularly unfortunate, because it has the effect of falsifying the whole perspective of the campaign. Yet he lets the truth be easily discerned under the cloak of words (vii. 148-52, viii. 73), and at last it leaps into view in the message to Mardonius (ix. 12), Μαρδόνιε, ἔπεμψάν με Ἀργεῖοι φράσσοντά τοι ὅτι ἐκ Λακεδαιμόνος ἐξελήλυθε ἡ νεότης, καὶ ὥς οὐ δυνατοὶ αὐτὴν ἔχειν εἰσὶ Ἀργεῖοι μὴ οὐκ ἐξιέναι. The Argives, in fact, until the battle of Salamis, and the failure of Mardonius to

¹³ Ed. Meyer, *Forsch.* ii. pp. 210-17, has nearly expressed my view of the attitude of these states and Herodotus' treatment of them. As regards Argos Grote had already led the way, third ed. vol. v. pp. 88-90.

¹⁴ In logical parlance the opposition between Sparta and Argos, like the later opposition between Athens and Corinth, was *contradictory*, whereas the opposition between Sparta and Athens was merely *contrary*. Cf. *Thuc.* v. 91.

make a breach in the defence by detaching the Athenians from the alliance, had entirely altered the situation, were performing for Xerxes the same service that they afterwards rendered to Athens during the Sicilian expedition—they neutralised the offensive power of Sparta and confined her effective action to the Peloponnese. The reproaches of selfishness and indifference so freely levelled by the Athenians at Sparta may have been natural at the time, and furnished a favourite rhetorical foil to the sacrifices so nobly borne by Athens, and a welcome retort to the taunts of her enemies after she had made peace with Persia in order to enslave the Hellenes, but they are unfair and ungenerous, and have propagated an injustice as black as any to be found even in Greek history. The Spartans simply could not march in force north of the isthmus lest the Argives should make a flank attack upon Laconia and raise Helots and Arcadians in revolt.¹⁵

Another consideration led to the same conclusion. Even apart from the danger from Argos the Spartans could not have ventured beyond the isthmus without imperilling the safety of Greece. An army of about 100,000 men and a fleet of about 400 ships was the utmost that the allies could muster, and it is doubtful whether both could be kept at full strength at the same time. Xerxes disposed of something like double these forces. It was his obvious strategy to use his superior numbers to turn the Greek positions. The probability that he would do so was fully realised by the allies, who shaped their plans not only to meet it but to take advantage of it. For the weakness of a turning movement is apt to be this, that it divides the force which attempts it, and perhaps gives the enemy a chance of making a concentrated attack on one or other of the divisions. But if the superiority in numbers be very large and the turning movement very wide this weakness is avoided, for the enemy cannot afford to divide his defence, and cannot move fast enough to prevent one or other of the divisions effecting its purpose. If Marathon, for example, had been a hundred miles from Athens, the Persians might have captured the city in spite of their defeat. So likewise if the allies had met Xerxes in force at Tempe, or even at Thermopylae, he would doubtless, since he commanded the open sea, have landed an army in the Peloponnese within a few days, which would have occupied Sparta or the isthmus long before they could get back to defend them. The reason why Xerxes never attempted to land troops behind the isthmus was, not that he could not dispense with his fleet for a time—he did for over a fortnight, not to mention his retreat—but that the Peloponnese was so strongly garrisoned that any force which he could have landed there would have been at once annihilated. It was simply a consequence of the Persian naval supremacy that the Greek defence on land had to be as much as possible concentrated.¹⁶

A third calculation must also have weighed with those responsible for

¹⁵ Cf. Hdt. vii. 206, φυλακὰς λιπόντες ἐν τῇ Σπάρτῃ; viii. 26, αὐτόμολοι ἄνδρες ἀπ' Ἀρκადίης. Possibly the need of gathering the harvest may

also have delayed the Peloponnesians. Cf. Ed. Meyer, *Gesch. d. Alt.* iii. § 234.

¹⁶ Cf. Hdt. vii. 175, ἀγχοτέρη τῆς ἐσωτῶν.

the Greek plan of campaign. It was bad enough, but inevitable, to have one disaffected state behind the defence. It was much worse to have two or three, all of them *ἐφεδρεύοντες τοῖς ἀτυχήμασι*.

These considerations clearly indicated that the main line of defence by land must be the isthmus. But to confine the defence to the Peloponnese was a plan open to grave objections, the least of which was the abandonment of all northern and central Greece and of all hope of support from the states north of Cithaeron. It was all very well to crush a corps landed from the Persian fleet. It was all very well to fortify the isthmus and defy Xerxes there. But if once Xerxes arrived at the isthmus with army and fleet together, the defenders would have to meet the two attacks at the same time, and that became a serious matter. The allied fleet of course could not hope to beat the Persian if it came to a pitched battle in the open sea off the Peloponnesian coast.

To advance the land defence farther northwards was impossible. But if the fleet could find a favourable station before the isthmus, it might seriously check and cripple the enemy, or even wrest from him the command of the sea. A naval victory was far the best solution for the allies, because the isthmus could not be turned by land, and if Xerxes lost command of the sea, he had at once to think of his own communications, and of the revolt of his Ionian subjects which was bound to follow on the first appearance of a Greek squadron. In the naval strategy we may plainly discern the mind of Themistocles. His plan was to post himself in a narrow sound, where the enemy could make no use of his numbers for a direct attack, but might be tempted to detach a squadron to take the Greeks in the rear. Themistocles would then fall upon his main fleet and endeavour to defeat it before the circumventing squadron could come into action.¹⁷ Either the sound inside Salamis or the sound inside Euboea was excellently suited for his purpose. The difficulty was to induce the enemy to attack the fleet instead of ignoring it and sailing past. In this regard, as in others, the Euboean channel was far the better position. Here the configuration of Greece came to the aid of her defenders. The pass of Tempe or the pass of Thermopylae might be held by a handful of resolute men whose absence would not appreciably weaken the garrison of the Peloponnese. But if Xerxes were checked by land, without the Peloponnese being laid open to invasion by sea, he would be compelled to use his fleet to turn the obstruction and force the defenders of the pass to evacuate their position. He had to arrive at the isthmus by land, and occupy the Greek army there, before he could successfully attack the Peloponnese by sea. But a Greek fleet posted between the north end of Euboea and the south end of the Magnesian promontory guarded the only landing-places which give practicable access to the interior of the country in the whole stretch of the Hellenic peninsula from Tempe to Marathon. Marathon was of course too far south for the landing. A force disembarked there would be exposed to attack from the allies on its march through

¹⁷ The lessons of Marathon had not been lost on Themistocles; cf. Plut. *Them.* 3.

Boeotia. Therefore if Xerxes were 'held up' at Tempe or Thermopylae, he would have to attack the Greek fleet at Artemisium, and if the Greeks could win a decisive victory there, Greece might be saved from invasion, for the Peloponnesians would be set free to come up to confirm the defence of the pass, or even assume the offensive against what part of the Persian army could be spared to continue the campaign after the defeat of the Persian fleet.

Accordingly, when Xerxes reached Abydos, 10,000 hoplites under the Spartan Euaenetus¹⁸ and Themistocles himself were sent by sea (the natural route) to Halus, whence they marched to Tempe. The fleet which brought them remained in the Pagasaeon gulf ready to take up its station. It seems to have been hoped that the appearance of the allied army would induce or compel the Thessalians to join the defence, possibly by bringing the Laconizing faction into power. The message sent by 'the Thessalians' to the isthmus may not have had exactly the significance ascribed to it in Herodotus (vii. 172). The version retailed by him, and the persistent attempts to cast all responsibility for Thessalian medism upon the Aleuadae, are evidently apologetic—let any one who still doubts this interpretation read vii. 130 with its deliciously naive ending. At all events the invitation to the allies does not appear to have expressed the mind of the Thessalians as a whole. The cavalry did indeed present itself, and there was no overt medism, but the tribesmen held aloof. Moreover Tempe is by no means the only pass into Thessaly, and the force present was quite insufficient to defend all the passes. To close the north frontier of Thessaly would have required a much larger army than could be spared from the Peloponnese. It is probable that the organisers of the expedition really did know of the other passes, but hoped that if the allies held the vale of Tempe, a general levy of the Thessalian tribes would turn out to guard the others, just as the Phocians guarded the Anopaea while Leonidas held Thermopylae. This hope proved fallacious, so the expedition returned to the ships and sailed back to the isthmus. The apologetic account reproduced by Herodotus slurs over the real reason of the retreat.

The failure in Thessaly was a serious blow to Themistocles' policy. The defence seemed to have fallen back to the isthmus and Salamis. Could the allies be induced to go back to Artemisium, and instead of Tempe to hold Thermopylae, a stronger position no doubt, but in some degree open to the same objections, for it too could be turned by land, and the peoples of Central Greece, especially the Boeotians, were no more to be trusted than the Thessalians? Could the Athenians, on the other hand, be induced to give up all hope of a serious land defence north of the isthmus, and to evacuate Attica if the navy failed (as was only too likely) to cripple the enemy's fleet? There was evidently a party in Athens strongly opposed to the idea of surrendering

¹⁸ *Συμερός*, Diod. xi. 2, is an obvious clerical error, $\Sigma Y = EY$ and ΛI has been absorbed in the N . Mnemias and his 500 Thebans may

have joined the allies in Thessaly (Plut. *de Her. malign.* 31), but the authority of the Boeotian Aristophanes is not above suspicion on such a point, as the context indeed might suggest.

their country without a battle. They demanded that if Thermopylae could not be occupied in force, at least the Peloponnesians should turn out to defend the line of Cithaeron (Hdt. vii. 141, lines 4 and 5 of the oracle, viii. 40).

It was probably at this crisis that the famous oracles were delivered to the Athenians at Delphi. Herodotus no doubt (vii. 140-4, and especially the first sentence of 145) conceives that they came earlier in the story, but he lays no stress on the occasion, and both the tone of the responses and the circumstances of their delivery postulate a more pressing danger than threatened Athens at the date indicated by his words. The expedition to Thessaly moreover is quite incompatible with that date.¹⁹ On the other hand, we cannot postpone the occasion till after the fall of Thermopylae. Then there was no time for missions to Delphi and no question of policy left to be settled.

If Themistocles looked for help from the God in persuading the Athenians, he got more than he wanted. The priestess poured forth terrible menaces, and bade them begone to the ends of the earth. That advice went far beyond the wishes of the government. So the envoys procured the intervention of an influential Delphian, Timon, to mitigate the utterance in the sense which they desired. The second response promises salvation in the 'wooden wall' and hints at a battle at Salamis.²⁰ Not a word of Artemisium! To the Delphians, who did not expect or wish the allies to hold Thermopylae and Artemisium, who aimed above all things at saving their temple and its treasures, and dreaded above all things to be compromised in Xerxes' eyes by the defence, Salamis was the uttermost and northernmost limit of concession to be granted to the Athenians consistently with the interests and prophetic reputation of the oracle.

Since the countenance of the Delphic God was averted, Themistocles seems to have sought to recommend his strategy by the authority of Bakis. He produced an oracle which promised a naval victory to bring freedom to Hellas when her enemies bridged with their ships the channels at the north and south ends of Euboea, at Artemisium and Cynosura. After the failure at Artemisium and the victory at Salamis this prophecy was transferred to the latter, as we find it in Herodotus,²¹ in spite of the strain put upon the topography.

¹⁹ See Hauvette's arguments, *Hérodote*, p. 327, which do not, however, face the pluperfect *ἐγγόνες*, at the beginning of Ch. 145.

²⁰ There is no cogent reason for rejecting a line of the two oracles. The alternative plans of defence were of course known at Delphi, and it was obvious that Salamis was the naval counterpart to the isthmus. Mr. Bury (*Class. Rev.* x. (1896), p. 417) detects in the words *ἐν τοῖς ποταμοῖς ἐναντίον ἑσση* a reference to Plataea, but so natural an idea needs no special explanation. 'He that fights and runs away will live to fight another day.' *Ἐσχατα γαίης* could, if it proved convenient, be interpreted to mean the Pelopon-

nese.

²¹ viii. 77; cf. 76, where Cynosura appears to be taken from the oracle, as Grote saw, and Munichia is mentioned for the sake of the temple of Artemis there, (cf. Stein *ad loc.*). *Κέως* is quite unknown, but *Κέων* might conceivably be a corruption of *Κέως*, and so transferred from a narrative of the Euboean operations. Grote was right, I believe, in suspecting the current explanation of the names (3rd. ed., vol. v. 176); but it is likely that the long eastern promontory of Salamis was called *Κυνόσουρα* (cf. Plut. *Sol.* 9, where *χηλὴν τινα πρὸς τὴν Εὐβοῶν ἀποβλέπουσαν* suggests a confusion

At all events the allies decided, although not, it would seem (Hdt. vii. 175), unanimously, to return to Artemisium and to occupy Thermopylae. The striking disproportion between the land and sea forces despatched plainly indicates that the intention was merely to hold Xerxes' army in check long enough to enable Themistocles to try conclusions with the fleet. The troops sent to Thermopylae consisted of 4,000 Peloponnesians, including 300 Spartans under Leonidas. On the way they picked up 700 Thespians and 400 Thebans, and, in obedience to a summons sent in advance, 1,000 Phocians and the full levy of the Locrians mustered to meet them at Trachis. The total force may have numbered about 6,500 hoplites and some light-armed troops.²² It was sufficient to defend so strong a position for a few days, which was all that was contemplated, although the pretence was naturally kept up that a larger army was to follow (Hdt. vii. 203). The fleet at Artemisium consisted, according to Herodotus (viii. 1-2), of 271 triremes, to which must be added the fifty-three which came up later (viii. 14), making a total of 324, besides nine penteconters. Herodotus' figures look like an official list, but most of the contingents reappear with the same numbers at Salamis in spite of the rough handling which they received at Artemisium (viii. 18). We cannot accept *both* enumerations. Has Herodotus transferred his numbers (so far as they coincide) from Salamis to Artemisium or from Artemisium to Salamis? We should naturally expect to find the contingents at their full strength at Artemisium rather than, after several stubborn actions, at Salamis. The 200 Athenian ships represent to Herodotus' mind the total navy of the state (cf. vii. 144, viii. 62). Half of them were more or less seriously damaged at Artemisium, yet all reappear at Salamis. Aeschylus puts the fleet at Salamis at only 310 ships (*Pers.* 338-40). The earlier list therefore appears to be the authentic enumeration.

There is a discrepancy of two days in Herodotus' narrative between the events at Artemisium and at Thermopylae. Busolt²³ solves the difficulty by inserting two days in the diary of the fleet. But it seems probable that it is

between two *Κυνόσουραι*, or a gloss upon the word), and that this coincidence helped the transfer. In the third line of the oracle I put no stop, and take *ἐλπιδι μαινομένη* to qualify *πέρσαντες*. My interpretation of the oracle is supported by the lines on the monument of the Megarians (*Oesterr. Jahresheft*. ii. pp. 238-9)—

τοὶ μὲν ὑπ' Εὐβοίᾳ καὶ Παλῷ, ἔνθα καλεῖται
ἀγνᾶς Ἀρτέμιδος τοξοφόρου τέμενος.

²² The epigram (Hdt. vii. 228) gives 4000 from the Peloponnese, and Herodotus, viii. 25, evidently took his 4000 dead from this source, although it speaks only of Peloponnesians and not of dead but of living. Herodotus vii. 202, enumerates only 3100 Peloponnesians. He elsewhere (viii. 25) mentions Helots, and seems to imply (vii. 229) that each Spartan was attended by one Helot. But it is not likely that the

epigram includes the Helots any more than Herodotus does. Herodotus' list, therefore, appears to be incomplete. Isocrates (Paneg. 90, Archid. 99), Ctesias (*Pers.* 25), and Diodorus (xi. 4) speak of 1000 Lacedaemonians. This supplement may be thought to be either confirmed by Demaratus' words (Hdt. vii. 102) or derived from them. Diodorus gives 1000 Locrians and 1000 Malians. The Malians are improbable, but 1000 is nearer the mark for the Locrians than Pausanias' 6000 (x. 20, 2), and not many of them need have been hoplites.

²³ *Griech. Gesch.*, 2nd ed., vol. ii. p. 681, note 3. Cf. Hauvette, *Hérodote*, p. 372, Grundy, *Great Persian War*, p. 319. Mr. Bury, on the other hand, accepts *τριταῖος*, and deducts two days from Xerxes' delay. (*Ann. of Brit. Sch. at Athens*, ii. pp. 95-7.)

the diary of the army which is at fault. Herodotus (viii. 15) means the three days of fighting at Thermopylae to coincide with the three days of fighting at Artemisium. Xerxes' four days of inaction before his first attack are surely intended to be the day of his arrival and the three days of the storm. He would naturally wait for his fleet to come into co-operation, and possibly he was hampered by other obstacles, as we shall see. He must have arrived before Thermopylae on the same day on which the fleet reached the Sepiad strand, that is to say on the twelfth day out from Therma (Hdt. vii. 183), and not the fourteenth, as Herodotus implies in the word *τριταῖος* (vii. 196). Doubtless the arrival of the army and fleet at these points had been timed to coincide, and Herodotus clearly means them to coincide, in other passages (vii. 184, 186, viii. 66) where he refers to the total force led by Xerxes, *μέχρι Σηπιάδος καὶ Θερμοπυλίων*.

It was probably about the time when Xerxes marched from Therma that the Persian admirals sent out a fast squadron of ten ships to reconnoitre. We must suppose that in order to escape notice they kept well outside Skiathus and perhaps touched at Skyrus—the Dolopes had medized—where Pammon may have given them his warning about the rock Myrmex. Thus they approached the channel between Skiathus and Magnesia from the south and pursued the three Greek ships on guard there *northwards*, leaving three of their own (which the Greeks at Artemisium seem to have mistaken for the guard-ships, for they did not molest them) to set up a mark on the rock.²⁴ This incident must have happened before Xerxes entered Thessaly, for he must certainly have occupied Tempe, and then the crew of the Attic ship which was run ashore at the mouth of the Peneius could hardly have escaped. In any case Herodotus implies (vii. 183, *ὥς σφι τὸ ἐμποδὼν ἐγγεγόνεε καθαρὸν*) that the ten ships returned to announce that the course was clear before the fleet sailed from Therma. Yet he involves their reconnaissance with the sailing of the fleet in an extraordinarily confused fashion (vii. 179, 183), and ascribes to their capture of the three guardships an effect on the minds of the Greeks which is utterly incredible. He tells us that the news was signalled to Artemisium by beacons from Skiathus, and that the Greeks thereupon fell back in a panic to Chalcis—that is to say, abandoned Artemisium, exposed the flank and rear of the army at Thermopylae, and stultified the whole plan of campaign! Fortunately Herodotus himself supplies a clue to unravel his own confusions, which has been most sagaciously followed up by Mr. Bury in an article in the second *Annual of the British School at Athens*. He adds that the intention of the Greeks in shifting their station to Chalcis was to guard the Euripus—*μεταωρμίζοντο ἐς Χαλκίδα φυλάζοντες τὸν Εὐρίπον*. What danger threatened the Euripus? Mr. Bury has ingeniously shown that what was really signalled from Skiathus was the passage outside that island of the 200 ships sent to turn the Greek position by circumnavigating

²⁴ Herodotus (vii. 179-83) conceives that the Persian squadron made straight for Skiathus, and the three ships ran on beyond the rest as

far as the rock, *ἐπήλασαν περὶ τὸ ἔρμα*. But this conception does not fit his story.

Euboea, and that it was not the whole Greek fleet that fell back to defend the Euripus, but only the fifty-three ships afterwards introduced into the narrative from nowhere in particular (Hdt. viii. 14). It is impossible to believe that the whole Greek fleet left Artemisium, but the despatch of the fifty-three ships would account for the story.²⁵ It is impossible to understand the stratagem of sending the 200 ships outside Skiathus if they were sent, as Herodotus states (viii. 7), from Aphetae, in full view of the Greek station, and in the broad daylight of the mid-afternoon. It is impossible that these ships should have quitted Aphetae in the afternoon, rounded Skiathus and Cape Geraestus, and reached the Hollows of Euboea in about twelve hours, as Herodotus' account demands (viii. 6-14). But these objections of time and place are avoided by Mr. Bury's hypothesis that the 200 ships parted company with the main Persian fleet off the Sepiad strand. I need not repeat all his arguments, but I will add a few considerations which confirm them. In the first place, nothing which had not been foreseen could be signalled by beacons. It must have been preconcerted that beacons should be lighted in certain numbers and certain positions, if the enemy did this or that, which it was foreseen that he might do. The capture of the Greek scouts, after a chase which carried them (say) fifty miles north of Skiathus, cannot have been either seen or foreseen, and so cannot have been signalled. But the passage of some of the enemy's ships outside Skiathus was a contingency which must certainly have been foreseen, and arrangements were doubtless made for signalling both the fact and the number of ships. Thus both the ten ships and the 200 would be signalled, and Herodotus has confused the two squadrons. He knew that the ten ships came within sight of Skiathus,²⁶ he had no idea that the 200 parted from the fleet before it arrived at Aphetae. Hence he could only refer the signal to the reconnaissance. This explanation throws light on both sides—the movements of the ten ships are mixed up with the movements of the 200, no less than the movements of the 200 with the movements of the ten. Secondly, the use of beacons suggests that the signal was made at night. The Persians must have put in to the Sepiad shore about sunset (Hdt. vii. 183), and the 200 ships would pass Skiathus with the last of the daylight. Thus the fire-signals fit the hypothesis. Thirdly, we can hardly believe that the despatch of the 200 ships was a happy thought which first occurred to the Persian admirals at Aphetae. It was surely a deliberate plan premeditated at Therma.²⁷ But if so, can we believe that these ships were ever brought inside Skiathus to Aphetae?

²⁵ Mr. Grundy, *Great Persian War*, p. 324, supposes that the whole Greek fleet had to run before the storm round Cape Kenaeum. It is more likely that the ships were drawn up for the night on the strand at Artemisium, but even if afloat they had fair shelter there, and safety hard by at Oreus; v. Lolling in *Ath. Mit.* viii. p. 16.

²⁶ Possibly Herodotus' information about the capture of the three ships came from Pytheas, (vii. 181, viii. 92), about the signal from some one with the fifty-three ships, and he has unskilfully combined them.

²⁷ It might help to explain Xerxes' delay before Thermopylae.

It is an additional advantage to Mr. Bury's theory that it dispenses with the second storm, which looks very much as if it were got up on purpose to account for the wreck of the circumnavigating squadron. Herodotus knew that this squadron was wrecked, but inasmuch as he did not start it on its voyage until after the first storm, he was driven to postulate a second storm to wreck it. It must be admitted that his efforts to raise the wind put some strain upon our credulity. Two storms in as many days are a most unusual phenomenon in Greece in August or September. At Aphetae the second storm produces absolutely no effect that might not be due to the ordinary land breeze blowing down the channel at night.²⁸ There is thunder and heavy rain, but that is not the weather for wind, and no wind is mentioned. Can the same night have been so tempestuous at the south end of Euboea? But, it will be urged, Herodotus wrecks the 200 ships at the Hollows of Euboea, and the first storm was a north-easter (viii. 13, 14, vii. 188). How could a storm from the north-east drive ships on the south-west coast of Euboea? And if the 200 ships were wrecked in the first storm, why do not the 53 ships get back to Artemisium until the day before the last battle? As regards the Hollows, Herodotus refutes himself. He tells us (viii. 13) that the night of storm fell upon the Persians *ἐν πελάγει φερομένοισι*, and he expressly distinguishes *τὸ πέλαγος*, the open Aegean, from the sheltered waters of the channel (vii. 176, 193; cf. iv. 85). That the shipwreck took place in the 'first' storm, and outside, not inside Euboea, may also be inferred from vii. 192, where the scouts run down from the hill-tops to Chalcis on the second day of the storm, and announce to the Greeks there *πάντα τὰ γεγόμενα περὶ τὴν ναυηγίην*. The main Persian fleet was at the Sepiad strand, forty miles north of Mount Dirphys, and if visible from there (which I doubt²⁹), at all events concealed by the corner of Magnesia from the more northerly Euboean hills. How much could the scouts report of the shipwreck of the main fleet, especially in such dirty weather? No! what they reported must have been the wreck of the 200 ships, and that wreck must have been on the east coast of Euboea, for the scouts run down from the hills, not up the west coast from the Hollows (where indeed the scouts would be ships). The scouts were doubtless sent up from Chalcis to Mount Dirphys and other points of vantage to signal the progress of the enemy's circumnavigation, and

²⁸ The dead and wreckage of the first battle drift to shore at Aphetae—*ἐξεφορέοντο ἐς τὰς Ἀφετάς*. The exact position of Aphetae is unknown. In spite of Hdt. vii. 193-5, it is difficult to believe it lay inside the gulf of Pagasae, and he elsewhere estimates its distance from Artemisium at 80 stades (viii. 8). The *ἐξ* in *ἐξεφορέοντο* does not help us, for it has no reference to direction (cf. *ἐκφέρεσθαι*, viii. 49, 76, and *ἐκπίνευν*). But one would expect to find Aphetae rather east than west of Artemisium, else the Greeks would have been in danger of being cut off from the Euripus.

Near Olizon would be the natural site, perhaps on the narrow isthmus, and so practically on both the gulf and the outer strait. Possibly Herodotus imagined that the east and south coasts of Magnesia made an acute angle, and reckoned the latter to the gulf. The tide in the Euboean channel (Hdt. vii. 198) *might* account for the drift of the wreckage without any wind at all; but I do not pretend to know how it sets.

²⁹ If the maps are accurate there can be very little daylight, if any, between the west point of Skiathus and the east point of Magnesia, as viewed from Mount Dirphys.

not left behind above Artemisium, as Herodotus in conformity to his general misconception imagined (vii. 182).

But something must have happened at the Hollows to bring them into the story. What was it? Perhaps our answer to the second objection will enlighten us. The fifty-three Attic ships get back to Artemisium, with the news of the wreck of the turning squadron, on the afternoon of the day before the last battle (Hdt. viii. 14). This date is very early if (as Herodotus fancies) the wreck took place only on the preceding night, but it is very late if the wreck is to be placed (as we argue) on the first night of the great storm. The fifty-three ships were sorely needed at Artemisium. How do we account for the delay? In viii. 14, Herodotus mentions three incidents one after another. The first is the arrival of the fifty-three ships. The second is the news of the wreck, which arrived at the same time. Herodotus does not expressly say that the ships brought the news, but the inference is almost certain (cf. Bury, *l.c.* p. 89). The third item is that the Greeks, emboldened by the reinforcement and the news, sallied forth at the same hour as on the previous day, fell upon the Cilician ships, and having destroyed them started at nightfall to sail back to Artemisium. This attack was evidently a serious action, for Herodotus twice refers back in a pointed way to the Cilicians (viii. 68, 100). But it is difficult to see how the Cilician ships came to be isolated from the rest, and why no assistance was sent to them from the main fleet. And it is difficult to see why the Greeks should have waited for the same hour as before. Is it not possible that this action was really fought at the Hollows of Euboea by the fifty-three ships, and formed part of the news which they brought, but that Herodotus has transferred it by a misunderstanding to Artemisium? That none of the 200 ships survived is hardly credible. The survivors would naturally have rallied in the Hollows under the lee of Euboea, and may well have been destroyed there by the fifty-three ships on the day after the storm at about the same hour as the Greeks at Artemisium were fighting their first battle—a coincidence which would be remembered. The fifty-three would then have 'started at nightfall to sail back to Artemisium.' The Cilician squadron, we may suppose, was the largest contingent of the 200. Herodotus was all the more likely to transfer the action itself to the place and time of its announcement, because he was prepossessed with the parallel between the fighting at Artemisium and at Thermopylae. It may be noted for what it is worth that Diodorus emphasises the separation of the Persian squadrons, and describes only two battles at Artemisium (xi. 12-3).

Minor points must not long detain us. The recurrent *motif* of panic and retreat is of course inconsistent with our general conception of the campaign, but it is also inconsistent with the record of the fighting, and is adequately accounted for by Herodotus' desire to bring out the dramatic contrasts in his story, and by the prejudices of his informants.

In particular the story of the bribery of Themistocles (viii. 4-5) is to be rejected. It does not harmonize well with viii. 19-20, where the Euboeans *ἐξεκομίσαντο οὐδέν*, and it falls into line with the other slanders and insinuations whereby Herodotus' malignant (Alcmaeonid) source seeks to take

away the credit of Themistocles' achievements and blacken his character when it cannot deny his ability. Is it likely that any Greek would have squandered thirty talents on Themistocles when he might have bought Eurybiades, the commander-in-chief, for five? Eurybiades has suffered for the sins of his fellow-citizens individual and collective, Adeimantus of course, here as elsewhere, for the sins of his son.

The news brought by the diver Skyllias to Artemisium (viii. 8) must have been the loss sustained by the Persian fleet at the Sepiad strand, as Mr. Bury shows, rather than the despatch of the 200 ships. The news brought by the scouts to Chalcis is not however to be dismissed as mere patchwork (*v. supra*).

On Sepias—*παλαιᾶς χοιράδος κοῖλον μυχόν*—and the Nereids (vii. 191) compare Euripides, *Androm.* 1265–8.

The two positions, Artemisium and Thermopylae, were mutually interdependent. It is universally recognized that Thermopylae could not have been held without Artemisium, for it would have been at once turned by the enemy's fleet. But it is also true that Artemisium was useless without Thermopylae, for the Persians would never have attacked the Greek fleet, but simply sailed past it outside Euboea, if the land road to the isthmus had been open. All that they wanted was to get their army and fleet to the Peloponnese *at the same time*. The Greek defence by land was from the very first fixed at the isthmus. All that Leonidas had to do was to hold Thermopylae until the Greek fleet had fought a decisive action with the Persian. In the pretence that the full force of the Peloponnesians was to follow him, and the alleged hindrances of the Carnean and Olympic festivals, we have to recognise only official dust for the eyes of the extra-Peloponnesian populace (*Hdt.* vii. 203, 206, viii. 26, 40, 72—into this last passage Herodotus has perhaps thrown a touch of irony). On the other hand, the assertion (vii. 207) that the Peloponnesians wished to abandon Thermopylae and fall back to the isthmus, and Leonidas was only pressed into staying by the indignant protests of the Phocians and Locrians, is half malignant and half apologetic, malignant against the Peloponnesians, apologetic for the subsequent medism of Phocians and Locrians.

But Thermopylae could be turned by land as well as by sea, and that not merely by mountain paths, but by the road up the Asopus and over the *col* into Doris. This road was doubtless no *chaussée*, and may never have been practicable for wheels (*cf.* Livy, xxxvi. 15), but it was not a difficult road, as hill roads go in Greece, and Mr. Grundy (*Gt. Pers. War*, p. 261, 302) testifies that even at the present day, in spite of the excellent *modern* road beside it, 'there is considerable mule traffic' over it. The position of Trachis, and the colony sent there by the Spartans in the Peloponnesian War, are indications of its importance. The Thessalians were of course familiar with this road, and according to Herodotus led the Persians by it into Phocis after the fall of Thermopylae (viii. 31). Artabazus retreats by it after the battle of Plataea (ix. 66, 89).

Why then did not Xerxes adopt this route on his first arrival before

Thermopylae, or at all events send a division by it to turn Leonidas' position, which was not worth two days' purchase if this road was open? There can be only one satisfactory answer³⁰—*the road was held*. Mr. Grundy has well brought out two facts: (1) that the road was very easily defended, for the gorge of the Asopus, up which it runs, is long and precipitous, and so narrow that at one point it contracts to twelve feet (pp. 261–301); (2) that the defence of Thermopylae regularly included the defence of Heraclea (Trachis), which commanded the gorge (pp. 262–4, note). Heraclea³¹ lay at the foot of the flat-topped hill which overhangs the mouth of the gorge on the west. This hill formed the citadel, a very strong position, which the Greeks cannot conceivably have left unoccupied. Even the lower town was so strong that in 191 B.C. a garrison of 2,000 Aetolians defied the consul Acilius Glabrio and his army there for twenty-six days (Livy, xxxvi. 16, 22–4). We can scarcely doubt, in spite of the silence of Herodotus, that Xerxes found at least the citadel of Trachis occupied, and consequently the Asopus road barred to him. This inference is supported by a parallel omission in Herodotus' distribution of the defenders. The Peloponnesian and Boeotian contingents were with Leonidas in the pass, the Phocians were guarding the path Anopaea, but where were the Locrian levies? The Locrians must have been the garrison of Trachis.³²

Herodotus's description of the path Anopaea, which started from the Asopus (vii. 216), and of the march of the Immortals (217), might naturally be taken to imply that Hydarnes began by ascending the gorge. This view seems to be universally accepted without further question. If it is right, we must suppose that Trachis had meanwhile been captured, or surrendered by the Locrians. But Pausanias, who had been at Thermopylae (iv. 35), gives a different account. In his narrative of the invasion of the Gauls under Brennus (x. 19–23), he describes two paths up into the mountains near Heraclea, neither of which can be identified with the Asopus road. The one was very steep and abrupt, started from near Trachis, and passed not far from a temple of Athena. In this path I recognize the original of the modern high road, and in the temple of Athena the original of the monastery of the Panagia. The other was easier for an army, and led through the territory of the Aenianes, *i.e.* round the western end of the Trachinian cliffs.

³⁰ Mr. Grundy (p. 269 and elsewhere) seems to me to make too much of the difficulty of transport. He appears to imagine Xerxes' commissariat train entirely on wheels, whereas one might gather from Herodotus that it consisted entirely of pack-animals of various kinds, including camels (see, among numerous references, especially vii. 125, 187; and cf. ix, 39). Probably the truth lies between these extremes. But there are very few tracks too difficult for the light, narrow Asiatic ox-waggon, and an oriental army (*pace* Herodoti) requires extraordinarily little baggage or even food.

³¹ On Heraclea Trachis, v. Livy, xxxvi, 22–4,

Thuc. iii. 92, Hdt. vii. 199, Strabo, 428, Paus. x. 22, Leake, *N. Greece*, ii. pp. 24–31. Herodotus implies, I think (with Mr. Grundy, p. 282), that the lower town was on the Thermopylae road. It is clear from Thucydides that there was never any change of site, although in Roman times (Strabo, Paus.), when Heraclea had completely retreated up the hill (cf. Livy), the ruins of the lower town, six stades below, were exclusively known as Trachis.

³² It may be noted that the Locrians and Phocians mustered *ἐς τὴν Τρηχίνα*, and that Xerxes commands all northern Greece, *μέχρι Τρηχίνος* (Hdt. vii. 203, 201).

Presumably it passed behind Trachis and connected with the Anopaea path in the valley of the Asopus above the gorge, for this, says Pausanias, was the path by which Hydarnes, and afterwards Brennus, circumvented the defence of Thermopylae (x. 22, § 8, cf. § 1). There is nothing in Herodotus inconsistent with Pausanias, on the contrary, the expression τὸν Ἀσωπὸν διαβάντες (vii. 217), which is unnatural on the received view, distinctly supports him.³³ There may be topographical objections, but I cannot discover that the topographers have ever even considered the question. If Pausanias's account may be accepted, the Persians simply turned the obstacle of Trachis to get at Thermopylae.

If Trachis still held out, the Phocians who were guarding the path Anopaea can hardly have expected an attack from the side of the Asopus. But they had another function, which, although barely hinted at in the story retailed by Herodotus, may have occupied more of their thoughts. They were not merely φρουρέοντες τὴν ἀτραπὸν, but also ῥυόμενοι τὴν σφετέρην χώραν, which interpreted into the concrete means defending Pausanias' *steep* path whereby the Gauls first attempted to scale the ridge of Oeta. We should expect therefore to find them posted somewhere near the intersection of this path with the Anopaea, probably somewhere not far from the monastery of the Blessed Virgin.³⁴ This station seems to me to fit the notes of time in Herodotus's narrative better than Leake's and Mr. Grundy's, and to be confirmed by the *oaks* which the latter notes (p. 302) in this zone of the forest, surely a genuine touch in the tradition. It also saves Hydarnes from too much forest-groping in the dark.

What happened in the morning twilight we shall never know for certain. It is obvious that Herodotus gives us only the Phocian apology, and a ludicrously lame one it is (vii. 218). We may conjecture that he is inspired from Delphi, for the tone of the advocate for the accused is audible in almost all that he says about the Phocians. Their spirited reply to the overtures of the Thessalians, and the old feud between the two peoples, dragged into the story time after time, are on a par with the Athenian reply to Alexander of Macedon, and the Alcmaeonid hatred of tyrants. The devastation of their country is too emphatically paraded in contrast to the immunity of Boeotia to absolve them from the charge of medism. The fastnesses of Parnassus are the last refuge of their reputation. Their courage is vindicated in the very camp of Mardonius. And even this shameful farce on the Anopaea is worked into a blasphemous parody of the last heroic stand of the Spartans at Thermopylae! At best these Phocians were more anxious to defend the path into

³³ So perhaps does the phrase ἐν δεξιῇ μὲν ἔχοντες ὄρεα τὰ Οἰταίων, ἐν ἀριστερῇ δὲ τὰ Τρηχινίων (v. Leake, pp. 54-5), and ἡ περίοδος τε καὶ ἀνάβασις in vii. 223.

³⁴ Herodotus's expression, ἐπ' ἀκρωτηρίῳ τοῦ ὄρους (vii. 217), can no more be pressed than his κατὰ ῥάχιν τοῦ ὄρους (216), or ἐπὶ τοῦ ὄρους τὸν κόρυμβον (218). It is likely enough that he

travelled the coast road (as Mr. Grundy argues at large), but the upper path remained to him vaguely something 'up there.' Possibly his guide or his own imagination fastened upon the rocks which Mr. Grundy (p. 302) calls the Great Gable, and they may be either the ἀκρωτήριον or the κόρυμβος.

Phocis than the path to Alpeni. At worst they bartered away the safety of Hellas and the lives of their allies for the security of Delphi and its treasures. A thousand Phocians appear next year in the enemy's ranks (Hdt. ix. 17, 31); is the number a mere coincidence? At all events the Phocians cleared out of the way, retiring towards the summit of the ridge, probably on the path towards Phocis, and the Persians did not follow them far, but having dismissed them, possibly with a few volleys of arrows, resumed their march for Alpeni.

Meanwhile what of Leonidas? He easily repelled the assaults of the first two days, which were probably not so seriously meant as the Greeks imagined. For the Persian generals clearly had no idea of carrying the position by a frontal attack. Their initial delay is to be explained by three considerations, all of which may have contributed to determine their inaction at Thermopylae. First, there was the expedition of the 200 ships round Euboea, which promised to compel the Greeks to evacuate the pass without striking a blow. Secondly, it is probable that the Persians at least attempted to get possession of Trachis, and so open the other pass, with much the same result. Thirdly, the turning movement by the Anopaea may have been already contemplated, but deferred by the storm which, even without rain (and much rain would be unusual in such a storm), would render night-marches in the mountains difficult. It is highly probable that this movement was originally designed for the night of the day after the storm, but was prevented by the heavy thunder rain with its *ρεύματα ἰσχυρὰ ἐς θάλασσαν ὀρμημένα* (Hdt. viii. 12), which would raise a spate on the Asopus (cf. Grundy, pp. 262, 300). It seems likely therefore that both the first and second assaults were rather feints to divert attention from the turning movement than serious efforts to force a passage. It was during the second night and at daybreak next morning that the earliest intimations of Hydarnes' march reached Leonidas, and it is here that our difficulties begin.

Apart from the jarring note of Theban treachery, which may be explained as a later interpolation by the author into his original draft (cf. the last words of vii. 233), Herodotus's whole narrative of the defence of Thermopylae reads like a national poem. Like the *Persae* of Aeschylus it seems to breathe the spirit of the *entente cordiale*, the *ξυμμαχία ἐπὶ τῷ Μήδῳ*. For the moment the clouds of spite and jealousy are melted and the story suffused with a glow of generous idealism. It is this chapter of his history which we might fancy to have been chosen by Herodotus for recitation at the Olympic festival, and to have moved the boy Thucydides to tears. One feels almost guilty of sacrilege in pointing out that this golden legend of heroic self-sacrifice and patriotic devotion owes its origin to a politic fiction and its ungrudging acceptance to a coincidence of interests. But, fortunately, when criticism has said its last word, there remains in the bare facts enough of sober heroism to console us for the loss of the adventitious glories of the romance.

Three motives are very evident in the narrative of Herodotus: first, the wish to explain the catastrophe by the oracle: second, the wish to shield the

allies from the blame of having left Leonidas to his fate; third, spite against the Thebans. The two former are closely related. In the oracle, which here (vii. 220) appears for the first time, and is inconsistent with the account of Leonidas's expedition given a few chapters before (202-7),³⁵ we must recognize the official explanation of the disaster, put forward to counteract the impression made on the minds of the Greeks by the news that one of the Spartan kings had been defeated and slain. It was produced to meet the discouragement which would naturally follow on so sinister an opening to the campaign, and to turn the bad omen into a presage of victory.³⁶ But although primarily in our view an apology for a *fact*, an *event*, the story of the voluntary self-devotion of Leonidas and his band of heroes proved to all parties so convenient a screen against censure, that it was at once adopted by tacit consent as the authorized version, and being unchecked by any criticism soon won its way to the domain of the romantic. The responsibility was indeed pretty equally distributed. The Spartans were chiefly responsible for the conduct of the campaign on land, and in a more general way for the whole policy of the league. They not only saved but enhanced their military reputation, and could now point to a signal and disinterested sacrifice in the cause of their allies. The Athenians above all the rest had to answer for the plan of holding Thermopylae. It was their advocacy which had persuaded the Spartans to attempt the defence of the pass, and 'let them in for' this calamity. The Peloponnesian allies escaped all blame of having basely deserted their general in the hour of need. It was simply a consequence of the voluntary self-devotion of Leonidas that he should have bidden them depart in peace, and the λόγος adopted by Herodotus (vii, 220), confessedly in the face of his facts, may even have been an original part of the explanation, for the Spartans could not in the crisis of the war afford to be exacting. Even the Phocians gained by the diversion, for they shared the blame with the Gods and their excuses were not so closely scrutinized. Only the brave Boeotians suffered wrong, but *they* no longer counted for anything.

It need scarcely be pointed out that the official apology is naively external in its point of view. A great disaster was fated to befall Sparta, but the fates allowed it to take one of two alternative forms. Leonidas devoted himself 'that the scripture might be fulfilled' (cf. viii. 53). Thanks to his patriotic sacrifice Sparta was now secure. The story is meant to explain the fate of Leonidas rather than his motive, still less his strategy. It was afterthought and posterity that worked up the subjective side, although even in Herodotus this elaboration is already far advanced. But we may safely say

³⁵ Except perhaps the words *καὶ τοῖσι ἐτύγχανον παῖδες ἔδντες* in 205. Can the *τε* in the preceding clause *ἄνδρας τε τοὺς κατεστέωτας τριηκοσίων* be a corrupt reduplication of *τ' = τριηκοσίων*, and *καὶ τοῖσι ἐτύγχανον παῖδες ἔδντες*, an afterthought added with the note on the Thebans which fills the rest of the chapter, (cf. the opening words of 206, which would fit

on very well)?

³⁶ The view so often expressed (e.g. by Busolt, *Die Lak.* p. 419 *seqq.*), that the Spartan government invented the oracle to excuse *themselves*, seems to me to make a false distinction between the Ephors and Leonidas, and between the Spartans and the general council of the allies.

that none of the motives attributed to Leonidas either by or in amplification of the official apology really determined his action. In particular, it was no disgrace to a Spartan *commander* to retreat when sound strategy demanded it (*e.g.* Eurybiades, Pausanias); and the explanations put forward wholly fail to account for the fact that Leonidas' doom was shared not only by his Spartan guard, who might be bound to abide by him *Λακεδαιμονίων ῥήμασι πειθόμενοι*, but also by the Boeotians, at all events the Thespians, if not the Thebans (v. Bury, *Ann. of Brit. Sch.* ii. p. 101-2).

The spite against the Thebans needs no demonstration. It is patent, and the criticisms of Plutarch (*de Her. mal.* 31-3) have never been rebutted, although they glance off Herodotus on to his malignant Athenian informants. The cloven hoof peeps out in the mention of Eurymachus (vii. 233). Leontiades, like Adeimantus, has suffered for the sins of his son, and it is likely enough that he has been promoted by Athenian enmity to a command which he did not hold, for the Boeotian Aristophanes, drawing apparently on documentary evidence, claimed it for Anaxandrus (Plut. *l.c.*). We cannot refuse to believe that the Thebans, like the Thespians, came and remained of their own free will. Diodorus (xi. 4) says that they were of the anti-Persian party, *ἀπὸ τῆς ἐτέρας μερίδος*, and the statement, although perhaps merely an inference, is yet a just and probable inference, and is supported by the Theban apology in Thucydides, iii. 62.

The attitude of the Boeotians in contrast with that of the Peloponnesians is significant. The other allies *ἔτλησαν Σπάρτης ἡγεμόνα προλιπεῖν*. The Thespians and Thebans elected to stay with Leonidas. They were not merely more nearly interested in the defence of the pass—at best now a matter of hours—but were in a desperate plight once the Persians got through. No refuge could be looked for in their own country, already pre-disposed to medize, and they may well have preferred to fall into the hands of Xerxes rather than into the hands of their enemies at home. While therefore we do not admit that Leonidas's intention was to immolate himself and his men, we must still recognise that it involved a risk which deterred all but the most desperate of his allies.

What then was the situation as it presented itself to Leonidas at his last council of war (Hdt. vii. 219)? Apart from the prognostications of Megistias, derived by Herodotus from his epitaph, the first news of the turning movement were brought by deserters during the night. Obviously they could announce no more than that Hydarnes had marched in a certain direction. Then came the scouts from the hills, who arrived at break of day, *ἤδη διαφανούσης ἡμέρης*. There is nothing in Herodotus to show that they brought any information beyond *τῶν Περσέων τὴν περίοδον*. The Persians reached the Phocians, who were stationed (we have seen reason to suppose) about the junction of the path Anopaea with the steep path above the right bank of the Asopus, somewhere near the monastery, at daybreak—*ὥς τε δὴ δέφαινε* (217). This point is separated from Leonidas's position by a long stretch of difficult country. Yet the advent of the Persians and the announcement of the scouts are represented as simultaneous. It would of

course be absurd to press the expressions of Herodotus to the letter, but it is obvious that we cannot allow the scouts many minutes of observation if his words are to be even roughly accurate. We must assume that they saw the Persians come up, and may suppose that they saw the Phocians fall back before them up the path towards Doris. It is quite conceivable that they were even despatched by the Phocian commander himself to tell Leonidas that he was retiring on Phocis pursued by the enemy, whom he would endeavour to hold in check and delay as long as possible! At all events it does not appear that they waited long enough to see the Persians enter upon the path to Alpeni, or that any later message came down to Thermopylae. Leonidas, therefore, may naturally have supposed (possibly on the authority of the Phocian commander) that the Persians were making for the valley of the Kephissus and would not become dangerous to him before the next day at the earliest. Since he had not himself known of the existence of the Anopaea path until after his arrival at Thermopylae (vii. 175), he might well imagine that Hydarnes was still ignorant of it, especially as the other path, if not to be called a road, must always have been much the more conspicuous and frequented. On the other hand he was certainly kept informed of the progress of the naval contest (cf. vii. 175, viii. 21), and must have known that the decisive battle was expected on that very day. It was of supreme importance that that battle should be fought, but the Persian admirals would decline it if they learnt that Thermopylae was evacuated—was it for this news that they waited that morning (viii. 15)? There was no doubt grave danger in holding the pass for even one day longer, if the Persians were on the march for Phocis. On the morrow they might be threatening the rear of the Greeks from Bundonitza or their communications from Elatea, and once Hydarnes got upon their line of retreat the doom of the defenders was sealed—unless indeed the fleet were victorious and could pick them up under the eyes of Xerxes, as the Athenian triremes saved the Greek army from Brennus two centuries later. But the end was worth the risk, so Leonidas judged. Not so his Peloponnesian allies. They could urge at the council that the position was turned and had become untenable, that the fleet had had its chance, that now not a moment must be lost if they were to make good their retreat. So they went their way. But inasmuch as the Boeotians volunteered to stay, Leonidas reckoned that he could carry out his purpose without the Peloponnesians. He had still about 1,400 hoplites, besides the Helots, and no very determined attack was to be expected before the turning force appeared. The sudden descent of Hydarnes must have taken the defenders by surprise. All retreat was cut off.³⁷ Leonidas had

³⁷ Herodotus (vii. 225) clearly means by the *κολωνίς ἐν τῇ ἐσόδῳ*, where the last stand was made, one of the two mounds in the middle 'gate,' cf. vii. 176. But it is perhaps possible that the tradition was attracted to the lion, and the last stand was really on the mound near the east 'gate.' If so, the Greeks may

have been overwhelmed in an attempt to withdraw, and the story of the sortie in front of the wall (Hdt. vii. 223, Diod. xi. 9, 10 Plut. *de Her. mal.* 32) may have arisen out of the confusion of the two mounds. Cf. Leake, *N. Greece*, ii. pp. 36-7, 52; Grundy *Gt. Pers. War*, pp. 288-90.

already fallen, and the rest of the devoted band could only share his fate and his fame.³⁸

The disaster at Thermopylae rendered further defence of the Euboean channel nugatory, even if the Greek fleet could have held the position longer, which after their losses in the third day's battle they evidently could not (Hdt. viii. 18-9). The land roads southward were now open, and the Greek hope of snatching a naval victory had failed. The defence fell back to the isthmus and Salamis. Xerxes resumed his march.

Herodotus (viii. 31-3) describes the advance as though the whole Persian host traversed the pass from Trachis (which must have surrendered on the fall of Thermopylae) into Doris and down the valley of the Kephissus. But it has been generally recognised that the easier passes, and especially the main road along the coast, must also have been used. Probably Herodotus's information was limited to the march of a single corps, and was derived from a Phocian source at Delphi. The Phocians were afterwards anxious to cover up and excuse their Medism and this anxiety (we have seen) is reflected in most that Herodotus says of them. They would be sure to make much of their sufferings in the cause of Hellas in order to prove their loyalty and the compulsion that forced them to serve in the enemy's ranks (ix. 17, 31). There is also some difficulty in reconciling the destruction of the temple at Abae with other notices of it in Herodotus (viii. 27, 134; cf. M. Hauvette's useful summary of Pomtow's objections, *Hérodote*, pp. 380-3). We may suspect that the devastation of Phocis is grossly exaggerated, and that the real attitude of the Phocians is better expressed by Herodotus's remark in ix. 31 (apologetic as it is) than by his highly coloured narrative in viii. 27-33. Yet it can hardly be denied that there must have been some basis of fact in the story. A Persian division, especially if detached on an independent march, and free from the surveillance of the head-quarters' staff, was likely to do much damage in a Greek territory whether the inhabitants were officially regarded as friendly or hostile. In the case of Phocis there is a strong presumption that the devastation was unauthorised and contrary to the king's wishes, for, in the first place, Xerxes does not appear to have accompanied the column through the Trachinian pass, but only reappears after the junction of the coast road, secondly the Thessalians, the old enemies of the Phocians, guided the invasion by this route, and, thirdly, special care was taken that the Boeotians should not suffer in the same way—Macedonian officers were sent in advance to the several cities to protect them. This fact, and the settled policy of clemency pursued by Xerxes till he reached Thespieae, justify us in saying that the burning of the three Phocian

³⁸ It may be urged against the theory here stated that Leonidas must have had constant information of Hydarnes' progress. I quite admit the force of this objection, but every alternative is open to some objections, and this theory seems to me the least objectionable. It

keeps nearer to Herodotus than that which I regard as the second-best, namely, that Leonidas sent the Peloponnesians to meet Hydarnes, whether in the pass near Bundonitza (as I should say), or near Alpeni (Bury, *l.c.* p. 102), or on the Anopaea (Grundy, p. 308).

towns south of Parapotamii (if it is true) must have been perpetrated before the king arrived, and not, as Herodotus says, on the expedition to Delphi.

These considerations may throw some light on the despatch of the detachment to Delphi (Hdt. viii. 35-9). The expedition is wrapped up in supernatural disguises. It is difficult to reconcile with a later passage in Herodotus (ix. 42). The attitude of the Delphians and the interests of Xerxes himself make it improbable *a priori*. The inscription recorded by Diodorus (xi. 14) cannot be used to confirm Herodotus, for (assuming it to be nearly contemporary) it is only another expression of the same story derived from the same source. If the Persians wanted to sack the temple, why did they never do so? Neither the oracle nor the alleged repulse of this detachment gives any adequate explanation. The reason can only be that the Persians did not want to sack it. No wonder that the whole episode has been rejected by some historians! But if no force was ever sent to Delphi at all, there was no sufficient motive to invent the story—it is too far-fetched an apology for the general attitude of the Delphians during the war. We must accept the fact that a force *was* sent, and it is supported by the detail with which the road is indicated. The starting point of the road and the express mention of Xerxes' orders preclude the hypothesis of Pomtow that the detachment was merely a band of marauders. But the purpose of their mission may have been misrepresented. According to Herodotus that purpose was *ὅπως συλήσαντες τὸ ἱερόν τὸ ἐν Δελφοῖσι βασιλεῖ Ξέρξῃ ἀποδέξαιεν τὰ χρήματα*. But it is possible that the real intention was to *protect* the temple and its treasures from plundering such as had befallen the Phocian towns. Perhaps the Persian guard was harassed from Mount Parnassus by indiscreet zealots who were not in the secrets of the God, and had been carefully sent away by his promise to take care of his own. But in any case the Delphians were sure in after days to represent the expedition as hostile, and ascribe their protection to Apollo rather than to Xerxes. If the words *ἀποδέξαιεν τὰ χρήματα* cover an inventory, the king had indeed an accurate knowledge of the precious things in the temple, and the sacred armour may have come out of its shrine only to be registered!

Meanwhile the Persian army pushed on through Boeotia. Thespieae and Plataea were laid in ashes, and Athens, save the acropolis, was occupied without a blow. Xerxes naturally made for Athens rather than the isthmus, because Athens had been from the outset one of the chief objects of his attack, and because he wished to recover touch with his fleet in order to concert the further operations against the Peloponnesians. The Athenians had abandoned the city and migrated to Salamis, Aegina, or Troezen. Perhaps this migration had begun on the return of the Thessalian expedition, when the oracle of the wooden wall was probably delivered, for the Spartans in Herodotus, viii. 142, speak of the Athenians having lost *two* harvests. At all events we must not take too seriously the statement that the Athenians expected the Peloponnesians to meet the enemy in Boeotia. It is partly afterthought in the light of the Plataean campaign (cf. Ed. Meyer, *G.A.* iii.

p. 384), partly a natural protest of the agrarian opposition against the policy of Themistocles and the Peloponnesians.

The yeomen of Attica, heroes of Marathon, adherents of Aristides, who had withstood the creation of the fleet, could scarcely be expected to surrender their farms to pillage without a murmur. In the story of Herodotus the conflict of parties turns mainly on the interpretation of the oracle about the wooden wall (vii. 142-3). But the oracle had been merely the occasion, and its interpretation involved important questions of policy, not only military. Themistocles had carried his main point, the plan of campaign, but he was compelled to purchase the support of the opposition by very large concessions. Aristides and Xanthippus had been recalled and promised military and naval commands for the next year. Athens was not now completely evacuated, but a garrison was left in the acropolis—for so we may interpret the story of the 'few poor men' (Hdt. viii. 51), which seems to be a version devised to cover the failure of the defence, (cf. 53, *ἔδεε γὰρ κ.τ.λ.*).³⁹ Themistocles doubtless was not sorry to see Athens laid in ruins. He wished to abandon the old site and transfer the city to the Piraeus (cf. Thuc. i. 93, Plut. *Them.* 4, 10, 19). But the opposition, who wished Athens to be agrarian, not commercial, suspected his design and clung to the inland rock. Their scruples about an even temporary evacuation had to be soothed by the disappearance of the sacred snake, and they insisted on retaining the acropolis as a guarantee of eventual return. Aristides, τὰ πολιτικά δεινός, may also have used the crisis to extort from the government the political concessions carried through by him after the war (Plut. *Arist.* 22, cf. Aristotle, *Pol.* viii. 4, 1304, *Aθ. πολ.* 23-4), which I am inclined, in spite of the alleged dates, to interpret to mean the opening of the archonship to his Zeugite clients and the introduction of the lot. Possibly the 'strike' of the crews, met by the eight drachmae a head provided by the Areopagus, may be connected with the same agitation. The history of the struggle of parties is obscure, but the fact emerges that, as in the fabled conflict between Athena and Poseidon, the champions of land and sea were contending for the prize of Attica, and the shoot that sprang from the burnt stump of Athena's olive may have had a special significance beyond what has generally been seen in it.

The Greek fleet took up its station in the sound of Salamis, not merely, as Herodotus would have us believe (viii. 40), at the request of the Athenians, who were anxious to transport their families and property, nor in any hesitation about fighting there, but determined to bring on a decisive battle if possible. It consisted of the still seaworthy part of the ships which had fought at Artemisium, reinforced by a few fresh adherents and by such contingents as had been collected meanwhile at Pogon. The total according to Aeschylus (*Pers.* 338-40) was 300, with an additional special squadron of ten,

³⁹ See Bury in the *Classical Review*, x. (1896), pp. 416-7. His argument is perhaps open to criticism in details—the occupation of the acropolis is not quite in harmony with the decree recorded by Plutarch (*Them.* 10); the

fortnight's siege is hard to reconcile with Hdt. viii. 66-70—but seems to me right in the main, and is quite borne out by a consideration of the position of parties.

and these figures, although the 300 is evidently a round number, are surely (as already argued) nearer the truth than those given by Herodotus (viii. 42-8, 82).

It is possible, however, to show how Herodotus' total, 380, may have been calculated from the basis of Aeschylus' total, 310. Aeschylus lays a stress on the separation of the ten—*δεκάς δ' ἦν τῶνδε χωρὶς ἔκκριτος*—which suggests that they played a distinct part in the naval operations. Now Herodotus assigns thirty ships to the Aeginetans, but notes that they had also other ships in commission with which they were guarding their own country (viii. 46). Pausanias (ii. 29, § 5) mentions that the Aeginetans furnished the largest contingent after the Athenian (cf. also Hdt. vii. 203). In Herodotus' list the Corinthians come next to the Athenians, with forty ships, so that the statement of Pausanias would be justified if the Aeginetans had this same number forty. Herodotus' total, exclusive of the Lemnian and Tenian vessels which came over from the enemy, is 378. But his items make only 366. It is usually held that the missing twelve are the Aeginetan extra squadron, and Stein accordingly proposes to insert *δυσκαίδεκα* at the end of the clause *ἦσαν μὲν σφί καὶ ἄλλαι πεπληρωμένοι νέες*. But obviously Cobet's suggestion, *ἄλλαι ἰ*, is far more convincing. These considerations make it probable that the ten ships of Aeschylus are to be identified with the 'other' Aeginetan ships. But the author of the computation may easily have overlooked this identity and added the ten Aeginetan ships to the 310 of Aeschylus, making 320. Now the difference between 320 and the 380 of Herodotus is exactly sixty, and Herodotus in vii. 168, a passage wholly disconnected with his list here, tells us that the Corcyraeans manned sixty ships to come to join the allies, but never rounded Cape Malea, because they did not wish to commit themselves to either side. However that may be, these sixty ships might not unnaturally be reckoned to the total allied fleet afloat, and account for the remaining difference between Herodotus and Aeschylus.

We have still to account for the discrepancy of two between Herodotus' items and his total. It might be suggested that he has omitted two Naxian vessels, for Plutarch (*de Her. mal.* 36) notes that Hellanicus credited 6 to the Naxians, whereas Herodotus only allows them 4 (Plutarch says 3). But all the items except the 10 Aeginetans, which is supported by or derived from Aeschylus, seem to me dubious. I prefer to say that Herodotus (or his authority) started from the total 380, deducted 12 for the Aeginetans and deserters, and then deducted the deserters by inadvertence a second time. The double deduction of these two ships would be the easier because they are mentioned very far apart, and only added to the list 34 chapters after it is completed. Herodotus may of course have had information about particular contingents, but our general conclusion is that where he has not simply repeated his figures from Artemisium, he has more or less adjusted them to make up his total of 380, which was derived from a different source.⁴⁰

⁴⁰ The question whether we ought to read *τετρακοσίας* or *τριακοσίας* in Thuc. i. 74, neither affects the problem here nor gains any elucidation from it.

To return for a moment to the Corcyraeans—it is very remarkable that Thucydides seems studiously to ignore the story of their double dealing in the very passage (i. 31–43) where he would naturally have mentioned it. Although they never saw the enemy, and could never be inscribed on the roll of fame among the states, ὅσαι ξυγκαθελοῦσαι τὸν βάρβαρον ἔστησαν τὸ ἀνίθημα, may they not have had more to say for themselves than was told to Herodotus? The subsequent neutrality of Corcyra between the Peloponnesian and Athenian leagues, like the subsequent neutrality of Argos, predisposed Herodotus and his contemporaries to see neutrality in her attitude during the Persian invasion, and such neutrality could hardly be thought to have been benevolent. But perhaps it was never in the Corcyraean bond to come up to Salamis. The possibility that the Persian admirals might detach a squadron from Euboea or Phalerum to attempt a descent on Laconia in concert with the Argives was sufficiently near to make any prudent commander anxious to keep a fleet in reserve in the south (cf. Thuc. i. 73). The Corcyraeans for their part were sufficiently remote from the Persian attack and sufficiently exposed to the Carthaginian to make them unwilling to incur liabilities in the Aegean which might hamper them in the Ionian sea. Possibly their obligations to the allies were from the first limited to the defence of the western and southern coasts of the Peloponnese.

It was doubtless the problem, how to bring the enemy's fleet to battle in the position most favourable to themselves, that chiefly occupied the council of Greek admirals at Salamis. Herodotus' account of their meetings and deliberations is more than questionable. No one who has studied his history of the war will be ready to believe that he had any intimate knowledge of the plans of the leaders. His information is entirely external, and his reports of what went on at the meetings are merely dramatic expressions of it, only a few degrees nearer to historical fact than the bedchamber counsellings of Darius and Atossa or Xerxes and Artabanus. Possibly a *mot* such as the retorts of Themistocles to Adeimantus may have become current and been remembered, but the speeches as a whole are scarcely less imaginary than those in the *Persae* of Aeschylus, and the allusions to later events can hardly be mistaken. The narrative is dominated and distorted throughout by the idea that the Peloponnesians were eager to run away to the isthmus. That idea is incredible. The arguments against retirement were as obvious as they were final. The tone of feeling in the fleet described by Aeschylus, and by Herodotus himself when he comes to the battle, is fundamentally different. The vein of spite in the story is patent. This besetting illusion of Herodotus appears to be compounded of the following elements of fact and feeling, which act and react in a complicated way on one another and on the whole narrative. First, the main source of the illusion, Themistocles' message to Xerxes. The fame and prominence of this message have had a disastrous effect on the tradition. Themistocles told Xerxes that the Greeks were bent on running away, and posterity has taken him at his word! There is a close parallel in the story of his second message (Hdt. viii. 109–10) which was evolved out of his letter to Artaxerxes (Thuc. i. 137). Second,

Athenian prejudice, which was only too eager to accept this literal interpretation so far as concerned the Peloponnesians and especially the Corinthians. Third, the natural temptation to the historian to make much of the fears of the Greeks for the sake of dramatic effect. Fourth, the popular misapprehension of the point of Themistocles' message and consequently of the battle itself. The advantage aimed at was not so much, as was afterwards supposed (Hdt. viii. 60, Thuc. i. 74), that the Greeks might fight in the narrow waters of the sound instead of the open gulf by the isthmus, but rather that they might divide the enemy's fleet, as at Artemisium, and so redress the disparity of numbers. This consideration, as soon as it is realised, brings out the full absurdity of the notion of the retirement. There are idiots and cowards in every assemblage of men, and of course there may have been some in the Greek fleet who wished to retreat. It is also likely that a rumour of such an intention was put abroad by the admirals to help Themistocles' strategem, and their repeated meetings might give colour to it. But we refuse to believe that retreat to the isthmus was ever seriously contemplated, much less deliberately voted by the council!

Herodotus' account of the meetings (viii. 49-63, 74-5, 78-83) is full of suspicious features. He describes three. The first decides on the news of the fall of the acropolis to retire to the isthmus, the second reverses this decision at the instance of Themistocles prompted meanwhile by Mnesiphilus, the third, held on the eve of the battle, is only prevented from reverting to it by the advent of Aristides with the news that retreat is now impossible. At the first the admirals, we are told, received in one breath the news of the entry of Xerxes into Attica and of the capture of the acropolis (viii. 50, 56), although (52) it held out *ἐπὶ χρόνον συχρόν*! Not only does the council decide to retreat to the isthmus, but Themistocles calmly acquiesces, and requires to be prompted by Mnesiphilus to protest! This meeting looks very much like a dramatic fiction devised on purpose to express the panic of the Greeks and to bring in Mnesiphilus. That mysterious prompter plays a part suspiciously suggestive of the detractors of Themistocles. It was a question much debated in the schools of the sophists whether *ἀρετή*, political capacity, was due to *φύσις* or to *διδασχὴ*, and Themistocles became a stock example in whom this question was 'clothed in circumstances' (v. Xen. *Mem.* iv. 2, 2, Plato, *Meno.* 93, Plut. *Them.* 2).⁴¹ Doubtless his case was an echo of political controversy. Mnesiphilus represents *διδασχὴ* and the enemies of Themistocles. Thucydides on the other side, in energetic protest against the story, contends for *φύσις*, (i. 138)—*ἦν γὰρ ὁ Θεμιστοκλῆς βεβαιότατα δὴ φύσεως ἰσχυρὸν δηλώσας κ.τ.λ.*—and surely with justice. It does not enhance the credit of the episode to find that Themistocles' published arguments, as represented by the words put into his mouth by Herodotus at the second meeting, do not repeat the railing accusation of Mnesiphilus against the allies of Athens, but are of a different order and more convincing. Mnesiphilus in fact seems to

⁴¹ See Busolt's excellent note, *Griech. Gesch.* 2nd ed. ii. p. 641, with the references there given.

have proved as useful a witness against the Peloponnesians as against Themistocles.

At the second meeting, according to Herodotus, Themistocles gets his way about staying at Salamis, but only by putting pressure on Eurybiades and in spite of Adeimantus. We may conjecture that what was really discussed was the message to be sent to Xerxes. The third meeting, we are told, assembled to debate about retreat, and (on the news of the Persian movement) broke up to prepare for battle. But is it not more probable that the dispositions and preparations for the battle were the sole and original business of the meeting? The supposed motive is only Herodotus' besetting illusion once more. The dramatic element in the story is here much in evidence. It appears in the despatch of Sikinnus early in the sitting, the surrounding of the Greek fleet by the Persians in the middle of it, and the arrival of Aristides and the Tenians at the close! Herodotus brings Aristides straight back from exile, but he must really have been recalled early in the summer.⁴² Herodotus has not hitherto had occasion to mention him, but that may only mean that he has carefully been kept out of the story. The opposition to Themistocles was not likely afterwards to boast of its past attitude! Mr. Bury (*Class. Rev.* x. 1896, pp. 414-8) very plausibly argues that Aristides was now one of the ten *στρατηγοί*, and in command of part of the Athenian troops on the island of Salamis, which would account for his action at Psyttaleia. He ingeniously explains his escape from the Persian fleet, and arrival from Aegina, by the suggestion that he had been sent in the trireme that went to Aegina to fetch the Aeacidæ.

The battle of Salamis is a difficult problem, but its difficulties are rather critical than topographical. The physical features of the scene are plain enough and have long been adequately known. The two cardinal points, the site of the town and harbour of Salamis and the island of Psyttaleia, are identified to everybody's satisfaction, and recent researches do not add much of any moment.⁴³ The Heracleum and Xerxes' throne remain doubtful. No fresh evidence identifies Keos or Cynosura, or Colias or the Temple of Athena Skiras. The Silenian shore is a little point gained, but the 'Trophy of Themistocles' and the 'Polyandrium' are not securely proved, and in any case have no bearing on the battle, for the dead would of course be taken back to the station of the fleet for burial, and the trophy might well be erected near the anchorage 'whence they sailed forth to victory' (cf. Thuc. i. 54, ii. 92). But the broad features of the topography are sufficient to check our literary authorities, and if they have not always had due weight in the estimation of the evidence, it has been rather from deficiency of imagination in the historian than from ignorance of the facts.

⁴² 'Αθ. πολ. 22, ἔρχομαι ῥηχίδου, cf. Plut. Arist. 8. Probably on the return of the expedition from Thessaly.

⁴³ On the topography cf. Lolling in *Hist. und Philol. Aufsätze E. Curtius gewidmet*, pp.

1-10; Goodwin in *Papers of the Amer. Sch. at Athens*, i. pp. 239-62; Milchhoefer, *Erläut. Text zu Karten von Attika*, vii.-viii. pp. 28-35; Bauer, *Oesterr. Jahresh.* iv. pp. 90-111.

Of our literary sources Aeschylus, an eye-witness writing in the fresh memory of the events, is obviously the best. We may not find a systematic account of the battle in the *Persae*, but the pictures given are assuredly trustworthy so far as they go. Herodotus has collected a miscellaneous store of anecdotes, but every attentive reader must see that he has little idea of the operations as a whole. He deals in episodes and incidents such as might be picked up from floating tradition, but he scarcely attempts to understand the strategy. What general notion of the battle can be detected in his narrative appears to be ludicrously naive and entirely *a priori*. His attempts to adjust to it the details which he records can hardly be expected to be very successful or consistent. Herodotus conceives the Greeks to have been ranged along the Salaminian coast, the Persians facing them along the Attic coast—were not the Greeks in possession of Salamis, the Persians of Attica? In order to get the Persian fleet from Phalerum opposite to the Greeks he moves it up the straits on the afternoon before the battle. That he imagines the Persians to have taken up that station at that time is clear from his expressions in viii. 70—*ἀνῆγον τὰς νέας ἐπὶ τὴν Σαλαμῖνα καὶ παρεκρίθησαν διαταχθέντες κατ' ἡσυχίην. τότε μὲν νυν οὐκ ἐξέχρησέ σφι ἡ ἡμέρη ναυμαχίην ποιήσασθαι· νύξ γὰρ ἐπεγένετο· οἱ δὲ παρεσκευάζοντο ἐς τὴν ὑστεραίην.* The time is late afternoon, and the word *παρεκρίθησαν* is conclusive as to the position. After the receipt of Themistocles' message therefore the Persians had only to swing round their right wing to enclose the Greeks on the west, *ἀνῆγον μὲν τὸ ἀπ' ἐσπέρης κέρας κυκλούμενοι πρὸς τὴν Σαλαμῖνα* (76), and to curl up the tail of their left so as to block the channels on each side of Psyttaleia at the east end of the straits. This movement of the left is oddly described because (as has been generally recognised) Herodotus holds a brief to vindicate the veracity of Bakis, and tries to force the situation at Salamis into conformity with his oracle, which was originally invented (if my interpretation is right) to suit the Euboean conditions.

But Herodotus' conception cannot be admitted. It is hardly credible that the Greeks allowed the Persians quietly to file past the noses of their ships and take up their position at only a mile's distance. It is hardly credible that the Persians allowed the Greeks quietly to embark next morning and put to sea in their faces. But the conception is flatly inconsistent with other features of the story. Themistocles' message becomes a ridiculous farce, for when once the Persians got opposite the Greek fleet escape was impossible without a battle—there could be no question of slipping away. All the parade of secrecy, of which Herodotus' makes so much, becomes meaningless. Psyttaleia, occupied for the reason that it lay *ἐν πόρῳ τῆς ναυμαχίης τῆς μελλούσης ἔσεσθαι* (viii. 76), becomes utterly remote from the probable course of the action. Finally Herodotus' conception is hopelessly irreconcilable with the descriptions of Aeschylus. But our critical canon must be that Herodotus may be used to supplement Aeschylus, but not to contradict him, and later writers may be used to supplement both these authorities, but not to contradict them where both are consistent.

What then do we gather from Aeschylus, and how far can we supplement

his account from Herodotus or Diodorus and Plutarch? In Aeschylus there is no hint of the Persians offering battle before the advent of Sikinnus. Themistocles' messenger arrives apparently in the afternoon (*Pers.* 357), and the movement to surround the Greeks begins at nightfall after the evening meal (364-5, 375, 377-8). Herodotus would seem to have antedated the start from Phalerum to the afternoon and postdated the envelopment to midnight (viii. 70, 76). Professor Goodwin (p. 251) to save Herodotus supposes that the fleet moved out to the south-east of Salamis before the message came—to my mind an absolutely impossible interpretation of Herodotus' description of this movement in the passage (viii. 70) already discussed. Bauer (p. 100) sends the Persians inside Psyttaleia to the harbour of Piræus, but this compromise seems to me to be no improvement. The fact is that Herodotus has simply adapted or misinterpreted his information to suit his preconceived idea of the battle.

Xerxes' order to his admirals is given by Aeschylus as follows (*Pers.* 366-8):—

τάξαι νεῶν μὲν στίφος ἐν στοίχοις τρισὶν
ἔκπλους φυλάσσειν καὶ πόρους ἱλιρρόθους,
ἄλλας δὲ κύκλῳ νῆσον Αἶαντος πέριξ.

That is to say, the mass of the fleet was to be ranged in *three* lines to guard the *three* channels, (1) between Attica and Psyttaleia, (2) between Psyttaleia and Salamis, (3) between Salamis and the Megarid, while other ships were to be stationed round about [the southern coasts of] Salamis to complete the semicircle. Probably Aeschylus pictures to himself a continuous line of ships round the outer side of the island, but a few cruisers would suffice to cut off fugitive boats or blockade-runners, and keep up communication between the main squadrons, which was all that was wanted. To these dispositions must be added what Aeschylus describes later (447-54), the occupation of Psyttaleia by a garrison of Persian troops. According to both Aeschylus and Herodotus (viii. 76) the purpose of this occupation was that the troops might rescue the friends and destroy the foes who might be driven upon the island during the coming battle. But it may be suspected that there is something of afterthought in this explanation. It may be doubted whether the Persians looked for a regular battle or any immediate fighting. All their dispositions are directed (*Pers.* 369-71, 384-5) to a blockade or siege of Salamis, and the Greek sally is not at all of the sort they had expected (391-4). The occupation of Psyttaleia would obviously much facilitate the blockade, and may be simply explained by that consideration.

All night long, if we are to believe Aeschylus (382-5), the Persian squadrons patrolled their several beats, but the Greeks made no attempt to run the blockade. Aristides must have been the last to get through, and he went in not out. At daybreak the Persians heard with consternation the pæan chanted and the trumpet ring out as their enemy, still invisible [in the inner strait], put forth to battle (386-97). Suddenly the Greek fleet emerged to view [round the long eastern promontory of Salamis], the right wing leading

in orderly array (398-401). So far there has been no word of a forward movement of the Persians. They are still outside the straits south of Psyttaleia. But when the Greek fleet burst into sight, οὐκέτ' ἦν μέλλειν ἀκμῇ (407). With a cheer (406) they *streamed* (412, cf. 88 and Goodwin, pp. 249, 254) through the channels, and charged the enemy (408), hoping no doubt to throw them into confusion and defeat them before their rearguard had time to get clear of the inner strait. But the Greek admirals seem to have had the same idea, and carried it out with greater skill, helped perhaps by their smaller numbers and preconcerted action. They backed water (if we may here draw upon Herodotus, viii. 84) and fell back toward the northern shore, thus both gaining time for their last vessels to come out into line, and drawing the enemy on into the trap. For the Persian squadrons, entering the narrows from the open gulf with too broad a front (cf. Diod. xi. 18), fell into helpless confusion, and offered excellent chances for the Greek ramming tactics (413-6). An indescribable *méléc* ensued. The Athenians pressed the enemy back on the west, the Aeginetans, acting perhaps in concert with their squadron outside in the gulf, worked round his right flank and cut off his retreat (417-8, cf. Hdt. viii. 85-6, 91). Yet so stubbornly did the Barbarians and their allies fight that it was only night that put an end to the battle (428), and a large proportion (probably half) of their ships were able to make their escape to Phalerum. The garrison on Psyttaleia, however, abandoned to their fate, were all shot down or hacked to pieces by the victors (454-64). According to Herodotus (viii. 95) it was Aristides who perpetrated this butchery. Some Athenian hoplites were drawn up on the shore of Salamis, probably on the eastern point of the island, where they could perform for their fellow-countrymen the same services as the troops on Psyttaleia were rendering to the Persians. Aristides, if we may accept Mr. Bury's ingenious theory, was in command of them, and doubtless saw his opportunity of claiming for his landsmen a share in the glory of the victory won by their naval rivals. As the Athenians formed the west wing of the fleet, he can have found no difficulty in getting the hoplites ferried across to Psyttaleia, where they massacred the Persians to a man.

Herodotus, apart from his general misconception of the positions and preliminary movements of the fleets, agrees very well with the version of Aeschylus. There are no contradictions in his narrative of the actual battle (viii. 83-95). The Greeks put out at daybreak. They are at once attacked by the enemy. They at first back water, then charge. The Athenians are opposed to the Phoenicians, who form the western wing of the Persian line. The Lacedaemonians are opposed to the Ionians on the eastern wing. The Lacedaemonians therefore fought on the Greek left, the Athenians on the right. Aeschylus (*Pers.* 399-400) says that the right wing led out, and we must assume that the Lacedaemonians in virtue of their hegemony led the van. But what had been the right wing in the bay of Salamis became the left in the battle, for the Greek fleet on passing the eastern cape of the island changed front and faced the south. The Aeginetans were probably with the Lacedaemonians at the eastern extremity of the line, for they station them-

selves in the channel and intercept the fugitives making for Phalerum. It seems to be implied that they had turned the enemy's right flank, and it may be conjectured that this movement of theirs decided the day, for it is the Aeginetans who receive the prize. Herodotus, like Aeschylus, emphasises the confusion into which the Barbarians fell, and his anecdotes of the various ships which encountered one another in the battle well illustrates this point.

Curiously enough it is Herodotus who has unwittingly preserved almost the only details which we can gather about what was taking place at the other end of the sound of Salamis. He retails a malicious Athenian story against Adeimantus and the Corinthians—how at the very outset of the battle they hoisted sail and made off (towards the isthmus, we must understand), and were only turned back by a mysterious barque which met them off the temple of Athena Skiras with the news that the Greeks were victorious. They then returned to the fleet at Salamis after all was over. But surely it is clear that the Corinthians were despatched towards the western strait to hold in check the enemy's squadron which had been posted there,⁴⁴ just as the fifty-three ships were sent to Chalcis from Artemisium to meet the 200 which were sailing round Euboea. Since the Corinthians claimed to have played a foremost part in the battle, and the rest of Greece (except the Athenians) admitted their claim, we may conclude that they spent the day fighting, probably against heavy odds, although possibly not alone. The scene of their action depends on the identification of the temple, which is quite uncertain. Personally I should look for it at the monastery of the Phaneromene near the ferry to Megara,⁴⁵ but a situation near or north of the island of S. George is not impossible. In this episode Herodotus has unconsciously preserved a strong confirmation of that account of the battle which we have found in Aeschylus, and a strong argument against his own conception.

Diodorus is probably following Ephorus, and Ephorus had a keen sense of the intelligible, which in spite of its occasional temptations is a valuable faculty. Accordingly Diodorus brings out clearly the three essential points: the blockade of the Megarian strait, the forward movement of the Greeks out from Salamis, and the fact that it was the attempt of the Persians to enter the sound from the open sea with too many ships abreast that threw them into confusion, and so he produces the most lucid account of any of our authorities (xi. 15-19). On the other hand, this account is simply constructed out of the materials supplied by Aeschylus and Herodotus. I doubt whether in the whole narrative there is a single new item of fact. It has been built up by reflection, inference, rationalism, and conjecture. It is in some respects an admirable piece of

⁴⁴ I am glad to see that Mr. Grundy has adopted this suggestion (*Gl. Pers. War*, p. 405). Plutarch, *de Her. mal.* 39, justly appeals to the epitaphs on Adeimantus and the Corinthians to refute the story of their flight.

⁴⁵ The passage in Plutarch, *Sol.* 9, which

might throw some light on the point is unfortunately mutilated. Solon's sham Megarians may have approached Salamis from the side of Megara. Cf. *De Her. mal.* 39, *περὶ τὰ λήγοντα τῆς Σαλαμίνος*.

work, but it is exactly on a level with the work of a modern historian of the campaign—it is reasoned history, not independent historical evidence. The statement that the Egyptians furnished the squadron sent to the western strait is an inference from their apparent absence from the battle, just as the statement that the Cilicians, Pamphylians, and Lycians came next to the Phoenicians and Cypriotes is an application of the method of residues. Ephorus perhaps rejected the destruction of the Cilicians in Herodotus, viii. 14, and evidently reckoned the Carians with the Greek contingents. He also seems to have seen objections to the episode of the dramatic return of Aristides, for he replaces him by a Samian swimmer, whom I suspect to be a conflation of Skyllias and Hegesistratus (Hdt. ix. 90–1). Diodorus is irreconcilable with Herodotus on the arrangement of the contingents on the wings of the two fleets. His reasons (if they are meant to be reasons) are arbitrary or inadequate. His tale of the losses, forty Greek ships and 200 Persian, is in itself plausible, but probably rests upon some calculation. He reckons 400 Persian ships at Mycale, and we have seen that data in Herodotus point to 600 at Salamis. At best the figures are only an estimate.

Plutarch is more likely than Diodorus to bring fresh evidence. He does add a number of details, but they are mostly of a trivial kind, and we cannot guarantee their accuracy. Is he right, for example, in shifting the exploit of Lycomedes from Artemisium to Salamis (Hdt. viii. 11, Plut. *Them.* 15)? or what is the value of the story of the sacrifice of the three captives, as to the occasion of which Plutarch does not seem to be quite consistent with himself (cf. *Them.* 13 and *Arist.* 9)? On the main features, however, he agrees well enough with Aeschylus. The channels and outer sea are occupied by Persian ships. The battle is fought in the sound, but at the eastern end of it, for the thick of the fighting is concentrated about Psyttaleia. The Barbarians struggle on till evening (*Them.* 12, 15, *Arist.* 8). On the other hand, Plutarch probably takes his 200 ships from Ephorus, although he (prudently?) does not call them the Egyptian squadron, and seems to imagine that they did all the blockading (and none of the fighting?). His most novel contribution to the story, the statement that Themistocles waited for the sea breeze before attacking, is inconsistent with Aeschylus and Herodotus, who agree that the Greeks moved out at daybreak, and may be invented on the model of Phormio's tactics in the gulf of Corinth (Thuc. ii. 84).

Our examination of the authorities has shown us that Herodotus has been led astray at the outset by his childish misconception of the battle, but is otherwise perfectly consistent with Aeschylus, that later writers have little or nothing to add to these two, that the account of Aeschylus was generally accepted, and that it was interpreted substantially as we have explained it. But there still remains the hardest question about the battle of Salamis—why was it ever fought at all?⁴⁶ Granted that the Persians were no longer strong enough to contain the Greek fleet at Salamis, and at the same time detach a large part of their own to effect a diversion behind the isthmus

⁴⁶ On this question Ed. Meyer has some excellent remarks, *Gesch. d. Alt.*, iii. § 224.

from Argos, yet was it not their obvious policy to ignore the Greeks and steer straight in full force for the Peloponnese? The Greeks might follow if they pleased, but they must lose the advantage of their stronghold in the sound, and could they venture to face the undivided Persian fleet in the open sea? Clearly it was this danger that preoccupied the mind of Themistocles. His problem was not how to get the Greeks to fight at Salamis, but how to get the Persians to attack them there. It was with this object that his famous message was devised. But how came the Persian leaders, whose strategy had hitherto been irreproachably prudent and correct, to fall into the trap? Aeschylus (*Pers.* 353-4, 362) can only ascribe the blunder to divine infatuation. Herodotus in the mouths of Demaratus and Artemisia (vii. 235, viii. 68, cf. vii. 139, viii. 136, ix. 9) echoes Greek criticism. Thucydides (i. 69) suggests that Xerxes failed from his own mistakes. Was it the prospect of annihilating the Greek fleet at a blow, and getting rid of it once and for all, that tempted him? So we must conclude. But was it not easier to annihilate the Greek fleet at the isthmus? What better news could Themistocles have sent the Persian admirals than that the Greeks were bent on running away from Salamis? By all means let them go! Does not this reflection surely indicate that it was the second clause in Themistocles' message that proved so tempting a bait? The Greeks were quarrelling among themselves and a strong party of them was ready to medize on the first appearance of the Persian fleet. What party? Themistocles does not leave us in doubt, he says distinctly—the Athenians! Put into plain words his message means 'Our allies have played us false. We have already lost Attica, and now they refuse to defend our families and property in Salamis. We have had enough of them, and are anxious to make terms with you.' And, to be candid, was there not a very large element of truth in that message? I think that any one who ponders the internal political crisis at Athens, of which we have already seen evidence, and compares it with the negotiations of the next year and the intrigues of ten years before, will admit that there was real danger of that party coming into power which was opposed rather to Sparta than to Persia, which valued Attic farms more than empire overseas, and municipal liberties more than national independence. We may conjecture that both Xerxes and Themistocles had better reason to take the message seriously than is recorded in our tradition, and that there was a note of irony in Themistocles' voice as he dictated it, and remembering the price he had paid for Aristides and Xanthippus, identified himself with their policy! But the same influences, which have sharpened the one edge of the message against the Peloponnesians, have blunted the other in defence of Athens and the Alcmaeonidae.

The battle of Salamis was not in itself a crushing defeat for Xerxes, but its consequences were decisive of the whole campaign, for it meant that the Persian fleet had lost the command of the sea. Xerxes had now to think of his communications with Asia, and of the revolt which was bound to follow in Ionia so soon as a Greek squadron showed itself on the other side of the Aegean. The design of building a mole from Attica to Salamis, imputed to

him by the Greeks, is scarcely credible even as a pretence to mask his retreat (Hdt. viii. 97). Possibly the victors discovered some preparations for throwing a boom across one or more of the channels, and this fact was magnified in transmission. Possibly such words as ἐμφράττειν and διαζῶσαι (which are used by Diodorus and Plutarch *l.c.*) were too literally interpreted. Possibly the story is a mere invention on the analogy of Xerxes' other violations of Nature, the bridge over the sea and the canal through the land (cf. Isocr. *Paneg.* 89). At all events the Persian fleet at once withdrew to watch the Asiatic coasts and the Hellespont. Xerxes led back one army-corps to garrison Ionia. Mardonius was left with another in winter quarters in Thessaly to complete the conquest of Greece next year as best he could. Artabazus with the third was told off to secure the communications in Thrace and Macedonia, where there was trouble brewing.

The miseries of Xerxes' return (Aesch. *Pers.* 482-512, Hdt. viii. 115-7) offered a fine theme for rhetoric, of which the Greeks have made the most. But it was a leisurely and orderly retirement, and although there may have been some scarcity of provisions, the numbers at Mycale and under Artabazus next year (allowing for garrisons) sufficiently refute the tale of immense losses. The incident of the ice on the Strymon is an exaggeration which can be matched in the official story of Austerlitz.⁴⁷

Themistocles, we may well believe, would have pressed his victory farther and struck at once at the Hellespont. But the Athenians were not strong enough for such an enterprise without allies, and the Peloponnesian leaders were not eager to create an empire which must inevitably become Athenian (cf. Hdt. ix. 106), while their crews were doubtless anxious about next season's crops. Themistocles was afterwards fain to claim virtue for the necessity, and so gave occasion for his enemies to blaspheme.

But although Themistocles might have made more of Salamis to the advantage of Athens, the solid gain to the Greek cause may best be estimated from the fact that in the next campaign the allies assume the offensive not only by sea but also on land. As Aeschylus puts it (*Pers.* 728),

ναυτικὸς στρατὸς κακῶθεις πέζον ὤλεσε στρατόν.

J. A. R. MUNRO.

⁴⁷ Cf. Mr. J. H. Rose's note in the *Engl. Hist. Rev.* July 1902, pp. 537-8.

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SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE PERSIAN WARS.¹

3. *The Campaign of Plataea.*

MARDONIUS reoccupied Athens, Herodotus tells us (ix. 3), in the tenth month after Xerxes had taken it, that is to say not earlier than June of the next year. The pause in the war lasted therefore far beyond the winter. Both parties were no doubt anxious to gather the new harvest, but there were also other reasons for their delay.

Mardonius had been left in a difficult situation. The forces at his disposal were, it is true, still formidable. First, he had his own division, which we have seen reason to suppose was one of the six Persian *corps d'armée*, 60,000 strong. In confirmation of that estimate it may be noted that Herodotus assigns to him one sixth of Xerxes' army, which he conceives to have been the levy of the whole empire; and that if we compare the details of Mardonius' division (viii. 113, ix. 31) with the catalogue of Xerxes' host (vii. 61-5), and reckon a myriad for each contingent of infantry (Immortals: *θωρηκοφόροι*: Medes: Sacae and Bactrians: Indians), we get 50,000 infantry, which with 10,000 cavalry gives the exact composition conjectured for a Persian army corps. The small drafts incorporated according to Herodotus from other contingents may be assumed to have filled up the gaps made in the ranks by the first campaign. Second, Mardonius had his Greek auxiliaries, say 20,000 men, including the valuable Thessalian and Boeotian cavalry. Herodotus (ix. 32) estimates the Greek contingents at 50,000 men, but he expressly says that he has no authority for their numbers, and both probability and analogy (*e.g.* vii. 185, viii. 66) are against so high a computation. It may also be noticed that he assigns the same proportion of auxiliaries to Mardonius as to Xerxes (50,000 : 300,000 :: 300,000 : 1,800,000). Third, Mardonius could draw upon the corps of Artabazus so far as troops could be spared from the siege of Potidaea and garrison duties,² that is to say to the extent of 40,000 men (Hdt. ix. 66, 70). Herodotus no doubt implies (viii. 129) that Artabazus had lost the remaining third of his force in the siege, but that is merely an inference from the numbers, 60,000 in chapter 126,

¹ Continued from vol. xxii. p. 332.

² It is pretty clear from Thucydides that 20,000 men were far more than enough to

besiege Potidaea. Was it the entry of Aristeus through the sea (Thuc. i. 63) that revived the memory of Artabazus' attempt?

40,000 in Book ix. Similarly he infers from the subordination of Artabazus to Mardonius (cf. ix. 42) that the former's corps was only a detachment of the latter's (viii. 126).

Thus Mardonius might concentrate as many as 120,000 men for an attack on the Peloponnese. But the wall at the isthmus, defended by the best troops in Greece, must have appeared even to Xerxes impregnable by direct assault, and if we are to believe Herodotus (ix. 7-9) was still being strengthened. The position could not be turned by land, and Mardonius had not command of the sea. He might of course call across the Aegean the remnant of Xerxes' armada, which mustered at Samos in the spring and still numbered 300 ships (Hdt. viii. 130). But he must have known that it was no match for the allies if they met it with the full force of their united fleets, especially as a large proportion of the 300 ships were Ionian.

Under these circumstances irresponsible advisers might well recommend the policy of patience and corruption (cf. Hdt. ix. 2, 41), but Mardonius had to redeem his promises to the king. His best hope of effecting something seemed to lie in offering favourable terms to the Athenians. He might perhaps detach them from the league and bring over their navy to his side (Hdt. viii. 136), or failing that might use them as a lever to put pressure on the Peloponnesians and force them to come out of their 'island' and offer battle in Boeotia.

In this attempt the position of Athenian parties seemed to promise some chance of success. Themistocles, whose conspicuous loyalty to the common cause had been amply recognized by the Spartans, had surrendered the direction of affairs to his old rivals, Aristides and Xanthippus. We have seen in his retirement and their accession the bargain whereby he purchased their support for his policy in the war. But such an arrangement was not likely to be publicly known even among the Athenians, much less to Mardonius. In his eyes the new government, elected doubtless in the winter, represented only the party traditionally favourable to an alliance with Persia and hostile to Sparta. This was moreover the party of agrarian interests, and he held under his hand a precious hostage in the soil of Attica. It was also the party of the hoplite army, inclined to fight out the war on land rather than on sea. The new government assumed office in the spring (Hdt. viii. 131, cf. vii. 173-4) whether by the ordinary practice of the time³ or as an exceptional measure. Mardonius naturally waited for its installation before opening his negotiations. Meanwhile he had doubtless plenty to occupy him in organizing the new provinces and his own commissariat and Greek public opinion—if that was the purpose of the mission of Mys. It was not until diplomacy had been tried and failed that Mardonius took the field.

But what were the Greeks about all the early summer? Leotychidas mustered a fleet at Aegina at the beginning of spring, but to the great disgust of the Chian conspirators refused to proceed beyond Delos.⁴ The

³ Cf. Wilamowitz, *Aus Kydathen*, p. 57 *scqq.*

⁴ Hdt. viii. 131-2. The comments of the

historian, especially the often quoted words *τὴν δὲ Σάμον ἐπιστάτο δόξη καὶ Ἡρακλέας στή-*

allied army was not yet assembled. If the Greeks advanced after midsummer, why did they not move sooner? Herodotus has a ready answer (viii. 141, 144, ix. 6-8). The Lacedaemonians were busy fortifying the isthmus. When Alexander came to the Athenians with the seductive offers of Mardonius, they promised to meet the Persians in Boeotia. But once they had finished their wall they had no further care for the defence of Attica. It was only the danger pointed out to them by Chileus of letting the Athenian fleet pass over to the enemy that roused them to action. But the more this account is scrutinized the less satisfactory does it appear. (1) The wall must have been for all practical purposes ready long before (Hdt. viii. 71, ix. 10). (2) A defence of Attica can scarcely have been seriously contemplated by any responsible person. It is an afterthought suggested by subsequent events and fostered by Athenian prejudices. Attica had been deliberately abandoned in the previous year. Xerxes had ravaged the country and sacked the Acropolis. Individual citizens may have ventured back to their homes to take stock of the damage, but the notion (Hdt. viii. 109-10, ix. 6) that the population returned *en masse* and fell to building and ploughing, however effective to enhance Athenian sacrifices and blacken Peloponnesian selfishness, is an outrage upon common sense. Thucydides (i. 89) ignores it, and Herodotus here as elsewhere supplies hints for his own refutation. He does indeed send Alexander to Athens (viii. 136, 140), but he afterwards implies that he had to cross the strait to Salamis (διεπόρθμευσε ix. 4). The Athenians sowed their corn (viii. 109-10), but they did not reap it (καρπῶν ἐστερήθητε διξῶν ἤδη viii. 142), although they might have done so by the middle of June. There was no sufficient strategic motive to defend Attica. What was wanted was an offensive campaign to oust the Persians from Greece, and according to Herodotus' own version (ix. 7) the Athenians are even more urgent that the Spartans should march after Mardonius had occupied their territory. (3) The fact said to have been pointed out by Chileus must from the very first have been obvious to the meanest intelligence. (4) Herodotus does not account for the inaction of the fleet, except by the transparent hypothesis of timidity. Why was the Chian invitation declined and the Samian accepted (Hdt. viii. 131-2, ix. 90-2)? What accession of strength had meanwhile emboldened Leotychidas? The answer throws a curious side-light on Herodotus' story. We have already had some 'practice in dealing with his numbers. They are not arbitrary inventions, but neither are they always statements of literal fact. They are sometimes conventional, and sometimes cover a calculation. We have seen that the Athenian ships are still 200 at Salamis in spite of all their losses at Artemisium, and that the total number of the Greek fleet there may have been calculated from the Aeschylean figure 310. Now Herodotus (viii. 131) puts the fleet that assembled at Aegina in the spring under Leotychidas at 110 sail. Has he reformed his methods? I think not. These '110'

λας ἴσον ἀπέχειν, merely echo the disgust of the conspirators, and in particular of his name-

sake from whom he probably derived the information, at the failure of their mission.

represent only the Peloponnesian and other contingents. The '200' Athenian ships were absent! This inference is confirmed from quite a different quarter. It has often been observed that there is a redundancy of 800 in Herodotus' figures for the light-armed troops at Plataea (ix. 29). Professor E. Meyer (*Gesch. d. Alt.* iii. p. 408) has neatly explained it by supposing that the Athenian archers (Hdt. ix. 22, 60) are included in the reckoning, and his suggestion has been generally accepted. But we learn from Thucydides (ii. 13) and the *Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία* (24) that 1600 Athenians were bowmen. If 800 were serving at Plataea, where were the other 800? Plutarch (*Them.* 14) assigns 4 archers to each Athenian trireme in the fleet at Salamis. The obvious conclusion is that the Athenians still had 200 ships in commission and the missing archers were on board. The Athenians probably did not join Leotychidas until midsummer, after they had landed their army in Attica (Hdt. ix. 19). Hence Xanthippus was still able to go on the embassy to Sparta (Plut. *Arist.* 10). It may also be noted that Diodorus (xi. 34) reckons the allied fleet which crossed the Aegean at 250 ships. Probably he put the Athenian contingent at 140, as at Artemisium (xi. 12).

The equivocation about the ships (for that is what it comes to—mark the word *πᾶσαι* at the beginning of Hdt. viii. 132) is doubtless to be imputed not to Herodotus himself but to his Athenian informants. But it is none the less fatal to his attempt, already somewhat discredited, to fix the whole responsibility for the delay upon the Lacedaemonians. For it would seem to show that the authors of this version felt that there was something less heroic than they pretended in the attitude of the Athenians at this crisis. The withholding of the fleet was at least open to criticism, and *prima facie* the Athenians were no less to blame than the Spartans.

Are we then to accept the theory of most recent historians, that the allies were pulling different ways? The Spartans wished to remain on the defensive by land, but make a diversion in the Aegean, which by threatening the Persian communications might force Mardonius to withdraw without a battle. The Athenians wished to make the Peloponnesian army march out and cover Attica before consenting to use their fleet. This hypothesis, plausible at first sight, is not, I think, really tenable. Our dispute with Herodotus has reinforced it on one point by showing that the Athenian fleet was actually withheld, but on the other hand has robbed it of its strongest argument by discrediting the supposed return of the Athenians to their homes. There are also other objections. (1) It is surprising on the face of it to find Sparta advocating a naval expedition and shirking a campaign on land, while Athens withholds her fleet and insists upon taking the field. Very different was their attitude after the battle of Salamis. And it was not by reversing their natural rôles that either would make the most of her proper advantages whether for the common cause or for her own ulterior objects. (2) It can hardly be said that the numerical superiority of the Persians, reduced to its true proportions, was enough to deter the Spartans, for it did not deter them a few weeks later. (3) If a diversion in

the Aegean had offered any immediate prospect of getting rid of Mardonius, would the Athenians have refused it? Would they not rather have been the first to propose it? (4) The interests of the two partners were not really opposed. Both wanted to get rid of Mardonius as quickly as possible. The Athenians had, to be sure, the more pressing need, but the Spartans had reasons urgent enough. So long as he remained on Greek soil Sparta could not rest. His presence incited against her every enemy inside as well as outside her entrenched camp, and was a standing menace to her whole political system. The strain upon the allegiance of her allies was perilous. Her very existence was in jeopardy. Historians have somewhat failed to appreciate the critical position of Sparta. Distracted by the noisy importunity of Athenian grievances they have not observed that the tardiness of Spartan action demands some better explanation than a conventional phrase such as 'selfish apathy, or 'characteristic slowness.'

The fact seems to be that although the situation called for an offensive campaign, and the general plan of it had doubtless been agreed upon during the winter, both the allied governments found serious difficulties in carrying out their undertaking. The great obstacle to a Spartan advance was, as before, the danger from hostile neighbours in the Peloponnese. Persian intrigue penetrated, we have seen, behind the isthmus. Mardonius had an alternative plan in case the Athenians stood fast to their allies. He had concerted a scheme with the Argives (Hdt. ix. 12), whereby they undertook to hold back the Spartans from marching to the defence of the isthmus, while he was doubtless to attack the wall. How the Spartans were to be held in check may be gathered from subsequent events. The Mantineans and the Eleans arrived too late for the battle at Plataea, and afterwards banished their generals.⁵ Probably these two states were infected with Medism, and the delay was due to treason. Mardonius, in fact, like other enemies of Sparta—Pheidon, Themistocles, Alcibiades, Epaminondas—combined against her the central zone of disaffected states, Argos, Mantinea, and Elis, which runs across the Peloponnese. The roads to the isthmus were to be blocked and the Spartans cut off from their allies in the north. This danger explains, very differently from Herodotus (ix. 8–11), the backwardness of the Spartans, the secrecy and suddenness of their march, and the indirect route by which they went. The road by Orestheum⁶ kept well away from the Argive frontier, and held open to them the choice of passing by Mantinea or to the west of Maenalus as might prove advisable. The confederates, unready or irresolute, let them through. The Mantineans and Eleans waited for the issue of the battle of Plataea and then tardily gave their adhesion to the victors. The banishment of their leaders probably means a political revolution.

⁵ Hdt. ix. 77. The significance of the passage was, I think, first suggested to me by a remark of Mr. E. M. Walker's.

⁶ On Orestheum, or Oresthasium, and the road see Mr. W. Loring's excellent discussion

in this *Journal* vol. xv. (1895) pp. 26–31 and 47–52. It was a route not infrequently used by the Spartans when the Arcadians were hostile.

Another reason, closely related to the former, must also have contributed to recommend to the Spartans a policy of waiting. It suited the political situation in the Peloponnese and the conditions of the campaign much better to let Mardonius come as far south as possible rather than to march north to seek him. A distant expedition was not only much more difficult, but also greatly increased the risks which the Spartans were leaving behind them.

Moreover the Ephors may well have felt some uneasiness as to the loyalty of the Athenians. The same considerations which encouraged Mardonius to hope must have filled them with misgivings. No Alcmaeonid statesman from Megacles to Alcibiades had many scruples about throwing over principles and changing sides when it suited the interests of his party or himself. The Spartans had reason to remember the shiftiness of Cleisthenes. And even if the fidelity of the leaders were above suspicion, could they guarantee the steadfastness of an ill disciplined and inconstant Demos? Until Aristides had prevailed on the Athenians openly and definitely to reject the overtures of Mardonius, the Spartans may not have felt sure on which side the Athenian fleet might eventually be ranged.

Aristides and Xanthippus had indeed a difficult game to play. They had to carry out at the head of one party the policy proper to another, and many of their own followers must have been puzzled and dismayed at their conduct. To many the league with oligarchic Sparta must have seemed an unholy alliance, and no danger so great as absorption in her political system. The loss of their country seemed to put the Athenians in complete dependence on their ally. How could they reassert themselves but by coming to terms with the Persians? How far the tendency to Medism extended amongst them is not easy to say, but that it existed there can be little doubt. The repeated overtures of Mardonius awaken distrust. The embassy from Sparta is surely significant. The answers attributed to the Athenians are pitched in so loud a key of rhetoric that they inevitably rouse the suspicion which they are designed to allay. Had the loyalty of Athens been above cavil it would not have needed to be so vociferously asserted. Lycides, we may be sure, did not speak for himself alone. Plutarch (*Arist.* 13) tells a story, which is none the worse attested because it is not to be found in Herodotus, of a conspiracy among the Athenians at Plataea to overthrow the constitution and, if necessary, betray the Greek cause to the Barbarians. Plutarch speaking the language of a later day represents the plot as anti-democratic, but we may probably recognize in it a revolt of the Agrarian party, with which interpretation the extreme leniency shown by Aristides in dealing with the conspirators is quite in harmony. The presence of the *ναυτικοὶ* may have been needed to counteract the discontent of the sorely tried *ἀγροικοί*, and uphold the policy of Themistocles and the government against the temptations of Mardonius. In the retention of the fleet at Salamis we may see a symptom of the internal crisis through which the state was passing.

Possibly another motive may also have influenced the Athenian

government. After the victory of Salamis politicians so astute as Aristides and Xanthippus could not mistake their part. They were now as zealous in appropriating the ideas of Themistocles as they had before been in combating them. Themistocles had been eager to push on across the Aegean in the wake of the vanquished enemy, had already laid (or relaid) the foundations of the Athenian empire among the Cyclades, and had looked forward to an expedition in the spring against the Hellespont and Ionia (Hdt. viii. 108-112). The subsequent policy of Xanthippus and Aristides shows how completely they adopted his imperial schemes. But the Spartans, we may suppose, were opposed to offensive action by sea, and would have confined the rôle of the fleet to covering the flank of Greece against naval attacks. They checked the pursuit of Xerxes' fleet, and declined the invitation of the Chians. They would have preferred to leave Asia to the Persian (Hdt. ix. 106). Conscious of the limits imposed upon them by their peculiar institutions they were unwilling to incur responsibilities across the sea, and they were naturally averse to conquests for the benefit of a possible rival. The Athenian statesmen may have used the diplomatic advantage given them by the offers of Mardonius and the need of their fleet to bargain for a freer hand in Asia. The fleet may have been withheld partly in order to extort the assurances which they desired, and Leotychidas' acceptance of the Samian proposals may have been due to Athenian pressure as much as to Athenian reinforcements.

Alexander's negotiations with the Athenians, dramatically condensed by Herodotus, probably occupied several weeks. It may have been about the middle of June⁷ that Mardonius broke up his cantonments in Thessaly and took the road for the south. Presumably he had with him his own corps and the Thessalians. The other Greek auxiliaries would join on the march or in Boeotia. An order was doubtless dispatched to Artabazus to follow in support with all the troops that could be spared from the army of Thrace.

Herodotus (ix. 1, 3) assumes that the objective of Mardonius was Athens, and attributes to him some very inept motives for re-occupying the city. He asks us to believe that Mardonius had occupied, and (on receipt of the Argive message) evacuated Athens, before Pausanias and his force arrived at the isthmus (ix. 13, cf. 6, 7, 12). But it is clear from the compact with the Argives that Mardonius must originally have directed his march against the isthmus, and it is incredible that he should have wasted time on Athens, and missed his opportunity, if the isthmus was undefended or only weakly defended. If the Argives had fulfilled their promise and held back the Spartans in the Peloponnese, he would of course have carried the wall, and certainly would never have deviated down to Athens. The Spartans therefore must have arrived at the isthmus before Mardonius quitted Boeotia, and Herodotus has put the Athenian embassy, the Spartan march, and the

⁷ On the date see Busolt's argument, *Griech. Gesch.*² vol. ii. p. 722, note 2. But he makes too much of the story of the embassy to Sparta.

Argive message too late in his story. The message probably reached Mardonius not at Athens but at Thebes, and determined him not to evacuate but to occupy Athens. His two first plans had both miscarried. He had failed to seduce the Athenians, and the Spartans had safely got through to the isthmus. But if he occupied Athens and renewed his offers to the Athenians backed by the threat of thorough and instant devastation, he would raise such a ferment among them (cf. Thuc. ii. 20-1), and such alarm among their allies, as might compel the Spartans to come out to the rescue. Moreover the occupation of Attica was calculated to detain the Athenian navy at Salamis, while the Spartan advance would denude the Peloponnese of its strongest garrison. If the Persian fleet could defeat or evade Leotychidas at Delos, it might land troops in Argolis or elsewhere and provoke the contemplated outbreak. We may suppose that this idea, and not mere vainglory as Herodotus fancied, was the purpose of Mardonius' signals to Asia—*πυρροῖσι διὰ νήσων ἐδόκεε βασιλεὶ δηλώσειν ἔοντι ἐν Σάρδισι ὅτι ἔχοι Ἀθήνας* (ix. 3). Since almost all the Cyclades must by this time have been in the enemy's hands, the words *διὰ νήσων*, if significant at all, may be taken to mean the islands of the northern Aegean, and it is not unlikely that Aeschylus has preserved for us in his famous description of the beacon-chain from Ida to Argos (*Agam.* 281-314) the list of Mardonius' signal-stations. Aeschylus may of course have adapted the extremities, but it is not impossible that Mardonius signalled also to Argos.

The Greeks on their part were probably as eager to come forth as Mardonius could desire. We may conjecture that the details of the expedition had been settled between the Athenian envoys and Pausanias at Sparta. Herodotus' account of the embassy (ix. 7-11) clearly can not be treated as historical, and at best merely reflects Athenian impatience and gossip at Salamis. Pausanias waited at the isthmus only to give time for the Peloponnesian allies to join him. Mardonius by his sudden march southward had put a long gap between himself and his supports in Thrace. It was the obvious strategy for Pausanias to bring him to close quarters and force a battle before the arrival of Artabazus. Moreover by his advance to Athens Mardonius had, perhaps purposely, offered his enemy a chance of cutting him off from his base at Thebes. We are not told with what force he entered Attica, but probably the main bulk of his army had been left behind on the Asopus.

Pausanias accordingly pushed forward without waiting for belated contingents (Hdt. ix. 28, 38, 41). But Mardonius was forewarned, and after burning Athens had set his force in motion for Boeotia. The message which came to him at Athens must have been, not the Argive message as Herodotus fancied (ix. 12), but another, from the isthmus. His intention seems to have been to take the road through Eleutherae, by which he had probably come, but hearing on the march that the Spartan vanguard had already reached Megara, he changed his route and withdrew by way of Decelea and Sphendale to Tanagra, covering his left flank by a cavalry

demonstration in the Megarid, which was no doubt meant to head off the Peloponnesians from the direct roads to Thebes over Cithaeron.⁸ From Tanagra Mardonius gained Scolus, where he set to work to erect a stockade, (if that had not really been done during his absence, as we may suspect,) and camped his army in the plain of the Asopus. Pausanias moved out eastwards to Eleusis, where he picked up the Athenians, and then advanced north of Cithaeron and drew up his forces on the skirts of the mountain facing the enemy (Hdt. ix. 15, 19).

Mardonius, we have seen, may have had with him something like 80,000 men, of whom about a fourth part may have been cavalry. Artabazus with his 40,000 must have been still far away in the north, for Mardonius, hoping to anticipate the Spartans at the isthmus, had marched suddenly and fast—*ὥς οἱ ἀπονοστήσας Ἀλέξανδρος τὰ παρὰ Ἀθηναίων ἐσήμηνε, ὀρμηθεὶς ἐκ Θεσσαλίας ἡγετὴν στρατιὴν σπουδῇ ἐπὶ τὰς Ἀθήνας* (Hdt. ix. 1). The Greek army, when all or nearly all had come in, mustered according to Herodotus (ix. 28–30) 110,000 men, composed of 38,700 hoplites, 35,000 Helots, 34,500 other light-armed troops, and 1,800 Thespians. These figures have been much criticized. The Thespians are a rather obvious complement to make up the round number. The light-armed are confessedly a conjecture on the assumption of one for each non-Spartiate hoplite.⁹ The Helots are in extraordinary force—no parallel can be quoted for the proportion of seven to each Spartiate. The numbers of the hoplite contingents have been vigorously impugned,¹⁰ and their authenticity remains open to question. On the whole Herodotus' list looks like an estimate of the forces, heavy and light-armed, which the allies (except Athens and Sparta) might have furnished if their citizens had turned out *πανστρατιᾷ*. Although such an estimate is no historical record, and might be based on data of a later day—*e.g.* statistics of the contingents required of their allies by Sparta and Athens, or calculations, such as must have been much discussed at Athens at the opening of the Peloponnesian war (cf. Thuc. ii. 9), of the relative strength of the rival leagues—it can hardly be pretended that modern critics are in a position to form a better. But it may reasonably be doubted whether the entire levy was in every case present. Is allowance made for those serving on the fleet, as it is in the case of the Athenians? or in garrison, as it is in the case of the Spartans (cf. vii. 234)? At all events the conjectural number of light-armed is probably exaggerated, and it is scarcely to be believed that the Spartans took every available Helot. There was however, as Stein remarks, special need of light-armed troops on this

⁸ Hdt. ix. 14–15, cf. Paus. i. 44, 4. Herodotus does not see the point of the cavalry demonstration. For the site of Sphendale v. Milchhoefer *Karten von Attika*, *Text*, ix. pp. 27–28. As Hauvette, *Hérodote* pp. 453–4, justly contends against Delbrück, we need not take Herodotus to imply that all Mardonius' movements were crowded into a single day.

⁹ The redundancy of 800 has already been

explained above.

¹⁰ Notably by Beloch and Delbrück. If Beloch's ingenious suggestion, that *Παλῆες* in Hdt. ix. 28 is a misreading of *Φαλῆες*, could be accepted, it would much enforce the argument that the figures are conjectural, for 200 hoplites would be a natural contingent from Pale but not from Elis. But it is too venturesome.

campaign, and, it may be added, there was special reason for not leaving too many Helots at home. Herodotus repeats the number of Helots several times (ix. 10, 28, 29, 61). Possibly the great revolt made the Spartans more chary of using Helots in their later wars. After every allowance for exaggeration we may suppose that the two armies were approximately equal in numbers, although the Greeks had an advantage in their heavy armour and the Persians in their cavalry. But in view of the advent of Artabazus, we should expect that *cæteris paribus* Pausanias would press things to an issue, and Mardonius maintain the defensive.

Every interpretation of the campaign of Plataea must now take account of Dr. G. B. Grundy's valuable survey of the field and Prof. W. J. Woodhouse's brilliant criticism of Herodotus.¹¹ It is not necessary to labour points which these scholars have settled. But unfortunately much remains obscure, and Plataea must rank after the Scythian expedition and the Ionian revolt as the most difficult of Herodotus' detailed military narratives. At Salamis we can correct Herodotus by Aeschylus, at Marathon and Artemisium he supplies clues for his own emendation, at Thermopylae the topography comes to our aid. But at Plataea Herodotus has his say without much check, dark places remain in his story after all the elucidations of Prof. Woodhouse, and in spite of Dr. Grundy's researches the fixed points in the topography are still too few. What is here offered is mainly tentative suggestion, and on many difficulties I have nothing useful to say.

Our first question must be, where was Scolus? Mardonius, having reached Tanagra from Declea and Sphendale and spent a night there, turned to Scolus, where he was in Theban territory. There he built his wooden fort, more than a mile square, on the left flank, as appears from Herodotus' description (ix. 15), of his position on the Asopus, which extended from Erythrae past Hysiae into the Plataeid. Agesilaus in 376 B.C. (Xen. *Hell.* v. 4, 47-9, cf. Polyæn. ii. 1, 11) made a feint from Plataea in the direction of Thespieae, then doubled back on his tracks, and taking the road to Erythrae got inside the stockade at Scolus before the Thebans came back from their other frontier. He then proceeded to ravage the country as far as the bounds of Tanagraean territory. Strabo (408) describes Scolus as a village of the Parasopia under Cithaeron, *δυσολίκετος τόπος καὶ τραχύς*. Most explicit is Pausanias (ix. 4, 4), who says that if one turned off the road from Plataea to Thebes just before crossing the Asopus, and travelled down stream for about 40 stades, one came to the ruins of Scolus. Since he entered Thebes by the Electran gate (ix. 8, 7), he seems not to have followed the direct road through the plain, which is sometimes impassable,¹² and was perhaps bridgeless, but to have struck across onto the main road to Thebes from Megara, which probably coincided near Thebes with the road from Athens and Eleutherae, and was presumably the usual driving route between Plataea and

¹¹ Grundy, *The topography of the battle of Plataea*, 1894, *The great Persian War*, 1901. *Journal*, xviii, 1898, pp. 33-59.
¹² Leake, *Northern Greece*, ii. p. 324, Grundy, *Woodhouse, The Greeks at Plataiai* in this *Topography*, pp. 24, 50.

Thebes.¹³ Measured from the crossing of the river on this road Scolus ought to be about where Leake placed it, near the village of Darimari,¹⁴ and with this situation the other indications very well agree. But if so, Scolus must have lain close to the point where the roads from Athens by way of Phyle and from Eleusis by way of Oenoe and Panactum cross the Asopus. Mar-donius therefore built his fort, not (as Greek afterthought fancied, Hdt. ix. 15) to be a refuge in case of disaster, but to guard this important point on the river.

We have next to determine, if possible, the sites of Erythrae and Hysiae. The passages already quoted throw some light on them. It is clear from Xenophon that Erythrae lay on the road from Plataea or Thespieae to Scolus. It is clear from Herodotus (ix. 15, 19, 25) that Erythrae lay to the east of Hysiae. Pausanias here comes to our assistance with some welcome 'cross-bearings' on Hysiae. He says (ix. 1, 6) that when the Thebans marched to surprise Plataea in 373 B. C., the Boeotarch Neocles *σφᾶς αὐτίκα οὐ τὴν εὐθείαν ἀπὸ τῶν Θηβῶν τὴν πεδιάδα, τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ ῾Τσιᾶς ἦγε πρὸς ῾Ελευθερῶν τε καὶ τῆς ῾Αττικῆς*. Hysiae therefore was on the main road from Thebes to Athens by way of Eleutherae. This is the road by which Pausanias himself enters Boeotia (ix. 1, 1 and 2, 2). The branch to Plataea probably diverged from it at about the same point as the modern loop road through Kriekouki. Pausanias notes (ix. 2, 1) that the ruins of Hysiae and Erythrae (in that order) lay a little off the direct Plataea road, on the right. He appears to have made a loop to the right to visit Hysiae, where he notices an unfinished temple of Apollo and a sacred well. Probably he kept on down the Thebes road as far as Hysiae, and then back up the lower side of the Kriekouki loop to rejoin the Plataea road. Now close under the rocky base of Cithaeron and immediately to the right of the Thebes *chaussée* there is an ancient site marked by a great quantity of loose stones, traces of buildings, and (that surest of tests) Hellenic pottery, and crowned by the ruins of an old fortress on the rocks above.¹⁵ In view of the references in the ancient authorities there can be little doubt that this site represents Hysiae, as Leake suggested. Other passages in Herodotus support the identification—vi. 108, the Athenians *τοὺς οἱ Κορίνθιοι ἔθηκαν Πλαταιεῦσι εἶναι οὖρους, τούτους ὑπερβάντες τὸν ῾Ασωπὸν αὐτὸν ἐποίησαντο οὖρον Θηβαίοισι πρὸς Πλαταιέας εἶναι καὶ ῾Τσιᾶς*, obviously the Asopus on the north and Hysiae on the east of the Plataean territory. Leake's site would make a very natural frontier on the east—ix. 25, the Greeks move past Hysiae from their first position near Erythrae to their second position in the Plataeid. The road from Erythrae would lead them a little below Leake's site, or if they kept to the hills their natural point for crossing from the bastions of Cithaeron to the ridges out towards the Asopus would be just there. Thucydides iii. 24 presents a slight difficulty. The fugitive

¹³ On the Electran gate cf. Frazer's *Pausanias*, vol. v. p. 38.

¹⁴ Leake, *N. Greece*, ii. pp. 330-1. *Karten von Attika*, No. 10.

¹⁵ Leake, *N. Greece*, ii. pp. 327, 333. W. Irving Hunt in the *Amer. Journ. of Archae.* vi. 1890, p. 472, note 39. Grundy, *Topography*, p. 9, *Gr. Pers. War*, p. 458 note.

Plataeans turn out of the road to Thebes and take τὴν πρὸς τὸ ὄρος φέρουσιν ὁδὸν ἐς Ἐρυθρὰς καὶ Ῥαϊάς. Thucydides appears to invert the geographical order of the places, but his form of expression is not unnatural if we remember that the road was 'the Erythrae road' (cf. Xen. *l. c.*), and that Hysiae lay a little off it on the Eleutherae road. His phrase may be paralleled on a hundred guideposts. For Erythrae, which is rather less prominent in history than Hysiae, no better site has been suggested than Leake's, who puts it at Katsula, a hamlet about two miles east of the proposed Hysiae. If this distance seems to any to overstrain Pausanias' words ὀλίγον τῆς εὐθείας ἐκτραπεῖσιν, (which I do not feel that it does), it may be urged that Pausanias does not appear to have gone on to Erythrae, and may well have accommodated his expression to the nearer of the two places. In a general view, *e.g.* a retrospect from Thebes, it would be the conjunction not the separation of the two villages that would impress itself on the memory (cf. Euripides, *Bacchae*, 748-54).

Our topographical investigation has led us to adopt Leake's sites for Scolus, Erythrae, and Hysiae. Dr. Grundy has, I venture to believe, been misled partly by a prepossession as to the first position of the Greek army, and partly by a misapprehension as to the ancient roads across Cithaeron. To begin with the latter, Dr. Grundy clearly distinguishes and marks on his map three passes: (1) the Eleutherae, or so-called Dryoscephalae,¹⁶ pass; (2) a pass about one mile to the west of it, which he calls the Plataea-Athens pass; (3) another pass about a mile and a quarter to the west of the second, and one mile or less from Plataea, which he calls the Plataea-Megara pass. Dr. Grundy's special interest in Plataea has led him to view these routes primarily in relation to it. But however prominent in history, Plataea was after all but a little town, which did not determine the course of the main roads, or their nomenclature. If we would see them in their true bearings we must start from Thebes. There were two great highways from Thebes over Cithaeron, although they probably coincided for a short distance out of the city. The first was the road to Eleusis and Athens through the 'Dryoscephalae' pass. This was the road to, or from, or through, Eleutherae, and no other could be so described. The second was the main road to Megara and the Peloponnese. It ran probably a little to the west of Kriekouki, and traversed Dr. Grundy's second pass to Vilia, which may be identified with the Megarian village of Ereneia, and thence over Mt. Karydes to Megara. This road did not touch Attic territory (Xen. *Hell.* v. 4, 19), and had therefore great political importance. There was a branch from this road to Plataea from the northern exit of the pass, where Dr. Grundy has discovered its wheel-ruts. The rough track through the third pass can be nothing else than another branch used as a short cut by travellers from Megara to Plataea on foot or on horseback. Travellers driving from Megara to Plataea would take the other branch from the second pass. Travellers driving from Thebes

¹⁶ I am not convinced that the Eleutherae pass has any exclusive right to the name Dryoscephalae. Herodotus, ix. 39, seems to apply it

to the whole group of passes, and Thucydides, iii. 24, is quite consistent with this interpretation.

to Plataea would probably follow the Megara road to a point near Leake's Gargaphia, and there find another branch up to the town, by which we have supposed Pausanias to have journeyed in the reverse direction. Doubtless there were also cross routes between the two great roads. The southern side of the Kriekouki loop is an obvious one, and has been already suggested for Pausanias' direct road to Plataea from the Eleutheræ pass. Perhaps there was another higher up the mountain near the brow of the ridge, where there seems to be a modern cross cut. In particular it was no doubt possible for a traveller from Attica to cross the frontier from the valley south of Eleutheræ to the Megarian road at Vilia, and so up to Plataea. But to treat this route as the ordinary Plataea-Athens road seems to me to be a gratuitous perversion. Whether Pausanias at Plataea (ix. 2, 3) means by the road from Megara the branch from the second pass or the short cut through the third, is unimportant for the general question. To Cleombrotus (Xen. *Hell.* v. 4. 14), advancing presumably from Megara, 'the road to Plataea' was naturally the road by Vilia; the particular branch is again of little moment, but Dr. Grundy is probably right in sending him through his second pass. Xenophon's words *τὴν μὲν οὖν δι' Ἐλευθερῶν ὁδὸν Χαβρίας ἔχων Ἀθηναίων πελταστὰς ἐφύλαττεν· ὁ δὲ Κλεόμβροτος ἀνέβαινε κατὰ τὴν εἰς Πλαταιὰς φέρουσαν* give the reason, not of Cleombrotus' choice of this route, for he could hardly have contemplated any other, but of the fact that he did not encounter Chabrias. Why Dr. Grundy takes him almost to Eleutheræ, and how he gets him there without violating Attic territory, I cannot understand. So much for the roads over Cithæron, which have a not unimportant influence on the campaign, but may be dismissed with this summary treatment because no one who has read Prof. Milchhoefer's authoritative account¹⁷ of the country south of the range requires much further explanation.

We come now to the problem of the first position of the Greek army. If we accept Leake's site for Erythrae, and Herodotus' statement (ix. 19) that the first position of the Greeks was there, we have to account for their taking up this somewhat inconvenient station. The ground was, to be sure, inassailable for the most part by cavalry (Hdt. ix. 21)—which shows that the army must have been drawn up along the top of the rocks which overhang the Hysiae-Scolus road¹⁸—but water was scarce (Hdt. ix. 25), communications must have been difficult, and supplies precarious. Herodotus unfortunately gives no details of the Greek movement from Eleusis to Erythrae. It has been generally assumed that it followed the Eleutheræ road. But it would be strange if Mardonius made no attempt to hold the Eleutheræ and Vilia passes. By doing so he would secure his own retirement from Attica, gain time for Artabazus to come up, and force Pausanias farther eastwards, that is to say farther away from his base at the isthmus. We have already seen that before quitting Attica he flung his cavalry into the Megarid, probably with the object of checking any advance by these routes, and Hero-

¹⁷ In the text to *Karten von Attika*, ix. § iv, *Rapport. (Nouv. arch. d. missions scient. et littér. 1892)* p. 369.

¹⁸ Leake, *N. Greece*, ii. pp. 327-30. Hauvette,

dotus' statement (ix. 15), that part of his position lay in the Plataean territory, can only mean that his right wing was thrown forward for the defence of the passes. I would suggest that Pausanias may have contented himself with a mere demonstration on the Eleutheræ road, and marched with the bulk of his forces by Oenoe, Panactum, and the Portaes pass, with the idea of turning the Persian left flank and crossing the Asopus at Scolus. Here he was checked by the stockade, and deployed his army to the left along the base of the mountain, continually extending his left flank to the westward as the troops came into line. By this manœuvre he would threaten to cut the enemy's centre near Hysiae, and force him to withdraw his right wing and evacuate the roads over Cithaeron.

Herodotus gives no precise indication¹⁹ of the spot at which the conflict with the Persian cavalry occurred, or in what part of the Greek line the Megarians were stationed. The scene may possibly be laid at the little valley between Katsula and Bubuka, up which the German map marks a path. But it is a tempting conjecture that the encounter was near Hysiae,²⁰ and that Mardonius was covering with his cavalry on the Eleutheræ road the withdrawal of his right wing to the Asopus by the Megara road. We may perhaps suppose that the Greek contingents held the same relative stations as afterwards in their second position (Hdt. ix. 28). If so, the Megarians were presumably the last deployed troops, and thus temporarily formed the extreme left of the army at the moment of the Persian attack. The [Plataeans and] Athenians would be the next to come up, and on them naturally fell the duty of relieving the Megarians. Aristides rightly pushed forward his most active corps [of hoplites?] and his archers to the rescue as soon as he learnt that the Megarians were in distress. The main body came upon the scene later.

It is characteristic of Herodotus' history that whereas he is blankly ignorant of the strategic manœuvres of the Greek army, he knows all the details of this skirmish. The reason has been generally recognized. The hero of the day was Olympiodorus, son of Lampon, and father no doubt of the more famous Lampon, who played a part in the foundation of Thurii. Herodotus probably had relations with the family, and heard the story from some member of it. It is likely that it lost nothing in the telling, but the details may be trusted. Hence it is worth noting²¹ that the body of Masistius is carried along the Greek lines on a cart (ix. 25), a touch which fits in very well with the road close along the front of the army. The breastplate of Masistius is doubtless described from the original in the Erechtheum (Paus. i. 27, 1), and the tradition which hung about it may have contributed to the tale.

If our interpretation of the action may be accepted, the importance of the repulse of the cavalry lay in the fact that it cleared the Hysiae gap

¹⁹ The words *ἐς Ἐρυθρὰς* in Hdt. ix. 22 qualify *παρόντων*, not *ταχθέντες*.

²⁰ Much where Dr. Grundy puts it. The words *ὡς οὐ κατέβαινον οἱ Ἕλληνες ἐς τὸ πεδίον* (Hdt. ix. 20) are no objection, and Hysiae is

not too far west of Erythrae if we remember how long the Greek front must have been.

²¹ Cf. W. I. Hunt, *Amer. Journ. of Archae.* vi. 1890, p. 473.

between the bastions of Cithaeron and the hills to the north-west, and so opened the way for the next move. Mardonius had been taken by surprise and manœuvred out of the Plataeid. He fell back behind the Asopus leaving the passes in the hands of the Greeks. Pausanias was encouraged to continue his advance towards the west, and attempt to carry out on the enemy's right flank the turning movement which had been foiled on his left. The credit of having first seen the meaning of the change of position is due to Dr. Grundy.

The Greek army moved down past Hysiae into Plataean territory. Herodotus (ix. 25) describes its new station as *πλησίον τῆς τε κρήνης τῆς Γαργαφίης καὶ τοῦ τεμένεος τοῦ Ἀνδροκράτεος τοῦ ἥρωος, διὰ ὄχθων τε οὐκ ὑψηλῶν καὶ ἀπέδου χώρου*. Hauvette and Woodhouse²² seem to me to be right in putting the shrine of Androcates at the church of S. John (see Dr. Grundy's map). Thucydides (iii. 24) says that the fugitives from Plataea *ἐχώρουν ἀθρόοι τὴν ἐς Θήβας φέρουσαν ὁδὸν ἐν δεξιᾷ ἔχοντες τὸ τοῦ Ἀνδροκράτους ἥρῳον*, then after proceeding for six or seven stades along this road they turned towards Erythrae. The words *ἐν δεξιᾷ ἔχοντες τὸ τοῦ Ἀνδροκράτους ἥρῳον*, although grammatically constructed with the subject *οἱ Πλαταιῆς*, really describe the *road*, which Thucydides wishes to distinguish from the *other* road to Thebes,²³ which passed to the *right* of the shrine. This latter was, after the first mile and a half out of Plataea, simply the highway from Megara to Thebes. It was probably the ordinary route for vehicles, and we have already seen reason to suppose that Pausanias the traveller used it. The road taken by the fugitives on the contrary was the direct road over the plain to the Asopus, and passed to the *left* of the chapel of Androcates. The distance traversed by the Plataeans is therefore immaterial for the position of the shrine. What is important is the prominence of that position, which made the chapel a landmark on the right of the road. The church of S. John is the most conspicuous site which can be suggested. Plutarch's description (*Arist.* 11) also to my mind conveys the idea of a conspicuous point in a general view of the field.²⁴

For the fountain Gargaphia there are according to Dr. Grundy two and only two possible sites—either the Apotripi spring close under the church of S. John, or 'Leake's Gargaphia,' a spring about half a mile to the east of the Apotripi. Too much stress must not be laid on the measurements given by Herodotus, which are obviously in round numbers—10 stades or 20 stades, a mile or a couple of miles. There is practically nothing to choose between the

²² Hauvette *Rapport* pp. 370-1. Woodhouse, *J.H.S.* xviii. 1898, pp. 38-40.

²³ Similarly Pausanias in a passage already quoted (ix. 1, 6) is at pains to distinguish from the direct road the still more roundabout route through Hysiae.

²⁴ Plutarch probably knew the ground at least as well as Herodotus or Thucydides. Objection has been taken (*e.g.* Leake, *N. Greece*, ii. p. 366, note; Grundy, *Topography*, p. 35,

note, *Gt. Persian War*, pp. 496-8) to his grouping together Hysiae, the temple of Demeter, and the chapel of Androcates. But it ought to be remembered that he is preoccupied with the oracle and inclined to stretch a point in its favour, and that he is describing the scene on a panoramic scale. Dr. Grundy (*Topography*, p. 3) notes how the mass of Cithaeron falsifies impressions of distance at Plataea.

two springs as regards distance from the 'Island' and the probable site of the Heraeum. Prof. Woodhouse prefers Apotripi, Dr. Grundy Leake's Gargaphia. I agree with Leake and Dr. Grundy for the following reasons. (1) Gargaphia is introduced into Herodotus' narrative as a familiar landmark, which needed no description to identify or locate it. But Apotripi is hidden away in a hollow beside the comparatively little frequented road to Thespiae, whereas Leake's spring must have lain close not merely to this road, but also to the main highroad from Megara and the Peloponnese to Thebes, and just at the probable junction of the branch from Plataea. It was in fact the most important meeting-point of roads in the whole Plataean territory, and doubtless well known to all wayfarers in that thirsty land. (2) Gargaphia lay near the right of the Greek position (Hdt. ix. 49). But we cannot believe that Pausanias had relinquished his hold on the Megara road, the main artery of his communications. The Spartans must have occupied the valley of Dr. Grundy's stream A. 4 on their right flank, and probably the hill beyond it on which stands the church of S. Demetrius. The enemy's cavalry, to whom the Eleutheræ road lay open, raided freely round the right of the Greek line (Hdt. ix. 38-9). It would not be difficult for them, by a combined attack along the Megara road on the Spartan front and a turning raid round their right flank, to get momentary possession of Leake's Gargaphia, whereas the Apotripi spring would be considerably harder to reach, and to get away from, without being intercepted. (3) Leake's fountain agrees much better with the distance (Hdt. ix. 57) to what I regard as the probable site of the temple of Demeter.

Wherever Gargaphia and the chapel of Androcrates be placed, it is evident that only the right wing of the Greek army could be near them. The Greek line can hardly have been less than three miles long. Where was the left wing? Perhaps Herodotus' Athenian informants preferred not to be too explicit about their countrymen's share in this part of the operations. After Prof. Woodhouse's analysis of the Athenian element in the narrative it is unnecessary to demonstrate its influence and character in detail. The prominence of the Athenians in the opening and closing encounters is paraded before us, but between these valorous feats all their best endeavours seem to be frustrated by the cowardice of their allies. We are given to understand that it was owing to the timidity of the Spartans that nothing came of the advance, and owing to their losing hold of both the water and the food supply of the army that retreat became inevitable. The retreat itself nearly proved disastrous through the flight of the Greek centre and the insubordination of a Spartan captain. The Athenians suffered for the sins of their confederates! Now anyone who has studied the controversial methods of that amiable people will easily divine that the 'tendency' underlying these chapters is an attempt to shift the blame of the failure on to other shoulders, and can, I think, form some conception of what probably happened. The general idea of the advance seems to have been to force the passage of the Asopus at the crossing of the direct road from Plataea to Thebes, the road over the plain. As it had to be carried out in face of the enemy, the movement from the first

position may have been made by brigades. The Athenians, who formed the left wing, would stand fast near Hysiae, while the Lacedaemonians moved from the right, passed behind them, and occupied the plateau and hills to the west as far as the Megara road. Then the centre would move to the ridge on which stands the church of S. John. Finally the Athenians would push rapidly along the Thespieae road behind this screen of hills and troops into the plain of Plataea, and make a dash for the ford. Such a manœuvre would account for the extraordinary story of the change of wings, worked up in Herodotus' narrative (ix. 46-7) to the glory of the Athenians and discredit of the Spartans. But however the movement was managed, we find the Athenians still on the left flank and to them must have fallen the honourable responsibility of leading the advance across the river. Once across they would take the Persians on their right flank while the other Greeks assailed them in front. What happened is of course not told. It looks as if the Athenians had quailed before the task, and instead of rushing the ford had taken refuge from the enemy's cavalry on the Pyrgos hill at the western edge of the plain, leaving a gap of a mile of level ground between them and the centre. Pausanias then had to close the gap by moving the centre down into the plain, and shifting the Lacedaemonians along to the station vacated by it on the 'Asopus ridge' (v. Dr. Grundy's map). This hypothesis may appear somewhat adventurous, but it would explain three facts which present no small difficulty. First, the fact that Pausanias entirely abandoned the Eleutherae road to the enemy, although he thereby risked the loss of his communications and the fate of the whole army. Second, the fact that the Greek centre appears to have borne the brunt of the Persian attacks on the position, and to have been harassed, if we may believe Herodotus, to the verge of demoralization. Third, the fact that the Athenians, when they start to retire to the Island, begin by *descending into the plain* (Hdt. ix. 56).

At all events the forward movement failed miserably, leaving the Greeks in a very critical situation, and the Athenians, who led it, must bear the chief blame for the failure. There was nothing for it but to withdraw to a safe defensive position covering the passes of Cithaeron. This necessity must have become obvious at once. The attempt to cross the Asopus, if it was to succeed at all, must have followed instantly on the advance, or rather formed part of it. The Persian counter-attack on the Greek communications surely cannot have been long delayed. It is almost incredible that Pausanias can have stayed on in his perilous situation for nearly a fortnight, as the ordinary interpretation of Herodotus demands. Prof. Woodhouse's chronology of the campaign,²⁵ which would limit the occupation of the second position to three days, seems to be much more probable.

The new position to which the retreat was to be directed is given by Herodotus (ix. 51) as 'the Island.' The earlier modern explorers boggled a little about describing as an island what is really only a peninsula, but the

²⁵ *J.H.S.* xviii. 1898, p. 57, note B.

Greeks were less pedantic, *e.g.* Peloponnesus, Arctonnesus,²⁶ or indeed *chersonesus*. The description in Herodotus is too precise to leave much room for difference of opinion as to the site, and the general identification of the Island has never been seriously in doubt since the topography was first investigated. But whereas the earlier travellers fix their attention on the lower part of the strip so designated, Dr. Grundy has justly insisted upon the far better defensive character of the upper part, the ridges at the foot of Cithaeron as opposed to the flat meadow in the Plataean plain. There can be little doubt that Dr. Grundy is right in his contention that this upper part of the Island was the position intended by Pausanias and his staff. The earlier explorers were misled by the statements of Herodotus (ix. 51) that the Island is ten stades from the Asopus, and in front of the city of the Plataeans. But the words *πρὸ τῆς Πλαταιέων πόλιος* naturally mean not north of Plataea but *east*, the side from which most travellers (especially Athenians) approached the city. The sentence *ἥ δὲ ἐστὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἀσωποῦ καὶ τῆς κρήνης τῆς Γαργαφίης, ἐπ' ἣ ἐστρατοπεδεύοντο τότε, δέκα σταδίου ἀπέχουσα* is more difficult. Dr. Grundy is driven to suppose that by the Asopus is meant in this passage the tributary stream which he labels A. 1. Prof. Woodhouse suggests that *κ'* (20) has dropped out of the text before *καί*, and if we insist upon finding a topographical fact in the statement this solution seems to be the best. But I suspect that the real explanation is psychological. The Lacedaemonians alone were posted near the fountain Gargaphia (ix. 49, 50). The rest of the Greek line stretched away north-westwards towards the Asopus (ix. 49), and the Athenians formed the extreme left. A measurement from the Asopus would have suggested, what was true, that the Athenians ought to have occupied the Island. A measurement from Gargaphia suggested, what was false, that the Lacedaemonians ought to have done so. If, as is fairly obvious, Herodotus' source for these chapters was Athenian, there was sufficient reason for the equivocal and invidious turn given to the sentence—'the Island is distant from the Asopus or rather from the fountain Gargaphia, at which they were then encamped, about a mile.'

For the idea attributed by Herodotus to the council of war, and doubtless insidiously suggested to him by his disingenuous informants, that the *whole* Greek army was to move to the Island, is surely absurd. So large a force could not be crowded onto so narrow a ground, and the main purpose of the movement, the recovery of the passes, would have been barely half attained. It is significant that this purpose is represented in Herodotus' narrative as merely secondary—to rescue a particular convoy by a sortie, as it were, from the Island, after that position had been occupied! But it is clear from Herodotus himself that only the Athenians were to go to the Island. Prof. Woodhouse has pointed out that the centre, in spite of the Athenian story of its panic, took up its proper station in good order at the

²⁶ It does not affect my point that the termination of these and similar words may prove to have nothing to do with *νήσος*, but to be the

-assos or *-essos* so common in Anatolian names, for the Greeks certainly took it for *νήσος*.

Heraeum, and that the movement of the right wing was directed to quite another quarter of the field.

The probable site of the Heraeum is marked by a large temple discovered by the American excavators in the northern part of the ruins of Plataea. It lies to the east of the fortified north-west corner of the town, which has been identified by Dr. Grundy as the citadel and original (or at least fifth century) Plataea.²⁷ Herodotus (ix. 52) says of the Heraeum τὸ δὲ πρὸ τῆς πόλιος ἐστὶ τῆς Πλαταιέων, εἴκοσι σταδίου ἀπὸ τῆς κρήνης τῆς Γαργαφίης ἀπέχον. The distance, twenty stades, is somewhat exaggerated for a bee-line measurement, but is not far wrong if it be taken as a sum of two reckonings, (1) from Gargaphia to the Mound on the Island (see Dr. Grundy's map), (2) from the Mound to the Heraeum. The description 'in front of the city of the Plataeans' is perfectly appropriate if *πρὸ* means 'east of' as we have already proposed. Now the Greek centre took up its new station *πρὸ τοῦ ἱεροῦ*, 'in front of the temple,' and these words again naturally indicate the east, whether we think of the general direction or of the orientation of the building. We may suppose therefore that the fortifications of Plataea, which were doubtless still defensible although the town had been burnt by Xerxes (Hdt. viii. 50), were to cover the left flank of the new position, and the contingents which had composed the centre were now to form the left wing, and were drawn up between the Heraeum and the Island.

The course taken by the Lacedaemonians and Tegeans on the right must be inferred from the spot on which the battle was fought, and that depends on the situation to be assigned to the river Moloeis and the temple of Demeter Eleusinia, for Herodotus' third landmark, Ἀργιόπιος χώρος καλεόμενος, gives us no clue. Dr. Grundy's second suggestion²⁸ for the river Moloeis, viz. the stream which he calls A. 6, seems much the most probable. It is the largest stream of the neighbourhood after the Asopus and Oeroe, and the most likely to have had an independent name. But there are many streams, and the really decisive point must be the temple of Demeter. Dr. Grundy, followed by Prof. Woodhouse, puts this temple at the church of S. Demetrius on the hill between his streams A. 4 and A. 5. Of course modern names often preserve an echo of ancient, and many a pagan deity has become a saint. But S. Demetrius is a particularly common saint, e.g. there is another (ruined) church dedicated to him just outside the wall of Plataea,²⁹ and modern sites do not always exactly correspond to ancient even when they preserve their names. The church of S. Demetrius is only $4\frac{1}{2}$ stades from Gargaphia, whereas Herodotus (ix. 57, cf. 49, 51, 52) implies that the temple of Demeter was about 10 stades from the fountain (which is evidently the starting-point of his measurements). On the other hand it is fully $7\frac{1}{2}$ stades from the probable Moloeis, whereas Herodotus implies that the

²⁷ H. S. Washington, *Amer. Journ. of Archae.* vii. 1891, pp. 392-404. Grundy, *Topography*, pp. 54-61.

²⁸ *Gt. Pers. War*, p. 495.

²⁹ *Amer. Journ. of Archae.* vi. 1890, p. 110.

temple was quite near the river. Now beside a well a few yards west of the Eleutherae road, and close under the rocky foot of Cithaeron, two inscriptions have been found, which relate to the worship of Demeter, and seem to date from the early part of the fifth century B. C.³⁰ They do not of course prove that there was a temple of Demeter on the exact spot where they were found, but the natural presumption is that there was one not far off. This presumption is confirmed by Plutarch's description (*Arist.* 11) of the situation of the temple on the field of battle—*τῶν Ῥσιῶν πλησίον ὑπὸ τὸν Κιθαιρῶνα ναὸς ἐστὶν ἀρχαῖος πάνυ Δήμητρος Ἐλευσινίας καὶ Κόρης προσαγορευόμενος. εὐθὺς οὖν παραλαβὼν τὸν Ἀριστείδην ἤγεεν ἐπὶ τὸν τόπον εὐφύστατον ὄντα παρατάξαι φάλαγγα πεζικὴν ἵπποκρατουμένοις, διὰ τὰς ὑπωρείας τοῦ Κιθαιρῶνος ἄφιππα ποιούσας τὰ καταλήγοντα καὶ συγκυροῦντα τοῦ πεδίου πρὸς τὸ ἱερόν.* There can be no question that Plutarch means the same temple as Herodotus. He describes it as situated at the edge of the rocky foot of Cithaeron near Hysiae, that is to say in the very neighbourhood to which the evidence of the inscriptions points. If it stood at the northern extremity of the village of Kriekouki, it would be about 11 stades from Gargaphia, within 2 stades of our supposed Moloeis, and about 6 stades from the site already assigned to Hysiae. This position also well accords with what Herodotus says of the course taken by the Corinthians and other Greeks who came from near the Heraeum to the assistance of the Lacedaemonians and Tegeans (ix. 69)—*οἱ μὲν ἰμφὶ Κορινθίους ἐτράποντο διὰ τῆς ὑπωρέης καὶ τῶν κολωνῶν τὴν φέρουσαν ἄνω ἰθὺ τοῦ ἱεροῦ τῆς Δήμητρος*—where *ἄνω* signifies, not that the road went uphill, but that it was the *upper* road over the ridges of Cithaeron, not the lower road at the bottom of the slope. The attack of the Persian cavalry with which the day opened (*Hdt.* ix. 57) is not inconsistent with Plutarch's description of the ground, for there is no indication that it was pressed to close quarters. The cavalry drove in Amompharetus, and doubtless harassed the Lacedaemonians with their arrows (cf. ix. 49), but this skirmishing is probably magnified by Herodotus' informants in order to give colour to the obviously apocryphal message from Pausanias to the Athenians which follows (ix. 60). It is significant that the cavalry takes no part in the actual battle, but reappears during the Persian flight to the stockade (ix. 68). Pausanias wisely refused to be drawn from his strong defensive position on the rocky ground until the Persian infantry was fairly engaged.

If we have rightly identified the site of the temple of Demeter and the battle, certain important consequences result from it. It is evident in the first place that the Greek right wing reached its proper allotted station, and was not overtaken by the enemy on its march as Herodotus was given to understand. The notion (*Hdt.* ix. 56) that the Lacedaemonians were making for the Island by this roundabout route in order to be secure against the enemy's cavalry is simply an Athenian misconception or rather misrepre-

³⁰ *C.I.G.* vii. 1670, 1671. Grundy, *Topography*, p. 9; *Gt. Pers. War*, p. 458, note. Frazer, *Pausanias*, vol. v. p. 5.

sentation designed to involve them too in the blame of not having carried out orders. For in the second place it becomes clear what was the new position which the generals intended to occupy. The left was to be covered by the walls of Plataea, the right was to rest upon Hysiae or the high bastions of Cithaeron above it, the centre was to occupy the Island, and perhaps the next ridge to the east of it. It is evident in the third place that this central station was assigned to the Athenians, and that they alone of the three divisions failed to take up their post. What hindered them of course we are not allowed to know. The excuse put forward in Herodotus (ix. 54) —*εἶχον ἀτρέμας σφέας αὐτοὺς ἵνα ἐτάχθησαν, ἐπιστάμενοι τὰ Λακεδαιμονίων φρονήματα ὥς ἄλλα φρονούντων καὶ ἄλλα λεγόντων*—is justly stigmatized by Prof. Woodhouse as transparently false. The most charitable explanation is that they were delayed by the slow procession of the old centre (new left wing) across their path. But it ill accords with the precipitate flight ascribed to that body in their own version of the retreat, and their obvious anxiety to throw blame on their allies suggests a more discreditable reason. Perhaps we may take a hint from their recriminations on the Lacedaemonians, and infer that it was fear of the enemy's cavalry that deterred them,³¹ for the Athenians, if our conjecture as to their starting-point may be accepted, had to cross the open plain north of Plataea to gain the Island. Finally the tenacity of Amompharetus assumes a very different character from that attributed to it in the Athenian tradition. Prof. Woodhouse has argued that Amompharetus and his company were left behind to cover the retirement of the right wing. One might go further and suggest that the delay of the Lacedaemonians, and the messages which passed between Pausanias and the Athenians (Hdt. ix. 54–5, 60), are best explained on the hypothesis that the Spartan general waited as long as possible in order to protect the movement of his allies to the Island, and that Amompharetus was ordered to hold the Megara road at the valley north-east of Gargaphia till the last moment as much in their interest as in that of the Spartans themselves. If so, the treatment of that gallant officer in the Athenian story is peculiarly infamous.

Sunrise found the two Greek wings in position, but separated by a gap of a mile's breadth which ought to have been filled by the Athenians, still trailing across the Plataean plain. Like their own Amompharetus the Athenians would seem to have come to their senses only when they realised that Pausanias was in very deed leaving them to their fate. The Persian attack on the Lacedaemonians must have been developed along the two main roads to the passes, the attack on the Athenians along the direct road from Thebes to Plataea. Hence the centre at the Heraeum, when it goes to the support of the wings, splits into two sections, of which the one turns (eastwards) along the slope of Cithaeron, the other makes (northwards) over the plain, *τὴν λειοτάτην τῶν ὁδῶν* (Hdt. ix. 69). The isolation of the three

³¹ If the left wing was indeed a coveted post of honour (Hdt. ix. 26–28) the Athenians may also have resented being ordered out of it, however richly they deserved the degradation.

divisions of the enemy, which had lost all touch with one another, was an opportunity such as no general could have neglected. Mardonius must have thought he had the Greek army at his mercy, and theoretically he ought to have won an overwhelming victory. What saved the day was the steady discipline of the Lacedaemonian hoplites, and the masterly judgment of Pausanias in timing his charge.

Mardonius in fact was unfortunate in his opportunity. It brought about what Pausanias had doubtless hoped for when he pressed forward from the isthmus over Cithaeron—a pitched battle on something like equal terms. For the part played by Artabazus in Herodotus' story is hardly to be taken as strictly historical. The dramatic instinct of the writer demands a foil to the infatuation of Mardonius and finds it in him. He is one more impersonation of a stock character in Herodotus' repertoire. What Solon is to Croesus, Croesus to Cyrus, Artabanus and Demaratus to Xerxes (to mention only a few of the examples), that is Artabazus to Mardonius. Artabazus and his 40,000 men took no part in the battle (Hdt. ix. 66). Did he ever effect his junction with Mardonius? I think it more probable that he was still several marches in the rear, but Herodotus (or his informant³²) has construed his absence into prudence. The victory of the Greeks is glorious enough without exaggerating the numbers of their enemy.

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³² Busolt, *Griech. Gesch.* II.², p. 713, note 1, relations with the family of Artabazus. conjectures that Herodotus may have had